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Since 2004, the Government of Nepal has sought to increase availability of comprehensive 
emergency obstetric and neonatal care (CEONC) services at district hospitals.  However, 
significant and persistent bottlenecks exist in the health system which prevent effective scale-
up. A “quick fix” strategy to address bottlenecks and ensure that hospitals had resources to 
deliver CEONC 24/7 was the creation of a “CEONC Fund” to “top-up” routine hospital budgets. 
The intention was the CEONC fund should only be used for CEONC services, not for any other 
hospital purpose. In 2015, the government decided to include the fund as a long-term policy 
and expand its availability to all district hospitals. However, routine data on fund utilisation 
and service data is limited. What is available indicates that utilisation varies substantially by 
hospital and actual provision of CEONC services also varies widely.   
This study aimed to understand why some district hospitals achieve a better provision of 
CEONC services than others. It employed a multiple case study design, purposefully selecting 
four district hospitals using an extreme case selection framework. It triangulated data from 
the districts with semi-structured interviews from central level key informants.  
The study results show provision of the fund to hospitals has limited impact on CEONC 
availability.  Several other factors in hospitals and the health system have greater influence 
on uptake of funding and service availability. The conclusion is, not only is a CEONC fund grant 
alone insufficient to ensure service availability, several other critical factors need to be taken 
into consideration to ensure that CEONC services are consistently and universally available. 
CEONC availability is heavily influenced by the quality of leadership and management of the 
hospitals and their capacity to maintain or develop the service as financial resources permit. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care (CEONC) 
Maternal mortality is a public health problem. According to the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) globally, 800 women die daily from preventable causes related to pregnancy and 
childbirth, with 99% in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) (WHO, 2014a). One proven 
strategy for addressing maternity mortality is to provide access to basic emergency obstetric 
and neonatal services (BEONC) and referral to comprehensive emergency obstetric and 
neonatal services (CEONC).   BEONC services comprise, provision of parenteral oxytocics, 
antibiotics and anticonvulsants; assisted deliveries; manual extraction of the placenta; 
removal of retained products and CEONC services comprise all those for BEONC plus 
caesarean section and blood transfusion (Campbell et al, 2006; Fournier et al, 2009).  
CEONC provision, and in particular caesarean, has been developed in clinical practice as a life-
saving procedure both for mother and baby. In 1985, the WHO set a target caesarean rate of 
10–15% as theoretically optimal for balancing health outcomes and resource use (Betran et 
al, 2007). Additionally, a minimum necessary caesarean rate at population level was 
identified. This was 5% of normal births to avoid death and severe morbidity in the mother 
and up to 10% of normal births to show improvements in neonatal outcomes (Gibbons et al, 
2010). Importantly, studies also showed maximum optimum caesarean rates i.e. whilst health 
outcomes improve with a rising caesarean rate when that rate is below 15%, they decline 
when it rises above 15% (Betran et al, 2007).  
1.2 Management of health services 
In LMICs coverage and provision of CEONC services is affected by many factors. Implicit in the 
definition of CEONC is that services are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (24/7) (Bailey 
et al, 2006; Paxton et al 2006; Worku et al, 2013). However, actual service provision varies 
greatly. The expectation is that on arrival at a health facility a mother will have access to the 
requisite medical care. This is frequently unmet. Bailey et al found, in their 2006 study on 
availability of life-saving obstetric services in 13 countries, that most hospitals were not fully 
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providing services. These countries included Nepal and others with similar health system 
challenges (e.g. India, Kenya and Mali).  
Impediments to access exist on both the demand and supply for services. Demand 
impediments include, distance to services, cost, lack of information and cultural acceptability 
(including language barriers) (Tanahashi, 1978; Ensor et al, 2004). Supply impediments 
include inadequate operational management and health systems bottlenecks (Kerber et al, 
2007) 1 . Bottlenecks include limited or poorly trained staff, inadequate or intermittent 
financing; poor infrastructure, lack of drugs or equipment and suboptimal clinical practice 
(Rana et al, 2007; Kurniawan et al, 2013; Baker et al, 2014). A study covering Benin, Ecuador, 
Jamaica, and Rwanda showed a wide gap between current evidence based standards and 
current levels of provider competence (Harvey et al, 2004; Harvey et al, 2007). Many such 
bottlenecks affect the provision of CEONC services in Nepal.  
In 2008, Puoane et al identified that a conjunction of favourable factors within a health facility 
could significantly affect quality of care and service provision. These included in-service 
training, induction of new staff, supervision and teamwork and feedback systems requiring 
strong leadership and management and opportunities for interaction and information-
sharing. Similarly, business research suggests that management and leadership practices can 
have profound impact on productivity and outcomes in healthcare (Funk et al, 2008). In 2007 
Bloom and Van Reenen assessed management practices at over 700 companies in developed 
countries. Using the same approach a study of 1,000 hospitals, Dorgan et al (2010) found an 
association between management practices, productivity, and outcomes.  
1.3 Context of maternal health services in Nepal 
In Nepal, the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) has reduced significantly from 580/100,000 live 
births in 1995 to 239/100,000 in 2016 (MoHP et al, 2017b). During this period, substantial 
efforts were made to scale-up the health workforce and increase numbers of skilled birth 
attendants (Lerberghe et al, 2014). However, there remains a need to improve access to, and 
uptake of, facility birthing and hospital care (Devkota et al, 2011; Malla et al, 2011). In 2004, 
 
1 A bottleneck is defined as “that component of a system that limits the overall performance or capacity 
of the system” (Langley et al, 2009 p.490).   
14 
 
the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) committed to increasing CEONC service 
availability in hospitals (MoHP, 2004). By 2017, 88% of tertiary level hospitals, 54% of district-
level hospitals, and 50% of private hospitals offered caesarean in their service mix (MoHP et 
al, 2017a).  
Politically, Nepal is decentralising and developing a federalised state structure creating 
opportunities and risks for the development of CEONC services. However, there is a 
commitment expressed in the Nepal Health Sector Strategy 2015-2020 (NHSS), to ensure all 
district hospitals are providing CEONC services (MoHP, 2015a, 2015c).    
In line with the WHO minimum necessary caesarean rate, the expectation in Nepal is that 
caesareans should account for no less than 5% of expected normal deliveries within a 
catchment area (Devkota et al, 2011). In 2011, the average caesarean rate in Nepal was 
4.49%2 (MoHP et al 2012). Whilst just below the minimum rate, this average hides large 
variations between urban and rural areas, richer and poorer women and better and less well 
educated women 3  (Cavallaro et al, 2013). The 2017 Demographic Health Survey (DHS), 
identified that the proportion of births delivered by caesarean in Nepal has increased since 
2011, from just under 5% to 9% in 2016 although this continues to hide the same variations. 
Higher caesarean rates for births in private facilities skew the proportions (MoHP et al, 
2017b). These rates also mask variations in service availability throughout the year. A major 
challenge is to ensure that these services are consistently available 24/7.  
In 2008/09, a special fund, the “Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care 
(CEONC) fund” was established by the MoHP to enable district hospitals to improve CEONC 
service availability 24/7. The fund provided “top-up” grant aid to enable hospitals to fill 
specific gaps in service provision because of inadequate budget allocations and to counter 
some systems bottlenecks. The fund’s remit was to provide financial resources for hiring 
contract staff, purchasing equipment, drugs and supplies, operating theatre repairs, and 
 
2 Caesarean delivery rates are expressed as percentages of live birth deliveries. The data presented is 
from the 2011 DHS in Nepal which was the most recently published DHS during the study formulation 
and data collection period. A subsequent DHS was published in November 2017 (MoHP et al, 2017b). 
3 20% of births to women with a School Leaving Certificate or above are by caesarean, compared with 5% 
to women with no education. Births to women in the highest wealth quintile are more likely to be by 
caesarean (28%) than women in the lowest quintile (2%). 
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information dissemination to communities to promote awareness on availability of services. 
The fund was initially piloted in six districts. This has been gradually expanded geographically, 
as the Government has added financial resources to support CEONC availability, and now 
covers all districts. 
1.4 Rationale for Research 
It was noted by Madon et al (2007) and Fryatt et al (2010) that weaknesses of health systems 
and management of those systems is a major barrier to providing effective healthcare in many 
LMICs. The need for this research, therefore, arises as the Nepali Government has extended 
the CEONC fund availability to all district hospitals, yet routine monitoring of the recipients at 
the time of data collection (i.e. 2015) showed substantial variation in fund utilisation and 
service provision. The specific reasons for these variations is unknown but they indicate 
weaknesses in both the health system and its management which would benefit from 
investigation. To date, understanding of these variations is limited to anecdotal reports and a 
2011 service evaluation (Devkota et al, 2011).  The evaluation was not an academic study, and 
did not consider achieving validity (internal, construct, generalisability or reliability) in its 
design.   
The value of research is increasingly measured in how it creates impact. Through using a 
realistic approach to examining the issues confronting health services management, academic 
research can contribute to evidence-based policy making and management decision-making. 
Accompanying this, is an acknowledgement of the role of research in: 
• improving new initiative efficacy designed to support health systems and health 
systems management; 
• expanding and accelerating the development of an evidence-based approach to 
improving the effectiveness of health systems (Remme et al, 2010).  
This study was purposefully designed as an academic research study (rather than service 
evaluation) to generate new knowledge of, and provide fresh insight into, the management 
and financing of CEONC services and to then generalise the knowledge gained to benefit the 
management and financing of these services in Nepali district hospitals. This study sits under 
the discipline of Health Systems and Policy Research (Chapter Three). The study does not 
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evaluate the provision CEONC services against a management standard but explores and 
identifies themes to understand how the CEONC fund (as an intervention), and relationships 
within the health system hierarchy, affect the availability of CEONC services. The benefit of 
undertaking academic research (rather than service evaluation) is the creation of empirical 
evidence of why variations in availability of CEONC services exist and allows comparison with 
international literature to understand the observed phenomena. Further advantages of 
academic studies are the rigour applied to the methodology and methods which allow for 
replicability and the ability to look at the application of accepted theory to guide the research 
and interpret the findings.  
The need for evidence-informed policy-making is well established, particularly in health 
policy. Within Nepal, despite commitment and efforts by the MoHP to strengthen evidence 
generation and informed policy-making, limited progress has been achieved (Dhimal et al, 
2016). Although there are notable exceptions, health policies with complex policy 
problems/environments, are often developed without utilising available evidence. A recent 
study by the Nepal Health Research Council identified that whilst there is a significant quantity 
of health research in Nepal, the quality of the research remains limited (ibid). Academic 
research can have significant impact on policy development, identifying new issues for the 
policy agenda, informing decisions about policy content and direction, or evaluating the 
impact of policy but it must demonstrate a rigorous academic approach to have impact 
(Hanney et al, 2003). For this case study research rigour is achieved through: 
• ensuring the validity of the data 
• the “appropriateness” of the tools, and processes of analysis.4   
Few academic studies have investigated the leadership and management of CEONC services 
in Nepal. Some peer reviewed academic studies have looked at specific aspects of the health 
system, e.g. human resources and facility management. However, they have not explored 
how the different levels of the health system interact or how this impacts on service delivery. 
No studies were identified that have applied a management framework analysis to Nepal 
health services. Some parallels can be drawn with research from other LMIC contexts but this 
 
4 For the approach taken to ensure the academic rigour see Chapter Three. 
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is insufficient to directly inform Nepali policy and practice. The CEONC fund arrangements are 
an example of a unique feature of the Nepal health system and policy environment.   
1.5 Contribution to knowledge 
This study applies a specifically developed novel theoretical model of organisational 
management, derived from the research of Puoane et al (2008) and Funk et al (2013), to four 
district hospitals providing CEONC services. It offers an original understanding of how both 
management practices within the district hospital, and relationships between the health 
service system levels, affect their ability to provide regular and reliable CEONC services. This 
study generates new knowledge on the functioning of the Nepali health system, and helps to 
inform the development of effective, outcome focussed, CEONC financing mechanisms and 
policy solutions recognising complex problems. Specifically, this research gives Nepali policy 
makers hard data to make decisions about the CEONC fund design and related managerial 
reforms, particularly given the move to federalism. During the research period (2014-2018) 
the governmental organisational context has changed but the study remains relevant because 
the issues identified still need to be addressed to secure the successful delivery of CEONC 
services and to prevent the gains made in maternal health from being lost. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
Chapter Two summarises theory and research related to the allocation of funding and grant 
mechanisms from central to sub-national levels in different countries and the literature on the 
management and leadership practices in health facilities.  It draws on research principally from 
LMICs in the health and education sectors observing devolved and ring-fenced funding 
mechanisms. 
Chapter Three describes the methodology and methods of the study and explains the 
philosophical position of the research and the discipline under which it sits. Drawing on the 
literature, a novel theoretical framework is developed forming the basis of data collection and 
data analysis. Data collection and analysis methods are described, and ethical issues and 




Chapter Four presents the results of the study through cross-case analysis comparing the four 
hospital findings to the theoretical framework, triangulating against data from central level 
interviews. Key factors are identified that appear to influence hospital capability to deliver 
CEONC services which the MoHP should consider. 
Chapter Five compares the findings with the existing literature and specifically answers the 
research questions identified in Chapter Two. Recommendations for policy and practice are 
proposed and study strengths and limitations reviewed including research scope and avenues 




Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with an outline of maternal and newborn health (MNH) services in LMICs 
and specifically in Nepal along with an overview of the Nepali health system to help the reader 
locate the literature review with the broader MNH and Nepali contexts (see Appendix 7 for a 
detailed description). The chapter then moves on to an explanation of the search strategy and 
critically reviews literature relevant to facility financing mechanisms which bear similarity to 
the CEONC fund, management, leadership practices and human resource (HR) management 
in LMICs in health, and education sectors. This examination demonstrates the need for further 
research in this area and outlines the areas where knowledge and understanding are lacking 
particularly in relation to Nepal. The research questions, aims and objectives for the study are 
then defined. This provides the theoretical basis for the conceptual framework developed in 
Chapter Three.  
2.2 Maternal and newborn health 
Maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality is a major global public health problem and 
the leading cause of mortality of women of reproductive age worldwide (Fournier et al, 2009; 
Asamoah et al, 2011; Shrestha et al, 2014). Globally, an estimated 300,000 maternal deaths 
occur annually of which nearly 75% are preventable (Karlsen et al, 2011; Shrestha et al, 2014). 
Most maternal deaths occur intrapartum (during labour and delivery) or in the first 24 hours 
postpartum. The complications that lead to these deaths present a complex challenge to 
manage (Campbell et al, 2006). In developed, and some developing countries, substantial 
reductions have occurred (90-99%) in the risk of maternal death, demonstrating that 
successful strategies for improving maternal health outcomes do exist. Principally, they are 
intrapartum strategies where women routinely choose to deliver in a health centre with 
skilled and trained midwives as the main specialists, supported by teams of other skilled 
attendants (ibid). These strategies include early detection and management of problems, 
including life-threatening ones (ibid). The availability of basic and comprehensive emergency 
obstetric and neonatal care (BEONC and CEONC) is crucial for maternal and newborn survival 
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(Kerber et al 2007; Fournier et al, 2009; Worku et al 2013, Shrestha et al 2014). These are a 
set of interventions used to treat direct obstetric complications that cause roughly 80% of 
maternal deaths globally, i.e. severe bleeding; infections; high blood pressure during 
pregnancy and complications from delivery (WHO, 2015). BEONC and CEONC are a health 
centre based intrapartum-care strategy that provides expert resources to treat these 
complications 24/75. BEONC can be available at most health facilities including primary level 
facilities, but CEONC requires 24/7 access to surgical facilities and needs to be in secondary 
or tertiary level hospitals. However, actual provision varies greatly and the expectation a 
mother will have access to the requisite medical care and skilled professionals on arrival is 
frequently unmet (Bailey et al, 2006, Paxton et al 2006; Worku 2013). Bailey et al’s study of 
1906 health facilities in 13 LMICs, including Nepal, found that most hospitals were not fully 
providing services. The Bailey research surveyed a sample of health facilities in each LMIC. 
This varied in scope from 17 facilities in three districts in Kenya to a national sample of 510 
facilities in Morocco. In some countries, the sample included all hospitals but only a selection 
of primary level facilities. The research attempted to include both private and public sector 
provision, but private facilities in some countries were not responsive. A functioning CEONC 
facility was judged by the performance of both caesarean and blood transfusion at least once 
in the previous 3-month period.  
Hospitals were more likely to report performing the services associated with BEONC and 
CEONC than lower level facilities. At hospital level, caesarean provision varied substantially. 
100% of the surveyed hospitals in Mozambique and Nicaragua had performed a caesarean in 
the 3 months prior to the survey, but just 33% of the surveyed hospitals in Rajasthan, India. 
In Nepal, 36% of hospitals sampled had provided a caesarean in the previous 3 months. The 
survey did not look at facility readiness to provide BEONC or CEONC services i.e. if a case 
presented would the facility have available the requisite staff, drugs, equipment and 
infrastructure to be able to respond. Including this would have increased the robustness of 
the survey data, since it would have provided an immediate snapshot of the facility’s 
capabilities and reduced reliance on the facilities records of services provided, which were 
not always available. Additionally, despite all the included countries being LMICs, they vary 
 
5 The services that comprise BEONC and CEONC are noted in Chapter One 
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substantially in terms of political, environmental and social contexts. This research provides 
a useful indication of the provision of BEONC and CEONC services. However, the variation in 
sampling between countries and the lack of a contextual analysis means that generalisation 
of the findings is not possible.   
Despite limitations, Bailey’s research identified that common impediments to access and 
provision of services existed on both supply- and demand-side of services. On the demand-
side, access was limited by acceptability of services, limited contact, lack of demand, distance 
to services, cost, lack of information and cultural acceptability (including language barriers). 
On the supply-side, poor uptake was the result of inadequate operational management and 
systemic health system problems.  
Impediments to access and provision of services are described as ‘bottlenecks’. An 
understanding of bottlenecks affecting CEONC services in Nepal is critical to understanding 
the impediments to successful coverage of CEONC services. The implications of Bailey’s 
research are that unless bottlenecks are targeted, efforts to expand CEONC services will have 
little effect.   
Nepal has made steady progress in improving citizen health and in meeting most of the 
health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)6 (Shrestha et al, 2014; MoHP, 2015b), 
particularly in child survival and improvements in maternal health, MDGs 4 and 5 (MoHP 
2015b). Nepal has experienced a rapid decline in MMR which has fallen 70% from 790 in 1990 
to 239 in 2016 per 100,000 live births (WHO et al, 2014; MoHP et al, 2017b). The under-5 child 
mortality rate fell by 72% between 1990 and 2016. However, neonatal mortality did not 
reduce proportionately, with only 58% reduction in neonatal mortality rate for the same 
period (WHO et la, 2014; MoHP et al, 2017b).  
The Nepal Health Sector Plan (NHSP-I, 2005-2010) committed the government to increase 
access to BEONC and CEONC services (MoHP, 2004) with BEONC being delivered in primary 
health care centres, which provide preventive and basic primary care at the village level 
(Bhusal et al, 2013). The district hospital, (present in all 75 districts and mandated to provide 
 
6 The United Nations Millennium Development Goals are eight goals that all 191 UN member states 
agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015 to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental 
degradation, and discrimination against women.  
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secondary and tertiary care services with inpatient services in addition to primary care) was 
identified as the focal delivery point for CEONC (ibid). This same focus on the provision of 
BEONC and CEONC services continued in the second and third health sector plans (NHSP-II, 
2010 – 2015 and NHSS, 2015-2020) (MoHP, 2010; 2015c). Specifically, in the NHSS, the 
government committed to achieving 100% of district hospitals with at least one CEONC site 
and defined through the basic healthcare package that management of complicated 
deliveries including caesarean and blood transfusion is a service that should be available at 
<50-bed hospitals (MoHP, 2015c).  
Despite the policy of 2005, a 2009 study by the MoHP identified that key challenges in the 
delivery of emergency obstetric care remained (Suvedi et al, 2009). This study aimed to 
understand the causes of death of women of reproductive age, especially those dying from 
maternal causes. It identified that, in eight study districts, 41% of pregnancy related deaths 
occurred in a health facility and, of these, over 80% of women who died from maternal causes 
were emergency admissions and in a critical state on admission: 18% died within four hours 
of arrival, 39% within the first twelve hours and 53% within the first 24 hours. The research 
had a high degree of rigour and reliability using a mixed methods approach. Like Bailey (2006), 
Suvedi’s study identified that critical health systems bottlenecks contributed to an inability to 
adequately treat the obstetric complications at the facility level (ibid). These bottlenecks 
included inadequate resourcing, both financial and human, poor infrastructure and lack of 
equipment (ibid).   
To improve CEONC service provision the MoHP introduced a special fund for emergency 
obstetric care in the financial year (FY) 2008/09. This fund (the CEONC Fund) allocated to 
selected district hospitals a CEONC specific ‘top-up’ grant (see Appendix 8 for a brief overview 
of health financing mechanisms). Responsibility for managing this grant was initially devolved 
to districts who would make spending decisions based on their local context and needs 
(Devkota et al, 2012). (Subsequently, limitations were placed by the MoHP on how the fund 
could be used.) The fund was piloted in 6 districts in 2008/09; distribution was then gradually 
expanded. By 2013/14 the CEONC fund was being provided to 34 districts and 65 districts in 




2.3  Search strategy 
A comprehensive literature review was undertaken at the start of the research and then 
updated at two subsequent points:   
i.) Before undertaking empirical work to inform the research questions and design 
(2013); 
ii.) Post data analysis to help explain the findings (2016); and 
iii.) During writing-up to ensure inclusion of any recent literature (2018).  
Web of Science, PubMed, ScienceDirect, JSTOR, SCOPUS and SSRN were searched for 
published literature using the following search terms for the initial literature review and all 
subsequent updates: "District Hospitals", "Hospital Management", "Leadership", "Health 
Facility", "Health Care Finan*", "Health System" and "Nepal".  Because of the significantly 
changing political environment in Nepal following the civil war, the search was limited to 2006 
onwards. A full literature search from 2006 onwards was undertaken in 2016 and 2018 to 
ensure that no relevant literature had been missed in the prior searches. The references 
included in all quoted articles were also reviewed for additional appropriate citations 
(Bowling, 2009). The summary of the search results from the final search phase are presented 
in Table 1.  
Table 1: Literature search findings  
 Results  








19 12 5 18 248 9 2 313 
District Hospital 
AND Leadership 
37 32 2 112 42 1 2 228 
Health Facility 
AND Health Care 
Finan* 
7 14 3 2 43 30 0 99 
Health System 
AND Nepal 
113 174 20 186 152 15 9 669 
 1309 
Because potentially relevant knowledge isn’t always reported adequately in academic 
articles, grey literature was included in this review (specifically government documents, 
multilateral reports, evaluations of facility financing schemes and consultancy reports) (Table 
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2) (Adams et al, 2016).  Google was searched for evaluations of facility financing mechanisms; 
the Nepal Health Sector Support programme website was searched for consultancy reports 
and the MoHP website was search for policy documents.  
Table 2: Grey literature 
Type of grey literature Number  
Consultancy Reports 15 
Nepal Government policy documents 8 
Multilateral reports (e.g. WHO, World Bank) 14 
Other country government reports 2 
Websites 2 
Conference Papers 1 
NGO reports 1 
Total 43 
The first search phase identified 1076 references, the second 1185 and the final identified 
1352 (i.e. 1309+43). A first review excluded duplicates, articles not in English, macro level 
studies, those with no full text available or related to high income countries. A second full text 
technical review excluded those related to clinical case management, not relevant to hospital 
leadership, unrelated to grant mechanisms, or maternal health or district hospitals (Figure 1 




































A table of included studies was formulated to keep a transparent record of information; 
citation, summary of publication, list of countries, methodologies, results and conclusions 
referred to in the text (Appendix 9). Of the studies included the majority were mixed method 
studies (n=15), followed by qualitative studies (n=7) and only one (n=1) quantitative study. 
The country references were either predominantly from, or relevant to, LMICs using the 
World Bank definition (2017) (Table 3).  
  
Records identified through 
database searching 




























Additional records identified 
through other sources 
(n = 56) 
Records remaining after duplicates removed 
(n = 1066) 
Records screened 
(n = 1066) 
Records excluded 
(n = 918) 
Abstract articles/studies 
assessed for eligibility 
(n = 148) 
abstract articles/studies 
excluded, with reasons 
(n = 70) 
Articles/studies included 
in synthesis 
(n = 23) 
Full text articles/studies 
excluded, with reasons 
(n = 55) 
Full text articles/studies 
assessed for eligibility 
(n = 78) 
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Table 3: Country of research 
Included in this research after applying exclusion criteria (n=23) 






























Income data source: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519  
Within the context of a review of policy instruments, grey literature was expected to feature 
as a source because of the nature of the topic and the audience of LMIC government officials 
with limited access to journals. However, where grey literature was included, it was reviewed 
to ensure that it adhered to the tenets of transparency and rigour (Adams et al, 2017). All 
articles/studies were assessed utilising either the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT) 
(Hong et al, 2018) or qualitative Cochrane Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) tool 
(CASP, 2018) depending on the research methodology. These tools were chosen as they are 
designed specifically for healthcare interventions. An assessment against these tools is noted 
in Appendix 9 to highlight the credibility of included studies, or where there are limitations, 
they are understood and appropriate caution applied when utilising the results.  
It was noted that there was a shift in the focus of the literature between the initial search in 
2013 to the final search in 2018.  Earlier research had a greater focussed on management 
practices and the processes involved in management, whereas later studies investigated a 
more intangible concept of leadership.   
2.4 Literature Review Findings 
The literature review draws on research on facility funding mechanisms, HR management and 
facility management and leadership.  The key findings from the review highlighted that 
financing mechanisms, if flexibly applied, can have a positive impact on the provision of 
services.  However, they need to be predictable, consistently available and have clear 
accountability mechanisms.  Critically, there is also a need to ensure that management 
capacity and leadership is in place to be able to utilise them effectively.  Maintaining a stable 
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workforce is critical to the provision of services, however, this is again underpinned by facility 
leadership (supported by central level policies) implementing effective HR strategies which 
motivate and support personnel.  Overall, the literature hightlighted that management and 
leadership are central to successful utilisation of financing mechanisms and overall that there 
is a relationship between effective leadership and management and increased hospital 
performance, both in service availability and health outcomes. These findings are explored 
further below.  
2.4.1 Facility funding mechanisms 
This section critically analyses the literature on facility funding mechanisms.  It draws on 
academic and grey literature from the health and education sectors and from a range of 
LMICs.  
In Kenya, to overcome deficiencies in health facility funding arrangements the ‘Direct Facility 
Financing (DFF)’ mechanism was developed (Opwora et al, 2009). The DFF was piloted in one 
province from 2005 and then scaled up nationwide as the Health Sector Services Fund (HSSF) 
from 2010. The HSSF isn’t a targeted grant like the CEONC fund as the funds could be used to 
support all health facility activities. However, like the CEONC fund, facility managers could 
decide how to address specific local needs (ibid). HSSF funds are allocated across districts by 
a formula using the Ministry of Health Resource Allocation Criteria (the criteria are based on 
poverty levels, new HIV/AIDS cases, number of women of reproductive age, number of 
government facilities, number of under-fives, and area). The distribution formula aims to 
ensure that funds are allocated to individual facilities within each district based on workload. 
Financing is not linked to results or service objectives. Funds are paid directly into a facility 
bank account. The health centre management committee (HCMC) has responsibility for 
deciding on what it is spent and then reporting on its use (Waweru, 2013a).   
Opwora et al (2009) used a conceptual framework to evaluate the DFF’s impact in two 
sampled districts. A study strength was the sample size and the combination of interviews 
with financial data, allowing for generalisability and replicability. 15 facilities were sampled in 
each district. Quantitative and qualitative data was gathered and structured interviews 
undertaken with doctors (n=30), patient exit interviews (n=292) and in-depth group 
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interviews with members of the HCMCs (12 groups, 50 participants). The study focussed on 
income sources and areas of expenditure and did not consider service objectives or outcomes 
(only weak and incomplete data from the government health information system was 
available). Thus, the evaluation was only able to measure process indicators. However, these 
indicators allowed analysis of the benefits and challenges of this type of financing mechanism. 
Opwora found that relatively small increases in funding can significantly affect facility 
performance when the funds are managed well. Transfer of funds directly to the facility was 
important. Benefits included improved health worker motivation, utilisation and quality of 
care, improved drug utilisation and management and, anecdotally, a positive impact on funds 
utilisation. Further, use of DFF funds to renovate buildings created space for specific services 
such as laboratory and pharmacy and provided more comfortable working conditions for staff 
and waiting bays for patients. Overall, the environment was felt to have become safer and 
more attractive for both clients and staff. Problems offsetting these benefits were identified, 
such as, possible corruption and funds misuse. Training was reportedly inadequate, and no 
DFF guidelines were available, leading to confusion. This study demonstrates the benefit of 
flexible financing but indicates the need to include management of these mechanisms in the 
scope of this research into the CEONC fund as this may impact its utilisation.  
The Waweru study (2013b), in its interim review of the HSSF (only available in grey literature), 
found that it was well received and had a positive impact on facility management and support 
staff, patient referrals, health worker motivation, and utilisation and quality of care. 
Challenges were identified, specifically around management and monitoring of funding with 
little documentation on HSSF available at facility level. The study included an unsystematic 
review of policy documents, administrative reports, and studies related to HSSF and drew on 
secondary data from key informant interviews (n=8) from a previous study and further 
supplemented this with additional national level key informant interviews (n=5). This study 
was predominantly a secondary analysis of previous research. It had deficiencies including an 
unsystematic approach to reviewing previous studies under an unclear conceptual 
framework. Whilst this study has significant limitations it does indicate, as the Opwora study 
above, that research on management and monitoring of funding mechanisms is an important 
consideration for this study into the CEONC fund to understand not only how it is perceived, 
but also how it is implemented.  
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The Indian Government launched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005 to 
provide accessible, affordable and accountable primary health care in rural areas. Eighteen 
“focus” states were selected (Prasad et al, 2012). The government developed a general grant 
mechanism designed to pay for urgent but discrete expenses covering infrastructure 
maintenance and provision of services at district, municipality and village level. Funds were 
allocated on a lump sum basis depending on the municipal level, i.e. district, block, village. 
Management of these funds would be through local District Health Societies. The Prasad 
study noted that there was wide variation in fund utilisation. 
A Child in Need Institute (CINI 2010) study into the application of the fund in a state with poor 
utilisation (Jharkand) found there were significant delays (3 to 9 months and sometimes into 
the following financial year) in the release of funds from the district to the sub-district level. 
These intermittent funding flows impacted utilisation as health facility staff did not know 
when funding might arrive and were unwilling to make financial commitments in its absence. 
It also showed a low awareness amongst fund managers, users and supervisors on the 
availability and purpose of the funds. This lack of awareness resulted in a rigidity in practice 
of fund utilisation (ibid; Prasad et al, 2012). CINI sampled 4 performing and 4 non-performing 
districts based on fund utilisation. Data was collected using a knowledge, attitude, practice 
framework with structured interviews of officials (n=126) and semi‐structured discussions 
with focus groups of voluntary health workers and village health committee members (n=44). 
A study strength was that they used several data points to ensure its internal validity, and 
both quantitative and qualitative data. Findings were validated by comparing with a well 
performing state (Tamil Nadu). Whilst predominantly a qualitative study focused on a specific 
context, the proximal similarity to other poor states in India and, indeed, to Nepal through 
people and other social contexts does allow for some level of generalisability (Trochim, 2005).  
This study identifies the need for this study into the CEONC fund to triangulate local data with 
the central data and the central level’s implementation of a funding mechanism to effectively 
consider the influence of the broader health system, not just local structures.  Delays in 
funding flows can effect the confidence of facility level staff to commit funds when they are 
unsure when, or even if, these funds will be reimbursed.   
In Nigeria, the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF) was introduced in 2014 to extend 
Primary Health Care (PHC) to all Nigerians by substantially increasing the level of financial 
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resources to PHC services. Half of the Fund aims to provide a basic package of services in PHC 
facilities through the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS); 45% is for essential drugs, 
maintaining PHC facilities, equipment and transportation, and strengthening HR capacity; and 
the final 5% is for responding to health emergencies and epidemics (Uzochukwu et al, 2018). 
In their study of accountability mechanisms for the BHCPF, Uzochukwu et al suggest that 
funding goals cannot be achieved unless certain conditions are met. These included a written, 
well communicated implementation guideline; sustained political commitment, particularly 
in relation to release of funds for health activities, (long delays can be a major problem in 
planning activities); clarity on the roles of the implementing actors; awareness and education 
of providers; and high quality data (financial and service provision) that allows for planning 
and decision making. Whilst the study was limited in its generalisability due to the various 
contextual factors of the BHCPF, these conditions noted by Uzochukwu et al have relevance 
for the CEONC fund and for Nepal and indicate that these conditions should be considered as 
part of this research, triangluting data from central and local actors.  
From a facility funding perspective, parallels can also be drawn with the education sector. The 
education sector has similarities to health, as the benefits accrue at the individual level (e.g., 
skill development and access to resources); the community level (e.g., the health-related 
characteristics of the environments in which people live); and the larger social/cultural 
context (e.g. social policies, residential segregation, and unequal access to educational 
resources) (Zimmerman et al, 2015). There are also similarities between financing schools and 
health facilities. Both can be treated as individual cost centres, within a broader government 
financing system and can be funded from taxation, personal contributions (user fees), 
donations and other sources.  
One relevant financing mechanism is the Direct Support to Schools (DSS) scheme established 
in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique based on a block grant mechanism (Ayako, 
2006). This mechanism was established to meet the revenue shortfalls experienced by schools 
after the introduction of free primary education. The grant was payable to all public schools 
to fund teaching, instructional materials and curriculum activities. Distribution was principally 
by formula based on school enrolment statistics. Another criterion occasionally used in the 
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grant allocation process included basic conditions in the school e.g. degree of degradation of 
school infrastructure.  
The Ayako study (grey literature) reviewed the experience and identified lessons from the 
application of the scheme covering its design, implementation strategy and impact on access 
to education and teaching and learning environment. The methodology included a desk 
review of relevant materials and in-depth interviews with education sector officials. The study 
showed that the mechanism successfully increased school enrolment through increased 
recruitment of teachers and maintenance and improvements of the school facilities based on 
school priorities. The study also identified problems that have relevance for this study in 
Nepal, i.e. political interference; weak organisation and control; mismanagement of funds; 
general lack of management skills by many principals and their staff, especially in expenditure 
and revenue control and budget formulation; delays in acquisition of inputs and a shortage 
of trained teachers. However, in reviewing the study against the CASP checklist (CASP, 2018) 
there was a lack of information on the research design to assess whether it was appropriate 
to address the aims of the research and how the findings were analysed. Consequently, the 
findings are utilised cautiously.  
 
In 2011, Devkota et al undertook an assessment of facility readiness to provide CEONC 
services. This was not a specific review of the effectiveness of the CEONC fund, but the study 
does reference the fund and is therefore a critical piece in shaping this research. The 
evaluation covered 18 district hospitals and is only available in the grey literature. It reviewed 
CEONC services in the preceding two years to establish if there was continuous availability 
and assessed if, on the date of visit, the facility would be able to provide CEONC services. The 
evaluators interviewed key informants, examined the utilisation of CEONC funding and 
secondary data collected from maternity and operating theatre service delivery statistics. The 
evaluation used a health systems framework to analyse the results that identified the 
components of health services that directly affect maternal and newborn outcomes, and the 
processes or enabling environment guiding and supporting these services. In 2011, (as now) 
no facility level norms existed for percentage of births delivered by caesarean. However, the 
2011 DHS calculated the national rate for caesareans as 4.6% (MOHP et al, 2012). The Devkota 
evaluation anticipated that within a facility dealing with complicated cases the percentage of 
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deliveries by caesarean would be at least 5%. However, within the 18 district hospitals studied 
the average percentage was only 0.4% of births (Devkota et al, 2011). The evaluation also 
identified that immediate service availability was low, mainly due to no provision of caesarean 
services 24/7 and key systems bottlenecks including lack of appropriately trained staff, poor 
equipment and supplies and poor infrastructure. Whilst the CEONC fund was meant to 
address these bottlenecks the evaluation identified inconsistent uptake of the fund (although 
accurate financial information was limited). The was not an academic study and has not been 
peer reviewed. It did not attempt to systematically review the international literature to 
understand the phenomena observed. A major drawback was the lack of comparison 
between study sites and no triangulation of data from the central level. This limited the 
internal validity and generalisability of the evaluation.    Despite these limitations, this 
evaluation showed how the CEONC programme was working in 2011 and provides an 
important basis for this study as it identified, although it did not explore in depth, the 
potential limitations of the CEONC fund as a mechanism to increase availability of CEONC 
services.  The Devkota evaluation pointed towards a variation in leadership approaches at the 
facility level as one potential reason for poor availability of services although it did not 
attempt to unpick this further in the context of the broader health systems framework.  It 
therefore recognised that the fund was not being utilised effectively across all facilities, but 
does not adequately explain, why this was observed, nor what works for who under which 
circumstances.  This provides a gap that this research seeks to fill.  
These studies help inform the case for this research.  They indicate that additional financing 
if flexibly applied can have positive impact on the provision of services, maintain security of 
supplies and improve infrastructure.  However, the conditions on the availability of such funds 
are material as is the managerial capacity to utilise such funds effectively and these need to 
be effectively explored and understood. There also may be little relationship between 
financial inputs and service outputs. These studies also demonstrate that bureaucratic 
processes can create their own bottlenecks and other factors affect performance such as 
corruption, political interference, misuse of funds, poor guidance and lack of training.  
Performance monitoring should be systematic and effective accountability mechanisms are 
critical to ensuring objectives are met. A focus simply on financial control fails to recognise 
that finance is a facilitator, not an end. Clear performance or objective setting and finance 
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need to be linked to achieve improved services. The supporting financial system also needs 
to be predictable, consistent, reflect the objectives and the circumstances of the organisation, 
and not be so bureaucratic as to impede its utilisation. Strong management and leadership 
are central to the successful utilisation of funding mechanisms, and, these need to be 
explored in-depth.   All of these aspects need to be taken into account in developing research 
into facility financing mechanisms such as the CEONC fund.  
2.4.2 HR management  
The WHO defines a health system as one encompassing all activities that have the primary 
goal of improving health. Within this, the health workforce includes all people engaged in the 
promotion, protection or improvement of the health of the population (Dal Poz et al, 2007). 
Using this definition, the health workforce includes medical staff, management and support 
workers that enable health systems to function. HR is one of the most important health 
system inputs, with the performance and benefits dependent largely upon the knowledge, 
skills and motivation of those individuals (both clinical and non-clinical staff) responsible for 
delivering health services (Kabene et al, 2006). HR must be managed effectively with an 
appropriate mix maintained between the different types of health workforce (ibid). 
Availability of staffing is a critical factor affecting service coverage which can be affected by 
geography. For example, poor distribution of staff skewed towards urban areas and away 
from remote and rural areas has damaging effects (Anand et al, 2007). This problem exists in 
the availability of CEONC services in Nepal and one CEONC fund aim is to enable district 
hospitals to fill vacancies in their workforce delivering CEONC services wherever they are 
located.  
A lack of adequately skilled staff was identified by Zimmerman et al (2016) as a key 
impediment to successful delivery of services, including CEONC. The Nick Simons Institute 
(NSI) in Nepal developed a programme to address recruitment and retention issues of staff in 
seven district hospitals. NSI provided a wide range of incentives to suitably experienced 
doctors. The intervention was successful in both retaining staff (three quarters of the doctors 
remained with the programme, and of those that left the majority remained working in rural 
areas but for different organisations). It also increased continuous provision of CEONC 
services compared to hospitals relying solely on CEONC funding to supplement provision of 
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CEONC services (ibid). This study demonstrates the context in Nepal for delivery of CEONC 
services and the importance of considering staff motivation in research on the delivery of 
services. However, since the programme was funded by NSI, they were not constrained by 
the government systems for hiring and contracting staff, nor by the funding delays 
experienced by the government because of delayed budget sign off. It is also unclear if the 
package provided to the NSI supported doctors caused any dissatisfaction or discord between 
them and the government doctors employed at the same facility but not receiving these 
benefits. Furthermore, NSI were evaluating their own intervention which could generate 
analytical bias.  
Availability and distribution of health personnel whilst critical is not the only aspect of HR 
management that affects services. A comprehensive HR management strategy applied at 
facility level can also impact the provision of services (Kabene et al, 2006). Such a strategy 
may contain several different elements. For example, a high-quality induction process allows 
an organisation to welcome new staff, help them settle in and ensure they have the necessary 
knowledge and support (CIPD, 2016). This helps efficiency, the handover of responsibilities 
and patient care (Ward, 1998). This can be a distinguishing feature between service quality in 
performing and non-performing health facilities (Puoane et al, 2008) and therefore important 
to consider in research on why there is variation between facilities in the provision of CEONC 
services in Nepal.   
A comparative case study of four hospitals in South Africa with a programme to improve the 
quality of care of severely malnourished children included two performing and two non-
performing facilities (ibid). Study methods focused on structured observations of ward 
procedures, on quantitative measures of the hospital environment, and on in-depth staff 
interviews and focus group discussions related to staff attitudes, teamwork, training, 
supervision, managerial support and leadership. One drawback of the research was that it 
was conducted only with clinical personnel and therefore did not include any perspectives on 
the performance of the facility from either a non-clinical or lay management or a public health 
perspective. There was no triangulation of the data with central level ministry personnel who 
might have provided an alternative view on the broader policy environment in which the 
hospitals were delivering services. Despite these limitations, this was a robust study which 
addressed the main aspects of validity in the case study methodology (i.e. internal, construct, 
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external and reliability). Key findings were: whilst all the facilities had access to the same 
external skills based training on management of malnourished children, the facilities that 
followed this up with a structured process of induction, continued in-service training and on-
going mentoring of a wide range of staff that achieved improved levels of service provision 
and quality of care, with case-fatality rates reduced by half. This on-going support also built 
morale of staff members and created a supportive environment for service delivery. It was 
also posited that using existing staff to train new staff may have contributed to greater 
absorptive capacity for new knowledge and an increased likelihood that an innovation would 
be assimilated and sustained.  From this study six themes were identified that framed the 
delivery of services in the facilities.  The themes are important as they highlight that guidelines 
and single point interventions, whether that is training or finance, whilst facilitative, are 
insufficient in and of themselves to effect sustained changes in practice at facility level that 
equates to improved provision of services (either in number of services or quality). The 
themes Pouane et all drew from their study were: induction and in-service training; 
supervision, support and leadership; teamwork interaction and communication; monitoring 
or performance and outcomes; attitudes towards the service being provided and patient care; 
and managerial awareness of progress in service activity and quality, including 
acknowledgement of their supervisory and leadership responsibilities. Linking all these areas 
were management and leadership.  These themes demonstrate a range of ‘softer’ 
interventions that are required that create the enabling environment for the success of other 
programmes.  These themes provide an important framework for this research (see chapter 
3) recognising that the CEONC fund, as a single point intervention, may have limited success 
without parallel interventions that foster leadership and teamwork.  
Keugoung et al (2013) in a study on the Cameroon, argued that systematic supervision and 
monitoring of performance is crucial and central to effective HR management compared to 
those facilities with a more laissez-faire approach. This also has a critical role in recruitment, 
retention and motivation as well as being an important factor in ensuring positive 
organisational outcomes. The Cameroon study used a robust mixed methods multiple case 
study methodology. Importantly for this study on the CEONC services, it identified that 
stronger management practices enabled greater control over staff performance and 
facilitated the use of sanctions to address poor performance. This study also showed that 
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improved performance occurred where a facility management had managerial authority over 
staffing compared to those where staff were managed by a central body. Furthermore, if 
management could only note occurrences of poor performance, rather than actively apply 
sanctions this adversely affected performance.  
Funk et al (2013) examined surgical productivity and quality hospital management practices 
in three sub-Saharan African hospitals. They sought to apply to a health context in developing 
countries, a modified framework developed from a measurement tool used to assess 
management practices at over 700 companies in developed countries by Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007). They hypothesised that optimisation of five management domains—goal 
setting, operations management, talent management, quality monitoring, and financial 
oversight—would be associated with enhanced surgical productivity. Funk et al selected three 
hospitals that were purposefully different to obtain exposure to a variety of surgical systems 
viz. a teaching hospital (affiliated with a university), a district hospital, and a mission hospital. 
They conducted structured interviews with administrators, clinicians, and technicians. Scores 
were attributed to each of the hospitals based on the presence of 14 criteria identified as 
good management practice. This study sought to provide a view on the impact of hospital 
management practices in low resource settings on the availability of services. This robust 
study provided a broader view of management approaches than the Puoane et al or Keugoung 
studies by including not only HR and leadership focussed themes, but also operations 
management and financial oversight. Given the financial nature of the CEONC fund, this 
broader view of what constitutes good management practice is valuable for this study. This 
broader perspective, plus the inclusion of non-clinical staff as key informants facilitated a 
comprehensive understanding of the health facility operating environment, not just that 
experienced by health personnel and helps shape the theoretical framework for this study 
(see Chapter 3). They found that the hospital with the highest management scores—the 
mission hospital—had the highest surgical volumes per operating room, the highest relative 
number of employees, surgeons, and surgical nurses, and no waiting list for essential surgery. 
They surmised that improved hospital management systems, such as lean process, talent 
management, and financial oversight would be likely to create an environment that fostered 
productivity and directly affected the ability to provide surgical services at a high level. 
However, this study focussed only on whether it was possible to assess management practices 
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in developing country health facilities, and did not seek to identify any causal links between 
management and performance. The disparate nature of the facilities did not allow for any 
meaningful comparators between the hospitals as they were operating both within the public 
health system and privately. Further, the deductive nature of this study meant it focussed 
entirely on the five domains of management, which were assumed to be relevant to health 
service delivery, without seeking to identify if this encompassed all the experiences of the 
facility in the delivery of services and thus presupposed and slanted the results further 
towards this theory.  
A core aspect of the themes identified by Pouane et al (2008) and the 14 criteria of good 
management practices examined by Funk et al (2013) is good communication practice. 
Communication is the continual process of providing, sharing and obtaining necessary 
information. Internal communication is how information is disseminated throughout the 
organisation flowing up, down and across the entity (CIPD, 2016). It enables personnel to 
receive a clear message from senior management that responsibilities must be taken seriously 
(ibid).  Within the health sector, the fostering of positive communications and relationships 
were identified as critical success factors in well performing district hospitals in South Africa 
as well as a significant strategy to revive an ailing hospital in Ghana (Couper et al, 2005; 
Marchal et al, 2010a). Mckee et al (2000) drawing on a major study that was being undertaken 
by the European Observatory on Health Care Systems noted that in intensive care units, the 
best predictors of better patient outcomes are organisational factors such as a patient-
centred culture, strong medical and nursing leadership, effective collaboration, and an open 
approach to problem solving. However, what is not covered in Mckee’s commentary on the 
research, but may be critical is the willingness of leadership to recognise these organisational 
factors. It will be impossible to create positive communications and relationships if there is 
no leader who wants to operate in this way. 
For Nepal, these research studies highlight key factors in HR management that are crucial to 
support the effective delivery of services, but which may be overlooked. Zimmerman and 
other sources identified that the availability of health service personnel is a crucial and 
undeniable criterion in the provision of services. However, to enable those personnel to 
function a comprehensive HR strategy is required as the evidence identified above indicates. 
An effective HR policy may also facilitate commitment and a unified approach to problem 
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solving. Communication is the basis for teamwork and positive relationships. It can facilitate 
the ownership of a shared vision of goals across a broad range of actors, both management 
and healthcare providers.  These are critical factors that remain unexplored in the Nepal 
context but are critical for the delivery of CEONC services.  
2.4.3 Management, leadership and relations with local communities 
Effective management is a pivotal factor in the successful delivery of a wide variety of health 
services (Couper et al 2005; Puoane et al 2008; Marchal et al 2010a; Funk et al 2013; 
Keugoung et al 2013). However, management is a broad term and those aspects influencing 
performance should be identified. From this literature review, several management practices 
impacting on health facilities’ performance were identified. Leadership and collaborative goal 
setting in public and private organisations has been strongly associated with increased 
productivity and outcomes (Bloom et al, 2010). Within the private sector, engaged leadership 
has had a positive impact on motivation, commitment, absenteeism, staff turn-over and 
organisational performance (ibid; Bloom et al, 2013). However, only a limited number of 
studies have considered this in health sector reviews in LMICs. Relevant studies are discussed 
below.   
Couper et al (2005) undertook a cross-sectional exploratory study in South Africa utilising in-
depth interviews with managers (n=21) at five well performing district hospitals. The aim was 
to identify what assists a rural hospital to function well. This included the hospital’s ability to 
set objectives, power to take decisions and the approach to leadership and collaborative goal 
setting as a supportive mechanism for implementing health policies. The study identified 
three major themes of successful management:  
• Firstly, teams working together for a purpose, including good communications, 
collaborative teamwork and unity.  
• Secondly, a work culture that provided an ethos for staff to be proactive and problem 
solve.  




The study though focussed purely on well performing facilities and this consequently restricts 
the generalisability of the study. However, despite this, the study does indicate, for the 
purposes of this study on CEONC services in Nepal, that a leadership that facilitates openness, 
risk taking and reflection necessary for learning, and communicates a compelling vision for 
the organisation creates the environment for establishing strong teams and greater 
accountability to the community.    
Consistent with the findings of Couper, Marchal et al (2010a) identified the development of a 
common facility vision as a key mechanism to establish commitment, motivation and 
dedication of staff and ultimately improvements in performance. The Marchal study involved 
a series of longitudinal case studies in Ghana and Tanzania examining the links between 
management and hospital performance. The Ghana case study focused on an ailing urban 
district hospital which was selected because it was an interesting positive deviant case, where 
its management team succeeded in improving the performance over a relatively short period. 
The study employed a realist evaluation methodology and utilised middle-range theory to 
form the initial hypothesis based on the effect of high commitment management on hospital 
performance. The mid-range theory included elements of leadership, creation of a shared 
vision, choice of management practices, mechanisms of reciprocity and outcomes at levels of 
HR management and hospital performance. The study found, which is useful for this study on 
CEONC services in Nepal, the management team demonstrated key features of the theory 
combining a crisis management plan with the development of a long-term strategy. Inclusion, 
participation, involvement and empowerment were the main attributes of management 
intervention. These created a shared vision of what the hospital should become and what 
good leadership should be. They mobilised and motivated the workforce by involving staff in 
both the diagnosis and search for solutions and concurrently, strengthened the management 
structures. The authors concluded that this combination created a positive organisational 
climate and the perception of organisational support. This resulted in better hospital 
performance including an increase in patient volumes (out-patients, hospitalisations and 
maternity) and revenues. Whilst this study attempted to overcome the limitations inherent 
in a single case study method through the application of a mid-range theory, challenges 
remained as without either effective local comparisons or an analysis of the relationship with 
40 
 
central ministries and national policies, it is difficult to fully establish the causal relationship 
between the improvements in performance indicators and sound leadership.   
More recently, Mathole et al (2018) undertook a mixed methods multiple case study, 
selecting two South African district hospitals operating in similar contexts but delivering 
different results in maternal and perinatal health outcomes. They identified important 
differences in the leadership approaches between performing and non-performing facilities 
which are relevant for this study on CEONC services in Nepal, that impacted resource 
management, staff morale, staff skills and accountability (to staff, communities and clients). 
The performing facility had a strong emphasis on supportive supervision and performance 
management, nurturing relationships and training. They also valued and used data to 
understand and monitor programme performance which facilitated accountability and 
resource utilisation. Both facilities were affected adversely by a central government culture 
unsympathetic to the needs of lower level government structures and their facilities. This 
study, whilst limited by a small sample (as with many case studies) does promote recognition 
of the significance of management and leadership. 
In Ghana, Aberese-Ako et al (2018) undertook a robust ethnographic study to understand 
how and why health system contextual factors affect leadership style and responses of 
hospital managers to frontline health workers and clients’ needs and the effects on frontline 
workers’ motivation to perform assigned tasks. Through participant observation, 
conversations (n=134) and in-depth interviews (n=52) with frontline health workers and 
managers they investigated managers’ decision making processes, leadership practices, 
administrative processes, communication and interactions between management and 
frontline health workers. They identified that different leadership styles affected health 
worker’s motivation with transformational leadership styles (as opposed to transactional or 
laissez-faire) leading to greater engagement by health workers in achieving the hospital’s 
vision for quality care and improving a hospital’s reputation. However, the ability of managers 
to demonstrate transformational leadership was limited by contextual factors which are also 
relevant for Nepal, such as their power over HR management processes or erratic or 
unreliable sources of funding. These limitations drove laissez-faire styles of management 
which adversely affected frontline worker motivation. This suggests that power to influence 
critical resources including the workforce mix, infrastructure development, drugs, medical 
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supplies and equipment is an important factor affecting the style of leadership that managers 
can employ. Therefore, the scope of managerial authority should be an important factor in 
health organisational policy.  
London et al (2013) in their examination of increasing autonomy of Vietnamese health 
facilities showed that enterprising leadership encouraged more independent decision making 
by hospital staff including over HR management. This included training, hiring contract staff 
and internal reallocation of staff to meet changing needs. A significant positive correlation 
also existed between autonomy and increased revenue. However, conversely to Aberese-Ako, 
London et al did not find that increased autonomy generated improved quality of care. Their 
data suggested the opposite with average lengths of stay and referral rates increasing in more 
autonomous facilities. There was also a concern that increased independence resulted in 
abuse of the system e.g. increased use of diagnostic equipment to receive financial incentives. 
London et al employed a cross-section design with an imitated control intervention. However, 
generalisabilty was affected by a small sample size and non-random sampling. Further, the 
paper makes no attempt to analyse the results against the literature and therefore does not 
engage with the global discourse on leadership or autonomy. What can be gleaned from the 
study, which is useful for this research in Nepal, however, is that autonomy doesn’t 
automatically lead to improved quality of care. Moves towards autonomy need to ensure 
appropriate statistical measurement of service quality and governance to prevent abuse of 
the system as well as supporting the development of a leadership that has a positive effect 
on organisational outcomes. 
That community participation is a key factor in successful health promotion initiatives has 
long been acknowledged internationally (WHO, 2001). To ensure positive health outcomes, a 
health facility needs to establish relationships with the community it serves and to 
demonstrate it is responding to local specific needs (Couper et al, 2005). This is not always 
achievable as some medical professionals may oppose changes that threaten their interests 
(Mckee et al, 2000). However, Couper identified that a sense of accountability and 
responsibility to the community are factors in establishing the successful delivery of positive 
outcomes. Dhakal et al (2009) in their qualitative study in one district on decentralisation in 
Nepal identified a key factor impacting on delivery of health services was that only about 50% 
of the local community groups involved in health (health facility management committees - 
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HFMCs), in the study district, were active. These were dominated by males with female 
members feeling they were there purely to make up the quota and unable to engage in 
designing services that were primarily meant to meet female needs such as maternal health 
care. This lack of engagement contributed to stagnation in improvements in equity and access 
to essential healthcare services for women of all ethnic groups. This highlighted the 
importance of the relationship between the organisation, and the community. Primary data 
were collected using in-depth interviews with key informants (n=37), focus group discussions 
(n=7), observation, analysis of raw data and document analysis. Secondary data were 
collected from the literature and health facilities records. This study benefited from 
triangulating data from both local and central level stakeholders. However, the district 
selected has different demographic and geographical characteristics from much of the rest of 
Nepal which reduces the study’s generalisability.   
Consistent with Dhakal’s findings, Gurung et al (2013) noted that where there are stronger 
HFMCs (i.e. previously trained, better informed and skilled) with more active participation of 
poorer castes and women, this has seen positive results in service utilisation and better-
quality outcome indicators over time. Gurung, through the USAID funded Nepal Family Health 
Program II, implemented a programme to empower and build the capacity of the HFMCs. The 
programme resulted in increases in the ability of the HFMCs to represent the poor and 
marginalised (lower castes and tribes); improved ability to raise funding to support facilities 
and improvement in the proportion of health facilities that were open with staff able to 
provide services. The study did not address those bottlenecks which adversely affect the 
ability of the HFMCs to operate, such as gaps in central level funding. Neither did it identify 
the overall gender imbalance of the HFMCs and the relative impact this might have had on 
service provision.   
In Kenya, Waweru et al (2013) undertook a study based on a nationally representative sample, 
to assess how prepared HFMCs were to undertake an expanded role in overseeing funds 
dispersed through the HSSF (section 2.4). They collected data through a sample of public 
health centres and dispensaries in 24 districts. Data collection included surveys with doctors 
(n=248), HCMC members (n=464) and facility users (n=698), and record reviews. This data 
was supplemented by semi-structured interviews with district health managers. This was a 
robust study with a nationally representative sample. It identified, amongst other findings, 
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that greater community involvement in holding the facilities and HCMCs to account was 
required.   
Despite the limitations of both Couper, Gurung and Marchal’s studies they do provide some 
evidence that supporting the development of leadership, participative decision-making and 
open communication internally and externally with the local community, can lead to an 
improvement in staff morale, reduction in absenteeism, a sense of ownership, and 
improvements in equipment, infrastructure and revenue generation. This indicates that 
whilst hospital performance is often largely attributed to resource availability issues, such as 
finance, human resources, equipment, drugs and supplies; there also should be a focus on 
leadership and management (values, trust, power, interrelationships, entrepreneurship and 
others) to drive improved outcomes (London, 2013; Mathole et al, 2018). Further, Dhakal 
(2009) and Gurung (2013) demonstrate that in Nepal the presence or absence of an engaged 
HFMC, that allows active participation of women and poorer castes, can affect both the 
uptake and delivery of services. HFMCs need training and support, to effectively undertake 
their role. Further, as noted in Dhakal’s study, an absence of an appropriate HR policy at 
national and district level created a critical bottleneck preventing a coherent and 
comprehensive HR strategy to be applied at facility level.   
 
2.5 Gaps in the evidence 
This study will fill a specific gap in the current body of evidence as to date there has only been 
one prior study that has incorporated the CEONC fund as part of its scope i.e. the Devkota et 
al service evaluation (2011). Whilst a broadly robust evaluation, it was not an academic study 
and was without the accompanying benefit of the creation of empirical evidence and 
comparison to the international literature. Overall, within the literature, particularly with 
regards to analysis of financing mechanisms by government there is a limited number of 
academic and peer reviewed studies. Of the eight health and education studies noted in 
section 2.4 reviewing facility financing mechanisms, only three were peer reviewed with five 
drawn from the grey literature. These studies had varying levels of rigour and whilst some 
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interesting results were highlighted, given their restricted nature, the reliability and 
generalisabilty of the results is limited. 
Expanding the literature search beyond financing mechanisms into management of health 
facilities has supported the identification of key features critical for the successful delivery of 
health services. This includes HR management and training, infrastructure, supplies and 
equipment and the enabling environment for service delivery, specifically leadership, 
management and robust financial management processes. The management literature is 
predominantly academic and has been peer reviewed (13 of 14 studies). However, a key 
weakness identified in several of the studies was a failure to triangulate data between the 
central and local levels. Focusing purely at the local facility level neglects the broader 
operating environment and systemic bottlenecks to which health facilities are subject.  
Within Nepal of the 4 peer reviewed studies 1 was from an NGO and whilst peer reviewed 
journals had an inherent bias towards favourable reporting of results, 1 dealt with 
management issues, 2 dealt with health policy and decentralisation, and 1 dealt with systems 
bottlenecks in relation to CEONC service provision. None dealt with management and 
financing mechanisms and CEONC service provision. No academic study to date has isolated 
the CEONC fund as a particular intervention or looked at its effectiveness as a mechanism to 
support the provision of CEONC services within the district hospital setting.  
These gaps in the literature stimulated the development of this study and the identification 
of the research aims and objectives detailed in section 2.8. It complements and adds to the 
existing literature providing this first comprehensive academic investigation of the CEONC 
fund and applying learning from the international literature on health facility leadership and 
management to the delivery of CEONC services in Nepal. The insights gained from this study 




2.6 Research question, aims and objectives 
2.6.1 Research question 
Why do some district hospitals in Nepal achieve better provision of CEONC services than 
others?  
2.6.2 Aim of the study  
The study’s aim is to explain the reasons for the disparity in provision of CEONC services and 
to identify factors that constrain or enhance the availability of CEONC services. The study 
focuses on the funding, systems and structures that influence the availability of CEONC 
services. Given the CEONC fund is purely a funding instrument, the study aims to identify 
whether simply providing additional funding is an effective mechanism for increasing 
availability of CEONC services in hospitals, or as the literature suggests other factors are 
important. 
2.6.3 Objectives of the study  
The objectives of the study are to: 
• Identify the factors (funding and other) affecting CEONC service availability at the 
hospital level.  
• Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the CEONC funding arrangements in 
securing a better utilisation of the CEONC services at the hospital level. 
• Determine factors which enable or inhibit utilisation of the CEONC fund at the central 
level as a contributor to the delivery of more efficient and effective CEONC services.  
• Explore lessons learned and make recommendations for future financing, 




This chapter has reviewed the literature which is relevant to addressing the research 
question. The chapter looks at ideas from other public service funding arrangements and 
several LMICs. This chapter briefly describes the Nepali arrangements for BEONC and CEONC 
services and the policy environment. It reviews the literature on the strengths and 
weaknesses of facility funding mechanisms in both the health and education sectors. This 
review highlights the significance of management on both the effective utilisation of finance 
and ultimately on the delivery and availability of services. Financial reform alone will not 
provide a more effective CEONC service unless accompanied by a management capable of 
taking advantage of that reform. The chapter therefore explores research on management 
practices, particularly as they impact on HR within healthcare. Finally, the chapter identifies 
the gaps in the literature and from that identifies the research question, aim and objectives 








Chapter Three: Methodology and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses and describes the philosophical paradigm, methodological framework 
and the design, developed to answer the research question and achieve the aims and 
objectives set out in Chapter Two. A comparative multiple case study methodology has been 
developed which utilises qualitative data and draws on financial data from the study sites. 
The design used a literature informed process to ensure internal and external reliability and 
validity. This chapter describes the choice of research sites, sampling method, data collection, 
fieldwork and analysis and the challenges and adaptations required to the approach given the 
difficult environmental and political context in Nepal during 2015 when data was collected. It 
also includes a critical analysis of the guiding theoretical framework which was used to 
develop the novel hybrid framework used for the study. The final section includes a 
consideration of the quality control, and ethical issues involved in the research. 
3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Research philosophy 
This study falls under health policy and systems research (HPSR).  HPSR investigates issues 
such as: how health care is financed, organised, delivered and used; how health policies are 
prioritised, developed and implemented; and how and why health systems do or do not 
generate health and wider social goals (Gilson, 2012).  “HPSR encompasses research on the 
policies, organisations, programmes and people that make up health systems, as well as how 
the interactions amongst these elements and the broader influences over decision making 
practices within the health system impact systems performance” (p.31 ibid). 
HPSR is multi-disciplinary and embraces a wide range of social and political realities. Research 
conducted within this paradigm can encompass several different epistemological and 
ontological positions as it seeks to understand complex causality drawing on comparative 
analysis to generate conclusions that are relevant in various settings (ibid). For the purposes 
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of this study, the three broad paradigms of positivism, interpretivism and critical realism were 
considered as the three principal lenses through which the study could be developed.   
From a positivist stand point within HPSR, the CEONC fund could be viewed as a specific 
intervention that could be tested in a quasi-experimental study. A controlled randomised field 
experiment was considered as an approach to test its efficacy. This would enable the causes 
and consequences of the implementation of the fund to be measured and identified through 
empirical research. However, pragmatically, given the CEONC fund exists and is operational 
the establishment of a controlled experiment was impossible. Further taking a purely 
positivist position would indicate that the CEONC fund, as an intervention, existed 
independently of how it is understood and seen by people.  Neither would it allow for the 
potential influences of the multiple actors that operate within the Nepali health system and 
the impact of different physical or temporal contexts on the fund’s efficacy (Hudson et al, 
1988).  
An interpretivist stand point would acknowledge that the effectiveness of the CEONC fund, 
as an intervention, arises through interaction among social actors. That it does not exist 
independently of these actors but is constructed through the way those actors interpret their 
experience, and that these interpretations change over time (Gilson, 2012). This approach 
would fit well with this study as would many of the qualitative methods utilised (in depth 
interviews, observations). However, the nature of interpretivist research is to understand and 
interpret the meanings in human behaviour rather than to generalise and predict causes and 
effects (Hudson et al, 1988; Neuman, 2000). Therefore, a purely interpretivist approach would 
limit the research ability to achieve its purpose of explaining why there is disparity in provision 
of CEONC services and to identify any causal factors that constrain or enhance their 
availability in the varying contexts.  
A third paradigm of critical realism was also considered. Critical realism is a philosophical 
reaction to positivist approaches to social science (Bhaskar, 2008). A positivist philosophy sees 
the world as quantifiable and observable and that scientific methods can be used to study the 
social world, whereas an interpretive approach places less emphasis upon natural sciences 
subject/object epistemology. Critical realism describes the interface between these two 
approaches (Bhaskar, 2008). Critical realism holds that knowledge is not independent of those 
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that produce it and is subject to change but on the other hand this exists apart from our 
knowledge and experience of them (Bhaskar, 1998). 
Within the context of this study, this is understood as whilst district hospitals in Nepal operate 
within a health system that provides resources it also creates limits which affect their 
capabilities. Managers have some flexibility to respond to local circumstances but that 
flexibility is constrained by central staff management actions which occur without local 
consultation. Ontologically, one of the central points in critical realism is the view that reality 
is constructed from generative mechanisms that produce events. These generative 
mechanisms are the way things act in the world and how they do this autonomously of 
humans (Bhaskar 2008).  
3.2.2 Critical realism in practice and context/mechanism/outcome configurations 
Pawson & Tilley (1997) propose realistic evaluation as a field method to uncover and assess 
the generative mechanisms within certain situational contexts, thus bringing the philosophy 
of critical realism to research practice. For a critical realist ontology within an HPSR 
perspective the dominant question is ‘What works for whom in which conditions?’ (ibid). As 
such, this approach embraces analytic or theoretical generalisability as well as using causal 
language to describe the world and understand why things are politically or pragmatically 
desirable (Gilson, 2012). Whilst this is not a fully-fledged realist evaluation study, it is inspired 
and informed by the approach. A realist evaluation study utilises a 
context/mechanism/outcome configuration (CMOC) to identify the contextual conditions 
that make interventions effective or not.  The CMOC identifies: the initial situation; the 
intervention designed to change that initial situation; the mechanism or underlying social or 
phsychological drivers that ‘cause’ the reasoning of actors; and the context that may provide 
alternative explanations of the observed outcomes (Figure 2) (Pawson and Tilly, 1997).  In a 
purist realist evaluation, the CMOC is developed at the start of an intervention and revisited 
and refined at various points throughout the study, with a final CMOC produced based on the 
analysis of evidence. From an HPSR perspective, a CMOC allows insights about the 
interactions between different (sometimes uncoordinated) interventions, communities, 
central and local implementers and health systems that make programmes more or less 
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successful.  This supports identification of lessons about how programmes produce outcomes 
and, therefore, inform policy decisions (Adams et al, 2016).  
Figure 2: Context/Mechanism/Outcome Configuration 
 
Source: Adapted from Pawson and Tilley (2004) p.6 
When the CEONC fund was developed no such CMOC was conceptualised: therefore, for the 
purposes of this study, a retrospective CMOC was developed.  This retrospective CMOC was 
developed through desk review of relevant government and research documents (that is, the 
initial guidelines for the CEONC fund, the Nepal Health Sector Plan (I) 2005-2010 and two 
studies from the grey literature, Suvedi et al, 2009 and Devkota et al, 2011) and through 
specific questions asked as part of the semi-structured interviews with central level 
informants who had been involved in the development and execution of the fund (CI1, CI2, 
CI6).    To create a retrospective CMOC, content analysis of these documents was undertaken 
searching for terms related to the purpose and intended outcome of the fund as an 
intervention and the specific context for delivery of CEONC services in Nepal during the early 
phase of development of the CEONC fund i.e. circa 2008. These findings were compared 
against qualitative data from the interviews to identify the mechanism by which it was 
anticipated the fund would work, i.e. the drivers that cause the reasoning of actors involved 
in the delivery of CEONC services.  As a result, a CMOC was developed that aimed to describe 
the implicit assumptions underlying the original design of the CEONC fund as an intervention 
(in 2008) and the context and mechanism by which it was intended to achieve outcomes 
(Table 4). A key assumption of the CEONC fund design was that there was a single context 
within which the CEONC fund was intended to operate and a clear pathway was assumed to 
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exist between the single intervention of additional funding and the outcome of increased 
CEONC service availability.  
Table 4: Intended CMOC for the CEONC fund 
Context Intervention Mechanism Outcome 
Lack of resources at the 
district hospital level, 
in particular human 
resources, restricts 
availability of CEONC 
services 












and provision of 
CEONC services 
 
As noted above, a key phase of realist evaluation is revisiting the initial CMOC utilising 
evidence-based findings. The purpose of this is to identify recommendations that reflect the 
realities of implementation (Adams et al, 2016). Therefore, following data analysis the 
retrospective CMOC above was revisited and refined (Chapter Five). This is a novel approach 
for Nepal and enabled explanations to be developed of why, how and under what conditions 
CEONC services can become established and therefore facilitates an understanding of the 
most appropriate solutions to secure countrywide improvements in CEONC policy and 
practice.  
3.2.3 Comparative case study methodology 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that for an explanatory study, if there are multisite data 
sources, qualitative methods can develop powerful general explanations. Further, Easton 
(2010) notes that the use of causal language to describe the world is a fundamental tenet of 
critical realism and that it is particularly well suited to case study research stating “It justifies 
the study of any situation, regardless of the numbers of research units involved, but only if 
the process involves thoughtful in-depth research with the objective of understanding why 
things are as they are.” (ibid, p.119). Therefore, from a critical realist and an HPSR perspective, 
a multiple case study methodology was selected as the most suitable to answer the research 
question. Within the critical realist perspective of the case study approach the case objects 
are identified to be ontologically ‘real’ i.e. they exist prior to the research act itself (Byrne et 
al, 2009) but that reality is socially constructed and social phenomena are intrinsically 
meaningful and therefore it requires an interpretivist epistemology to be able to understand, 
rather than measure or count, this meaning (Sayer, 2000; Easton, 2010).      
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Comparative case study analysis is of growing interest among HPSR researchers investigating 
health systems phenomena (Gilson et al, 2008; Marchal et al 2010b). This is because, health 
policy and systems are strongly influenced by, and often embedded in, contextual factors that 
necessarily become part of the focus of inquiry. Additionally, HPSR questions often require 
study of the complex behaviours and relationships between actors and agencies; and how 
relationships influence change, including over time. A case study approach benefits HPSR 
because of its flexibility. It supports exploratory inquiry; it helps generate ideas and concepts 
for follow-up work: it allows detailed description of particular experiences and enables the 
investigation of ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions: it allows analytic generalisation through a range 
of personal, organisational and societal factors, through cross-case analysis (Gilson et al, 
2011). This provides a pathway between research outcomes and practical application.  
Case studies are “an exploration of a ‘bounded system’ of a case or multiple cases over time 
through detail, in depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in 
context” (Creswell, 1998, p. 61). They are a useful mechanism in understanding a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-world context, particularly when the phenomenon 
and context are inextricably linked (Bromley, 1986; Yin, 2009; Yin, 2012).  
There are challenges in adopting a case study methodology. Historically they have not been 
seen as involving serious, rigorous inquiry because trust may be lacking in the credibility of 
the researcher’s procedures to protect against biases as well as a perceived inability to 
generalise case study’s findings (Yin, 2012). On balance, however, the strengths of the case 
studies methodology outweigh the challenges. This study therefore utilises an explanatory 
multiple case study design (Yin, 2003). The principal reasons for selecting such a methodology 











Table 5: Reasons for selecting comparative case study methodology 
 What the study is trying to achieve Why a case study methodology is appropriate 
1 This study aimed to develop an in-depth 
understanding of how and why variations 
occur in the extent to which districts hospitals 
provide CEONC services and the significance of 
the CEONC fund in determining availability.  
Case study research is a useful mechanism when 
answering descriptive or explanatory research 
questions i.e. the “hows” and “whys” of a 
phenomenon, particularly within a real-life 
context. It enables rich and thick data collection 
and analysis (Woodside et al, 2003; Yin, 2003; 
Schiele et al, 2010). 
2 The intention of this study is to identify and 
disentangle the complex factors and 
relationships that have evolved within district 
hospitals affecting the provision of CEONC 
services and with the central level 
management (the MoHP). 
Whilst focussed on a small number of hospitals, 
case studies are a useful mechanism to examine 
operational links (Easton, 2010; Yin, 1989; Yin, 
2003). 
3 The boundaries between the utilisation of the 
fund (i.e. the phenomenon) and how a district 
hospital reacts (i.e. the context) are unclear 
and would benefit from detailed analysis. 
A case study approach allows analysis of complex 
systems, considers external conditions and 
allows for rigorous and informed judgments 
about the interactions between the parts and 
the whole (Bromley, 1986, Keen et al, 1995; Yin, 
2009, Byrne et al, 2009).    
4 This research has practical implications for the 
government of Nepal, the delivery of CEONC 
services and CEONC fund management.   
Case studies are a methodology ideally suited to 
creating managerially relevant knowledge. 
(Gibbert 2008).  
5 The research aims to create new knowledge 
for policy and practice in Nepal 
The connection between the case study and 
empirical reality will allow the production of new 
knowledge relevant for both theory and practice 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Schiele et al, 2010). 
 
3.2.4 Designing the case study, reducing bias and ensuring validity  
To ensure this study addressed the challenges noted above (3.2.3), two systematic 
approaches to case study design were drawn on from two widely cited and acknowledged 
authors, Robert Yin and Kathleen Eisenhardt. Yin (2012) describes a simple three stage 
process for designing case study research viz: define a case; decide whether to use single or 
multiple, holistic or embedded units; decide whether to employ a theoretical framework 
(Figure 3). Yin suggests that “a case study that starts with some theoretical propositions will 
be easier to implement than one having no propositions” (p. 9). Basing the data collection and 
analysis on a theoretical framework would produce more valid and robust results, recognising 





Figure 3: Three steps to designing case studies 
 
Adapted from Yin (2012) 
To limit bias, Eisenhardt (1989) proposes research should ideally begin with no preconceived 
theories or hypotheses to test. Her approach permits the development of theory from data 
rather than attempting to falsify a hypothesis. Eisenhardt’s approach to case study 
methodology has 8 steps designed to ensure validity of the case study methodology (Table 
6).   
Table 6: Process of building theory from case studies 
 Step  Activity 
1 Getting started 
 
Defining research question 
Possibly a priori constructs 
2 Selecting cases 
 
Neither theory nor hypotheses 
Specified population 
Theoretical, not random, sampling 
3 Crafting Instruments and 
protocols 
 
Multiple data collection methods 
Qualitative and quantitative data combined 
Multiple investigators 
4 Entering the Field 
 
Overlap data collection and analysis, including field notes 
Flexible and opportunistic data collection methods 
5 Analysing data 
 
Within-case analysis 
Cross-case pattern search using divergent techniques 
6 Shaping hypotheses 
 
Iterative tabulation of evidence for each construct 
Replication, not sampling, logic across cases 
Search evidence for "why" behind relationships 
7 Enfolding literature Comparison with conflicting and similar literature 
8 Reaching closure Theoretical saturation when possible 
Adapted from Eisenhardt 1989 p.533 
Whilst these two approaches are diametrically opposed as one states that the research should 
begin with a theoretical proposition (Yin) and the other that there should be no such theories 
to test (Eisenhardt), there are parts of the process in each that are compatible and as a result 
the design of this research draws on a combination of these two approaches to design the 
Defining a case
•Generally a bounded 
entity





•deciding on single or 
mulitple case study 
design
•deciding on holistic 
(single unit of analysis) 
or embedded (multiple 
unit of analysis) design
•decide how many 
cases to include
Using theory in 
design work
•deciding whether or 





case study approach.  Fundamentally, the foundations are with Yin’s pragmatic approach, 
utilising an initial theoretical framework to help complete essential methodological steps, 
such as developing the research question, selecting the case, refining the case study design, 
and defining the relevant data to be collected as well as organising the initial data analysis 
strategies and generalising the findings from the study. However, additional activities from 
Eisenhardt’s were also seen valuable been used to add further structure to Yin’s steps.  Those 
activities that were drawn on from Eisenhardt in this research are bolded in Table 6 above 
and the combined approach laid out in Table 7.    
With the in-depth study of several cases there was the potential for bias to exist, for example, 
through investigators developing affection, sympathy or, indeed, antipathy towards the 
objects of investigation (Jupp, 2006; Bryman, 2012). The approach adopted, through the 
framework, helped to minimise bias (Maxwell, 2005; Bryman, 2012, Hepworth, 2013). Table 
7 shows the process by which the case study was designed and the steps taken to reduce bias.  
Table 7: Process of designing the case study research 
Step Activity Reducing Bias 
One: Getting 
started 
Following an initial literature review, 
the research question, aims and 
objectives were defined (2.8). 
Ensuring openness to contrary findings 
through critical analysis of the conceptual 
framework. 
Two: Defining a 
“case” 
The case object was a district hospital 
receiving CEONC funds  
Systematic district hospital selection in line 
with the sampling strategy (3.2.5) to ensure 
no district hospital was deliberately 




A holistic multiple case design was 
selected to provide greater confidence 
in the findings.  
Multi-case and multiple data collection 
methods were utilised to enable 
triangulation of data and reduce risk of 
chance associations. (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
Hepworth, 2013). Data was also collected 
from the central informants to provide an 
additional layer of interpretation and 
analysis of district hospital information. 
Four: Selecting 
cases 
The specified population for the cases 
was the 32 district hospitals in Nepal 
eligible for the CEONC fund in 2015. 
Cases were selected based on 
deliberately contrasting factors (3.2.5). 
The sampling strategy (3.2.5) was designed 
to ensure no district hospital was 




whether to use 





From the literature, a theoretical 
framework was developed (3.4) to 
refine the research question, structure 
the data collection tools, develop data 
analysis strategies, ensure that known 
and/or suspected factors were 
considered and to generalise findings. 
Ensuring openness to contrary findings 
through critical analysis of the conceptual 
framework and cross case analysis to 









Multiple data collection methods were 
selected including both qualitative and 
quantitative (financial) data (as 
appropriate) (although due to the 
limitations of the quantitative data, no 
quantitative analysis was undertaken). 
Multiple investigators were utilised. 
(3.5) 
Translated interview transcripts were 
reviewed by an independent third party to 
ensure transcription was accurate and 
avoided translation bias.  The principal 
investigator trained Nepali investigators 




Data collection and analysis 
overlapped and included field notes 
A ‘diary’ was kept to reflect on all aspects 
of the research and the responses of the 





Both within case and cross case 
analysis was used. (Chapter Four) 
Identification and analysis of discrepant 
data and negative cases. Discrepant data 
was assessed to determine whether 
conclusions needed to be adapted 
(Maxwell, 2005; Hepworth, 2013). Cross 
case analysis helped interpret findings (Yin, 
2009, Yin, 2003) 
Nine: Shaping 
Hypotheses 
Tabulation of evidence against each 
theoretical construct (Chapter Four) 
Cross case analysis used to investigate 





Comparison with conflicting and 
similar literature. Conclusions drawn 
from evidence and theory. (Chapter 
Five) 
Ensuring openness to contrary findings 
through critical analysis of the conceptual 
framework and cross case analysis to 
interpret findings (Yin, 2009, Yin, 2003)  
Process based on Eisenhardt, 1989 and Yin, 2012 
As noted above key criticisms of case study methodologies exist that must be considered. 
Principally these are that it lacks controls, that there is inadequate measurement of 
independent and dependent variables and that subjectivity or arbitrariness may affect data 
interpretation (Runyan, 1982). The critical question is how to trust the case study conclusions 
and judge the extent to which the findings address the concepts with which the research and 
cases are concerned. This is achieved through ensuring the validity of the data i.e. the 
appropriateness of the tools and processes used to collect the data. Specifically, this refers to 
the internal validity, construct validity, external validity and reliability (Gibbert, 2006, Mills et 







Table 8: Achieving validity in the case study research based on Mills et al (2010) 
Internal Validity: 
 
Using different methodological 
tools to “triangulate” the data 
 
 
The research framework was explicitly derived from literature 
utilising the theoretical framework to develop an explicit description 
of causal relationships between variables and outcomes; utilisation 
of a pattern matching analysis i.e. comparing theory with actual 
events and theory triangulation, using these as research framework 
and mechanism to interpret findings (Gibbert, 2006, Denzin et al, 
1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003, Trochim, 1989). 
Construct validity: 
 
Selecting the most appropriate 
measurement tool for the 
concepts being studied. Ensuring 
the data collection tools really 
measure what needs to be 
assessed 
Peers in Nepal reviewed transcripts of interviews. Participants/ key 
informants were not able to participate in this review due to the 
translation into English.  Translation was checked and back 
checked. A clear chain of evidence was maintained between the 
field researchers, the translators and transcribers and the author as 
principal investigator (Yin, 2009). Data analysis started immediately 
after the first case study field work was completed and continued 
during subsequent case studies.  
External validity or 
generalisability beyond the 
circumstances of the case to 
more general situations.  
 
This was achieved by undertaking multiple case studies; whilst 
statistical generalisation is not possible, the intention is for there to 
be analytical generalisation i.e. generalisation from empirical 
observation to theory (Gibbert, 2006). The number of case studies 
selected complied with Eisenhardt’s suggestion that cross-case 
analysis involving 4 to 10 case studies are a good basis for analytical 
generalisation. In addition, the breadth of participation from clinical, 
public health, management and central ministry level and the 
number of key informants contributes towards generalisability.  
Reliability:  
 
The extent to which the results 
can be repeated in ways that 
yield the same results. 
 
This was derived through a guide that was developed for the people 
collecting the data. This could also be used for replication by other 
researchers if required. A case study database was developed that 
includes the case study notes, the case study documents, tabular 
materials (e.g. quantitative data such as financial data) and the 
narratives collected during the study. This is hosted within NHSSP 
for confidentiality purposes, but organised in such a way as to 
facilitate retrieval for later investigators if suitable permission is 
sought (Gibbert, 2006; Yin, 2009). 
To confirm results, a preliminary report on findings was produced and circulated to critical 
peers, colleagues and key participants in the government of Nepal. The purpose of this was 
to enable them to offer alternative explanations, suggestions for data collection or flaws in 
logic or methods (Yin, 2009; Hepworth, 2013). This report was formalised into a consultancy 
report for the MoHP in January 2016.  
3.2.5 Sampling methodology 
Pettigrew (1988) notes that, given the limited number of cases that can be studied, it is 
neither necessary nor preferable to randomly select cases. As such, it makes sense to choose 
cases that represent extreme situations and polar types in which the process of interest is 
clearly apparent and from which emergent theory can be replicated or extended (ibid). This 
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study selected multiple case studies to enable systematic comparison, increase validity (Yin, 
2003; Schofield, 2006), and improve generalisability (Leonard-Barton, 1990; Lincoln et al, 
2006). The study recognises that the cases (i.e. the district hospitals) are complex systems and 
do not operate within a vacuum. There are multiple interactions not only within the district 
hospital (e.g. between clinical departments, such as obstetric and surgical and between 
clinical and administrative departments) but also externally, between the district hospital and 
the central department of health services (DoHS) in Kathmandu (Byrne et al, 2009).    
To identify results that would be widely applicable, the study selected four diverse district 
hospitals from the total population receiving CEONC funds at the time of sampling. The four 
sites were identified and selected using an extreme case selection framework (Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4: Sampling framework 
  Allocation of CEONC Fund FY 2013/14 
   
low 
(<2M NPR p.a.) 
high  




























s Below 5% Case Study A Case Study B 
Above 5% Case Study C Case Study D 
 
As shown in Figure 4, two broad delineators were used to segregate the total universe of 
district hospitals in receipt of CEONC funding: budget allocation of the fund and percentage 
of caesareans against total deliveries. A high budget allocation was identified as greater than 
NPR 2 million per annum. This funding amount is chosen in the absence of other data on 
financial allocations to the facilities and does not necessarily indicate an increased spend per 
bed or head. Service data based on numbers of caesareans was used as a proxy indicator for 
availability of CEONC services. Caesareans were used as a proxy for two reasons. Firstly, the 
activity is specific only to comprehensive rather than basic emergency obstetric care and is 
only performed at hospitals with surgical facilities. Secondly, caesareans are one of the 
59 
 
commonest obstetric procedures where complications exist, and reporting is relatively 
reliable (WHO, 2009). The Demographic Health Survey available at the time of data collection 
calculated the Nepal national rate for caesareans as 4.6% (MOHP et al, 2012). Using the WHO 
recommendations (Chapter One) an assumption was made that the percentage of deliveries 
by caesarean would be at least 5% this was used as the delineator between high and low 
caesarean rates. 
Once the districts were disaggregated by fund allocation and percentage of caesareans, 
additional factors were considered to select the districts. One factor was geographical spread, 
so that as many regions and ecological zones (i.e. mountain, hill, terai [plains]) as possible 
were represented.  This resulted in Eastern, Central, Western and Mid-Western regions and 
hill and terai ecological zones included in the sample (Rukum is designated Mountain and Hill). 
Geographical regions are important in Nepal as they are both a key equity marker and a 
parameter used by governments for planning, budgeting and delivery of health services (Sato 
et al, 2015). A geographical spread was also useful because the strategies to scale up services 
in the terai regions are different from those for the hills and remote districts (ibid). Once these 
factors had been identified, selection was then based on accessibility, affected by the 
earthquake recovery and civil unrest that the country experienced during April – December 
2015. Researchers (section 3.5) could visit all regions except for the far-west due to the civil 
unrest. One earthquake affected district was included in the sample. Table 9 and Figure 5 
show the 4 districts selected for this study (Appendix 5 has the full sample universe and a map 
with the study locations in the new federalised structure).  Since the field research was 
undertaken, the process of federalism has defined new provinces in Nepal. The table, 





























 No Western 5 terai 900 23 979 2.35% 










4000 15 449 3.34% 




Yes Central 3 hill 1200 132 1455 9.07% 












3.4 Development of the theoretical framework 
As an explanatory case study approach looking at causal relationships, two theoretical 
approaches were considered to frame the research. Firstly, factor theory and, secondly, 
explanatory theories (Yin, 2003, Jupp, 2006).  
Factor theory was a possible theoretical framework as it would comprise assembling a list of 
independent variables (e.g. availability of human resources, physical location, strength of 
management experience and skills) and determining those that are most highly correlated 
with the dependent variable (i.e. availability of CEONC services) (Yin, 2003; Keen et al, 1995). 
However, Yin (2003) and Simons (2009) identified that utilising factor theories may reduce 
validity as the limited number of data points available within the case studies might make it 
impossible to rank the factors in order of importance or develop a robust causal 
understanding (Yin, 2003, Simons, 2009). Therefore, utilising explanatory theories was 
considered as an alternative. 
Yin (2003) notes that, in comparison to factor theories, explanatory theories are more suitable 
for causal case studies. However, the challenge for this study was the lack of a single viable 
explanatory theory that adequately addressed management, financial and service delivery 
elements (ibid; Byrne et al, 2009).    
The literature review indicated that strengthening district health systems may benefit from a 
focus on developing well-thought through and well-coordinated policies and management 
procedures rather than relying solely on providing additional financial resources (Prashant et 
al, 2014). Consequently, a linkage should be developed between the specific funding 
intervention (i.e. the CEONC fund) and the performance of a hospital in delivering CEONC 
services. Two frameworks were identified that could provide the building blocks of an 
appropriate contextual theoretical model for this study. These were the human resource 
management framework developed by Puoane et al (2008) and the five management 
domains identified by Funk et al (2013). These two frameworks were selected as they were 
developed from studies that sought to identify how different facets of health facility 




3.4.1 Pouane et al theoretical framework 
The Puoane et al (2008) study (summarised in Chapter Two) reviewed why some facilities in 
South Africa achieve better care of severely malnourished children than others. This research 
explored the reasons for a disparity in outcome (fatality of children) and identified factors 
that constrain or enhance the quality of care. The study adopted a grounded theory approach 
to data collection in which each strand of information lead to further investigation of 
behaviour and activities with data collection continuing until saturation was reached. 
Interviewees were clinical staff.  
As noted in Chapter Two, six themes could be identified from the Puoane study: 
i.) Induction and in-service training; 
ii.) Supervision, support and leadership; 
iii.) Teamwork interaction and communication; 
iv.) Monitoring of performance and outcomes; 
v.) Attitudes towards the service being provided and patient care; 
vi.) Managerial awareness of progress in service activity and quality, including 
acknowledgement of their supervisory and leadership responsibilities. 
Together these six themes represent good managerial practice. They are categorised and 
disaggregated further in Table 10. 
Table 10: Puoane et al theoretical framework 





supervision and teamwork  
Managerial style, 
monitoring and leadership 
Staffing levels Availability of 
supplies 
Induction of new doctors Awareness of progress in 
service activity and quality 
Training / qualifications 
of staff   
In-service training Interaction and 
communication with staff 
    
Supervision Monitoring of performance 
and outcomes 
    
Teamwork and staff 
attitudes 
Perception of their role 
(supervisory and leadership 
responsibilities) 
      Leadership and support 
Adapted from Puoane et al (2008) 
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This Puoane research has relevance to this study as a similar concept is being explored i.e. 
why hospitals receiving the same intervention (additional funding) perform differently in their 
service delivery. Puoane used their results to infer a causal relationship between activities 
under the six themes and the ability of the hospitals to deliver high quality and effective 
services. The linking point between these six themes and the delivered quality of care was 
‘management’. These six themes provided a lens through which to view district hospitals in 
Nepal to help identify if a causal relationship existed between management practice and 
service provision. No literature on the quality of management and service delivery in Nepal 
expressed by these six themes exists. They therefore provide a novel approach for this 
research.   
In Chapter Two comments were made on the limitations of Puoane et al’s research. This Nepal 
study compensated for those limitations by consulting with a wider group of people. Further, 
whilst the Puoane study nominally took an inductive grounded theory approach to data 
collection, in practice the results remained within the confines of the six themes used to guide 
the data collection, no emergent themes were detailed. It was also unclear what basis the six 
themes had in theory or the literature. Therefore, whilst the Puoane framework could be 
applied it needed adjustment to ensure it was better grounded in theory and was sufficiently 
broad to encompass views on the health system beyond those experienced just by clinical 
staff. 
3.4.2 Funk et al theoretical framework 
An alternative study by Funk et al (2013) contrasted with Puoane’s (2008) inductive study as 
it was strongly deductive and set out to disprove a hypothesis. Funk’s study (see Chapter Two) 
examined specific hospital management practices in three sub-Saharan African hospitals 
looking at surgical productivity and quality. Contrary to Puoane’s study, Funk’s study was 
based on theory, drawing from management literature and research from the business 
community. Funk hypothesised that optimisation of five management domains—goal setting, 
operations management, talent management, quality monitoring, and financial oversight—
would be associated with enhanced surgical productivity. Each of these domains were further 
disaggregated into specific management practices (Table 11).   
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Table 11: Funk et al's management domains 























protocols in use 
and consistent 
with hospital goals  
Employees 
actively recruited  
Adherence to 
standardized 
protocols monitored  
Hospital finances 
examined by 














on performance  
Progress toward goals 







hospital needs and 





Surgical and executive 
leadership held 
accountable for 
progress toward goals   





meetings)    
Adapted from Funk et al (2013) 
Funk’s study has relevance to this research as it addressed the impact of hospital 
management practices in low resource settings on service availability and used a broader set 
of management indicators than Puoane. By including not only human resource and leadership 
focussed themes, but also operations management and financial oversight, plus the inclusion 
of non-clinical staff Funk allowed a more comprehensive understanding of the operational 
environment of a health facility. However, Funk’s study did not identify causal links between 
management and performance. The deductive nature of this study meant it focussed entirely 
on the five domains of management, which were assumed to be relevant to health service 
delivery, without seeking to identify if this encompassed all the factors affecting the delivery 





3.4.3 Combining and adapting the theoretical frameworks  
To develop a framework appropriate for the Nepali context, these two frameworks were 
combined, added to and adapted to develop a third novel framework aimed to provide a 
model of how the availability and delivery of CEONC services in Nepal should function. The 
process by which this was done was in three stages.  Firstly, the two frameworks were 
compared side by side and areas of overlap identified.  These areas of overlap formed the 
basis of the combined theoretical framework. Where the wording of themes / domains was 
different, but the premise was the same between the two models, preference was given to 
the terminology utilised by Pouane et al.  This was done based on the rationale that the 
Pouane study was a similar premise to this research, i.e. why some facilities perform better 
than others despite receiving the same initial intervention (training in case management of 
severe acute malnutrition in children in the Pouane research and the CEONC fund in this 
research) and therefore more likely to align to the findings of this study. Secondly, areas of 
difference between the two frameworks were then identified and either allocated under an 
existing theme (e.g. active recruitment and performance management from the Funk model 
was defined as human resource management and included under staffing and qualifications) 
or added as a separate category (i.e. financial oversight).  Thirdly, from the literature review 
and descriptions of the Nepali health system pre-federalism (Appendix 7), there were 
additional aspects of how a district hospital functions within the Nepali health system 
(particularly in terms of the relationship between the community, the facility and the central 
authorities) and financial management functions beyond those identified by Funk et al, that 
were considered to be potentially important to explore.  These additional aspects were added 
to the final combined framework.  
The final theoretical framework is shown in Figure 6 colour coded to identify which content 
was drawn from Puoane, Funk and this author.  This model was used to develop the 
framework for all the data collection methods, in the semi-structured interviews and during 
field observations.  It formed the preliminary guide for the deductive analysis of the data.  It 
was not field tested ahead of data collection, based on the premise that the majority of the 
framework had been tested through the Pouane and Funk studies. Based on the study 
findings and reflections on the utility of this initial version of the framework, it was 
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disaggregated, reorganised and emerging themes were included.  A revised framework is 
proposed in Chapter 6.   

























• Procurement  











support and team 
building 
• Interaction and 
communication 
• Target setting and 
monitoring of 
performance 
• Awareness of 
progress 
• Perception of their 
role 
• Relationship with 
MoHP/FHD  
• Relationship with 
local community 







• Financial Reporting 
• Independent auditing   
Adapted from Puoane et al 2008 (in green) and Funk et al 2013 (in red), additional in black from this author.  
3.5 Data Collection and Analysis Methods 
Yin (2003) advocates the use of multiple data sources for construct validity, to enable 
triangulation and ensure there are ‘thick’ descriptions and insightful explanations (Cousin, 
2005; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2012). For each of the case studies in this research, there were at least 
three types of data sources with data being compared within and across case studies to 
maximise validity.  
Data sources included archival records; semi-structured interviews with clinical, public health 
and management staff at the district level undertaken in Nepali (these were translated); semi-
structured interviews with key informants at the central level in Kathmandu undertaken in 
English which were transcribed and direct observation of operations at the case study sites.  
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3.5.1 Archival records 
Archival records are an invaluable tool of data gathering (Mills et al, 2010). Two categories of 
archival records were sourced for each district. Firstly, financial records: financial reports 
were sourced from the MoHP transaction accounting and budgeting control system (TABUCS) 
for the financial years 2013 to 2015. Financial information was also triangulated through the 
CEONC fund monitoring data (although this remained incomplete at the time of data 
collection). These records showed CEONC fund expenditure and acted as an indicator of 
financial management robustness within the district hospital and of financial reporting. 
Secondly, service delivery statistics at the district level were drawn from DoHS annual reports 
for the financial years 2009-2015 and from the hospital Health Management Information 
System (HMIS) for 2013-2014. This enabled identification of numbers of deliveries, utilisation 
of CEONC services and provided a cross reference on the quality and reliability of the service 
data available at both district and central levels.  
3.5.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Open-ended semi-structured interviews were used for gathering case study data and at the 
central level in Kathmandu. All staff with significant roles in CEONC fund implementation and 
delivery of CEONC services were identified and participated in interviews, the only exception 
was the Ilam Medical Superintendent who was absent during the field research. Overall 30 
district level interviews were undertaken and 9 central level interviews. Within each case 
study district, participants were selected from public health officials, hospital management 
and clinical staff working in the obstetric unit. At the central level, key informants were 
selected based on their current or historical involvement in the CEONC fund development or 
the oversight of CEONC services. During data analysis codes were assigned to each of the 
interviewees. Participants were coded by their primary area of responsibility of medical staff 
(MS); public health officer (PHO), hospital management (HM) or central informant (CI). Table 
12 shows the breakdown of interviewees within each case study. 
 
Table 12: Semi-structured interviews 
69 
 






Public Health Nurse PHO1 Nepali 
District Health Officer PHO2 Nepali 
Clinical Staff 
Auxiliary Nurse Midwife  MS1 Nepali 
Staff Nurse MS2 Nepali 
CEONC Doctor MS3 Nepali 
Medical Superintendent MS4 Nepali 
Hospital 
Management 
Accounts Officer HM1 Nepali 




Public Health Nurse PHO3 Nepali 
Clinical Staff 
Staff Nurse MS5 Nepali 
Anaesthetist Assistant MS6 Nepali 
Gynaecologist/Caesarean Provider MS7 Nepali 
Department Head - Nurses MS8 Nepali 
MeSu/District Health Officer MS9 Nepali 
Hospital 
Management 
HDC Chair HM3 Nepali 




District Public Health Officer PHO4 Nepali 
Clinical Staff 
CEONC doctor MS10 Nepali 
Medical Superintendent MS11 Nepali 
OT nurse (Matron) MS12 Nepali 
Department Head: Maternity Ward  MS13 Nepali 
Hospital 
Management 
HDC Chair HM5 Nepali 




Public Health Nurse PHO5 Nepali 
District Public Health Officer PHO6 Nepali 
Clinical Staff 
Department Head: Operating Theatre MS14 Nepali 
Anaesthesia Assistant MS15 Nepali 












CEONC Mentor/NHSSP Consultant CI1 English 
NHSSP Consultant CI2 English 
NHSSP Consultant CI3 English 
External 
organisation 
UNFPA CI4 English 
NGO CI5 English 
Government 
Government FHD CI6 English 
Government MoHP CI7 English 
Government FHD CI8 English 
Government MOHP CI9 Nepali 
Interview questions were aligned with the research question and the theoretical framework 
(section 3.4). They were adapted as the study developed. Open-ended interviews were 
chosen to allow discussion to flow and show the complexities that exist which are unique to 
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a context or may give rise to patterns across the contexts (Yin, 2003). Kvale (1996) outlines 
considerations for preparing for interviews and these were reflected in interview 
preparations and interviewer training (Table 13).  
 Table 13: Planning for interviews using Kvale’s guidelines 
Kvale’s guidelines How this was carried out 
Structured and clear 
(making clear the 




• Interviews were semi-structured with key guiding questions prepared and 
peer reviewed in advance. Peer-review was undertaken by NHSSP 
consultants and researchers to ensure quality. 
• An overview of the study was verbally given to each participant as well as a 
written copy. Verbal and written consent was obtained at this point.  
• Prompts were developed prior to interviews if needed to help participants.  
• The interviewer checked that all the ideas from prompts had been 
explored before moving on to another question. 
Gentle, open and 
sensitive (enabling 
subjects to say what 
they want to say in its 
entirety and in their 
own time and way) 
 
• Interviewees selected the interview time and venue as far as possible 
within the time constraints of the field visits. 
• The interviews were semi-structured with no specific time limit, just a 
guide for how long they would take.  
• Following the questions, interviewees were given the time they needed to 
answer each question. 
• At the district level, interviews were conducted in Nepali being the most 
comfortable for the interviewees. At the central level interviews were 
conducted in English (with one exception) as participants were a mixture 
of nationalities. (The research assistant was Nepali speaking fluent English 
and where the interviewees were Nepali she provided any necessary 





relating to them during 
the interview) 
• As each interviewee was only interviewed once, the interviewer would 








statements with the 
participant) 
 
• Additional questions were asked in the semi-structured interviews to seek 
further information on points of interest to the research, or clarification of 
a statement made. 
• Each interview was audio recorded and a research assistant took notes 
during the interview. This allowed the interviewer to actively listen to the 
participant’s answers. Digital recording was chosen for ease of data 
management and transcription. The transcription of each interview was 
typed up and reviewed by the interviewer within 48 hours of the interview 
 
3.5.3 Direct observation 
Mills et al (2010) note that direct field observations as an evidence source can contribute to 
a strong case study. They provide an opportunity for researchers to directly observe what is 
happening in the social setting, interact with participants, and participate in activities. This 
was used as the third source of data for the case studies. Field visits were made to each case 
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study site which enabled direct observations of district participants, organisational culture, 
behaviours and environmental conditions. The purpose of the field observations was to help 
triangulate the data collection from the interviews and to reflect any circumstances witnessed 
that might not be represented in the interviews. Field observations were guided by the 
theoretical framework and collected through formal field notes, a research diary and reported 
through discussions between the field and the author. Field observations were separately 
coded as FO in the analysis. Specific guidance was given to field investigators conducting 
direct observations (Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Direct observation guidance 
• Observe formal staff meetings (if occurring). Note interactions between senior and junior staff 
members e.g. if and how junior staff members express opinions/put forward ideas in formal 
meetings. 
• Observe informal interactions between staff e.g. between the DHO/DPHO and the MeSu: how 
do they behave towards each other? 
• Note conditions within the facility e.g. motivated/unmotivated staff; sufficient/insufficient 
resources; quality of equipment and facilities 
• Observe formal training (if occurring) and its nature e.g. participatory, skills based etc. 
• Observe informal training e.g. on the ward through ongoing mentoring of junior staff 
• Observe meetings which involve financial decision making. Note role of finance officers e.g. 
are they active participants in decision-making, providing advice or simply reporting figures.  
Structure of field notes  
• Date, time, and place of observation 
• Specific facts, numbers, details of what happens at the site 
• Sensory impressions: sights, sounds, textures, smells 
• Reactions to the recording of field notes 
• Specific words, phrases, summaries of conversations, and insider language 
• Questions about people or behaviours for future investigation 
• Page numbers to help keep observations in order 
3.5.4 Field work 
The original study design intention was for the author to undertake all the field work in May 
2015. However, in April 2015, immediately preceding the intended field visit, a massive 
earthquake hit Nepal followed by a second large earthquake in May 2015. During the summer 
of 2015, there was significant political upheaval which resulted in blockades of the Indian 
border and a fuel crisis. Consequently, travel within Nepal became severely restricted and 
international traveller access to districts outside Kathmandu became limited. Thus, a revised 
approach to data collection was needed. This meant that the only viable data collection route 
was to utilise Nepali researchers. Therefore, through NHSSP, three Nepali researchers were 
identified who were experienced qualitative researchers (each had PhDs and their work 
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included a substantial element of research). Considering Kvale’s (1996) guidance that "unless 
the interviewer is well acquainted with the various topics of the interview, he is not likely to 
be effective" (p.148), it was a requirement that the researchers were conversant with the 
CEONC fund and with CEONC service delivery. To maintain quality and consistency across the 
case studies a research pack was developed that included: 
• a basic data sheet for each facility 
• a consent form (in English and Nepali) 
• guidance on direct observation methods, how to write field notes and on how to 
conduct interviews 
• a participant information sheet (in English and Nepali) 
• a peer reviewed research protocol 
• a semi-structured interview tool 
• key literature that informed the theoretical framework 
• the theoretical framework.  
Additionally, a training session via Skype was undertaken individually with each Nepali 
investigator prior to field visits. This ensured each of them had extensive knowledge of the 
interview themes, could conduct an informed conversation about the topic and knew what 
issues were important to pursue (ibid). The author, as principal investigator, oversaw all the 
case studies and held detailed discussions with each researcher before, during and after the 
field work.   
In practice these changed arrangements had benefits. Firstly, given the greater travel 
flexibility of the Nepali researchers, there was the potential to undertake case studies in 
remoter districts over a longer period. The original intention was to collect data during May 
2015 but this was extended to December 2015. This enabled an increase in the potential 
universe of case objects. Secondly, data collection by Nepali researchers meant that 
interviews could be conducted in the interviewee’s language creating a more comfortable 
environment and removing the barrier of both a foreign interviewer and an interpreter. 
Thirdly, collection of direct observation data was improved as no interpretation of meetings 
or discussion was required. Fourthly, as this author was not undertaking field visits more time 
for data analysis and comparison was available with results fed back as interviews were 
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underway. Fifthly, to avoid the risk of bias as researchers may have a subjective view where 
they have met the informants and become immersed in case details the separation from the 
case study field work allowed the author to take a more objective overview of the evidence. 
Sixthly, having multiple investigators facilitated divergent perspectives to be identified 
(Pettigrew, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989).   
3.5.5 Data Management and Analysis 
Data Management  
A case study database was developed (Yin, 2003) containing the raw data. This database could 
be available for future investigators to review the evidence directly (if permission is sought 
from the MoHP and NHSSP with consent as necessary from participants). Data was stored on 
the author’s laptop and backed up on a password protected USB stick. The database 
comprises: 
• case study notes including reflective analysis/research diary and observations. 
• interview tapes and transcripts: all interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
anonymised. Where the interviews occurred in Nepali they were transcribed and 
translated into English and then back translated into Nepali for comparison with the 
original transcript. 
• case study documents: all documents obtained during the study.   
• tabular materials such as financial data and service utilisation data. 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis and interpretation was undertaken following the approach described by 
Wolcott (1994) i.e. combining, organising and evaluating the data through description, 
analysis and interpretation. The analysis explored how things work or not using cross case 
analysis to identify key factors, relationships and patterns from the data. Interpretation 
focussed on meaning, particularly comparing with the literature (Simons, 2009).  Two 
processes of data analysis were undertaken, both inductive and deductive.  The rationale for 
utilising two approaches was to try to limit bias in the interpretation of the data.  That is, but 
undertaking an inductive process first the aim was to not limit interpretation to the 
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theoretical framework.  Then undertaking a deductive analylsis process against the 
theoretical framework to enable comparison, utility of the theoretical model and 
identification of additional issues.  
All data from the semi-structured interviews and direct observations were uploaded to Nvivo. 
Preceding the data analysis, the author immersed herself in the case study data, including the 
interview transcripts.  
For the inductive analysis, a general inductive thematic analysis approach was followed 
(Thomas, 2006).  Data analysis was guided by the research questions, multiple readings and 
interpretations of the raw data. The raw data was approached without a priori expectations 
of the results.  The raw data was allocated into categories and coded.    Each category was 
given a short label that reflected the specific feature of the category and a description of the 
category, including key characteristics, scopy and limitations.  Data coded into these broad 
categories were sub-categorised and linked in a hierarchical category system. Mindmaps were 
drawn to help visualise the key themes and recurrent themes were individually coded as they 
were identified. Decisions about what was more or less important was based on frequency of 
mentions from multiple sources and triangulation between district and central level data. 
Throughout the analysis process, there was continuing revision and refinement of the 
category system. These categories were subsequently incorporated into the overall model in 
an open network (i.e. no hierarchy or sequence between the categories) (ibid).   
For the deductive data analysis, the data was reviewed again in its raw state and coded 
thematically against the theoretical framework.  Data that did not fit the existing theoretical 
framework was then compared against the model formed through the inductive analysis 
process.  
All data were examined within the context of the individual case study. As noted by Mills et 
al (2010), this enabled immersion in the circumstances of each case study. Additional desk 
research was undertaken by the author on the wider context of the district to fully understand 
the hospital’s operational environment.   
Each case study was written up in detail to support the generation of insight (Eisenhardt, 
1989) such as to identify unique attributes and patterns in the data (see Appendix 6 for the 
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case study descriptions). Thematic analysis was used to identify and search for themes, 
reviewing themes, defining themes and writing up (Clarke et al, 2013). As proposed by Yin 
(2003) the analysis compared how the patterns evident in the case data fit with the 
theoretical framework and looked for plausible and rival explanations within the case that 
could suggest causal or interactive linkages within the health system.  
Following the ‘within case analysis’ a ‘cross-case analysis’ was undertaken. This analysed data 
against the framework in two different formats. Firstly, data was aggregated across the case 
studies and, as demonstrated by Leonard-Barton (1988), tabular displays and graphs of 
information about each case were used to compare data. Specific categories were identified, 
based on the theoretical framework to look for within-group similarities as well as intergroup 
differences (Eisenhardt, 1989). Secondly, an analysis of the data looking for convergent and 
divergent data between the supposedly similar and different case studies, was undertaken. 
For example, looking for the reasons why some hospitals perform poorly and others well in 
terms of caesareans irrespective of the volume of CEONC funds they receive. 
3.6 Ethical considerations 
3.6.1 Ethical Approval 
Prior to conducting the fieldwork, ethical approval was granted for the research from the 
University of Bath from its REACH committee (reference EP 14/15 135), in accordance with 
its research ethics policy. In Nepal, the Nepal Health Research Council granted permission to 
conduct the research in line with the research protocol (Reference No: 1906) (Appendix 4).   
3.6.2 Informed consent  
Before each interview a written briefing of the study was provided to the interviewee and 
written consent requested. This included the freedom to withdraw from the study at any time 
prior to data analysis. Once the case studies were completed the Nepali researchers 
submitted the signed consent forms to the author.   
With participant observation, there is no clear line between when the research starts and 
stops, unlike an interview which is structured as separate from regular activities. To mitigate 
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this the author ensured that the Nepali investigators were transparent and open about the 
objectives of the research.  
3.6.3 Anonymity and privacy 
Anonymity and privacy were respected unless clear agreement to the contrary was reached 
with the participant. However, the nature of case study research meant that some findings 
could not easily be disguised without distorting the research and participants were made fully 
aware of these limitations prior to data collection as part of the informed consent process. 
In the preliminary report that was submitted to the MoHP, the names of the districts and 
participants were anonymised. Central level findings were also anonymised. However, to 
differentiate between interviewees at the district level working in either the DHO/DPHO, 
HDCs, medical staff and central interviewees, broad classifications of ‘public health officer’, 
‘medical staff’, ‘hospital management’ and “Central Informant” have been utilised.  
3.6.4 Data security 
All data held electronically was password protected and only those directly assisting in the 
research had access. Long term, data will be transferred to a password protected areas of the 
NHSSP server. Only personal data that was strictly necessary for the research was collected 
and retained and specific consent was obtained for its use.    
3.6.5 Whistle blowing policy 
Given the nature of the discussion around financing arrangements the possibility that fraud 
might be uncovered as well as the potential to identify clinical poor or malpractice was 
discussed with the University of Bath. Thus, a ‘whistleblowing’ policy was established.  
Fortunately, it did not need to be utilised.  
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter the methodology used in this research is discussed.  The research design is 
described and the theoretical framework which shaped the processes of data collection, 
analysis and case study design is introduced. The approach to sampling is described and the 
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challenges and opportunities presented by environmental and political circumstances 
detailed. The specific methods used to collect data are described as are the processes for the 
analysis of that data. Finally, the author considered the ethical implications of conducting the 
case study research in Nepal.  
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Chapter Four: Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a cross-case analysis of the data, comparing and contrasting results 
from the four hospitals. It is structured as follows: 4.2 describes the operational arrangements 
and perception of the fund drawing on archival and interview data; 4.3 describes the case 
studies based on desk based research, service statistics and archival data; 4.4 onwards draw 
out the themes based on the case study data (principally archival data, semi-structured 
interview and field observations) and triangulated with the central level interviews. This 
chapter draws on the case descriptions in Appendix 6 and the description of the health system 
in Nepal in Appendix 7. The cross-case analysis aims to identify key factors, relationships and 
patterns from the data. The approach described by Wolcott (1994) was followed (Chapter 
Three) to organise and assess the data through description, analysis and interpretation. The 
main themes are illustrated with direct quotes from study participants 7 . Utilising the 
theoretical framework this chapter shows the themes that were identified from the data 
finding patterns between the better performing and poorer performing hospitals with the 
implications for the CEONC fund. These results are discussed and compared against the 
literature in Chapter Five.  
4.2 The CEONC fund 
To set the context a brief description of the CEONC fund is given, describing how it works in 
theory and in practice (Table 14). The general perceptions of key informants the fund and the 








7 NB: quotes from the districts are using the translated text which is translated to capture the Nepali use 
of language rather than sanitised into Queen’s English.  
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Table 14: How the CEONC fund is designed and how it functions in practice 
Functionality Design Practice 
Fund size 
 
Depends upon national budget 
settlement but is intended to 
finance perceived deficiencies in 
areas such as equipment and 
supplies and community 
interaction, plus funds to pay for 
contract staff to fill vacant posts 
in each clinical cadre required to 
deliver CEONC services. The 
fund size has increased as more 
hospitals have been covered.  
No annual budgetary calculation exists of the 
current total cost of CEONC services. No 
calculation is made of the additional budget 
required to provide an extended CEONC service 
across Nepal. No quality of service objective is 
specified. No reliable actual financial and 
statistical information is available about current 
CEONC activity. The annual CEONC fund budget 
need is assessed by the FHD based upon their 
understanding of what is required with no 
consultation with hospitals. That sum is then 
adjusted as necessary to reflect Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) pressures. 
Allocation to 
districts 
CEONC fund allocation to district 
hospitals is based on FHD view 
of hospital need (e.g. staffing 
gaps, equipment gaps). No 
consultation was planned with 
hospitals and no financial or 
statistical information 
introduced to assess funding 
requirements.  
Central allocation of CEONC Funds to district 
hospitals based on FHD view of need (in practice 
the CEONC mentor’s understanding of the 
hospital need). No consultation occurs with 
hospitals and no financial or statistical 
information is used to assess funding 
requirements. This process raises the question 
whether a single individual can have accurate, 
comparative and comprehensive knowledge 
without supporting data and with no 
consultations. This process was judged 
satisfactory initially as only a few hospitals were 
supported. Currently many more are supported 




Intended to supplement the 
hospital’s annual budget.   
Acts as a supplement to a hospital’s annual 
budget. Some hospitals still have no core 
funding for CEONC services.  
Flexibility Flexible: Intended to allow 
recipient hospitals to fund 
staffing (using temporary 
contracts), training, equipment 
and supplies, infrastructure or 
community outreach as local 
needs required.  
Inflexible allocation based on the CEONC 
mentor’s assessment of need. In 2015, post-
earthquake, because of budgetary limitations 




No technical support to CEONC 
services built into the 
programme. 
One single mentor to provide technical support 
and skills building to all district hospitals as 
CEONC fund has expanded.  Provides support to 
as many districts as possible. Intended to 
provide remote and in person training and 
mentoring in the provision of CEONC services – 
e.g. coaching on provision of caesareans.  
Intended to be government position in the FHD, 
though it isn’t currently (see footnote 2). 
Financial 
reporting of fund 
expenditure 
No financial tracking 
accompanying fund built in the 
design. No audit of whether the 
funds were used to support 
CEONC activities specifically.  
Limited and ad hoc financial tracking, partly 
through additional financial reporting template 
(introduced in 2014) and through the MoHP 
TABUCS. No single person responsible for 
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Functionality Design Practice 
tracking expenditure against the fund. Quality of 
financial reporting is poor.  
Statistical 
reporting 
No statistical tracking of CEONC 
activity was envisaged. 
No statistical tracking of CEONC activity is 






No recognition that CEONC fund 
allocations could vary annually 
and substantially.  
CEONC fund allocations vary annually and 
variations can be considerable. This makes 
funding of the CEONC service unstable. No 




Intended to be a short-term fix 
allocated to specific districts. 
Expanded as a top up budget to all districts, - 
now a long-term fix (NHSS 2015-2020).   
Release of the 
fund 
Annually in July at start of 
financial year. 
Varies substantially year by year depending on 
when overall government budget is approved 
and released by cabinet. Has been released up 
to 4-6 months into the financial year. But no 
carry over to the next financial year is permitted 
so temporary staff contracts must cease at 
financial year end. 
 
FHD has encouraged hospitals to commit 
expenditure before the CEONC budget is 
settled. Some are reluctant to do so and 
uncertainty over the funding level discourages 





sanctioned posts   
Single financial year contracting 
only. 
Single year contracting. But as budget releases 
can be late into the financial year actual 
contract lengths can be truncated. Contracts 




Receive higher pay for being on 
short term contract; no 
additional benefits of housing, 
career progression or training.  
Receive higher pay for being on short term 





Overseen by the FHD.  Overseen by the CEONC mentor (not 




and any CEONC 
funding 
Varies depending on hospital 
size. DHO manages services and 
funding at <25 bed. The hospital 
management manages services 
and funding at >50 bed.  
Varies depending on hospital size. DHO 
manages services and funding at <25 bed. The 
hospital management (MeSu) manages services 
and funding at >50 bed.  In practice, some 
confusion over fund management.  
Footnotes:  
1. In its workforce planning the MoHP allocates a certain number of permanent positions (sanctioned posts) 
across each cadre of medical staff to each hospital. However, this allocation is still based on the 1991 
Health Policy, despite a population increase of 45% since 1991 (Shrestha et al, 2012). This inevitably causes 
the focus of allocations to be on staffing. 
2. The mentor, although nominally filling a government position is not a civil servant but is a contracted 






Even though CEONC funding has deficiencies reactions from case study interviewees were 
overall positive. It is perceived to have increased service availability and patient flow.  
“CEONC is an essential element. A positive side is that people have realised that they 
don't have to go out for caesarean services. People didn't come to the hospital for 
child bearing before. But these days they come and when they can't stand the labour 
pain, they will go for operation.” HM2. 
“It has provided benefits. Mother and child are kept safe by caesarean services. 
Children get immunisations. The health of mother and child gets better” MS5 
Anecdotally the programme has helped improve maternal survival, (although not verified by 
service data). It is perceived to have contributed to a reduction in onward referrals, which has 
economic benefits for both the community and individuals as referrals can incur great cost.  
“This service has had very good impact, it has saved the lives of mothers. We did not 
have any maternal death last year.” PHO6 
“It is running well. Mothers do not need to go elsewhere for a caesarean. Staff are 
feeling confident for the delivery; if any complication happens, caesareans are there 
for back up. It is a risk for both mother and child if they were referred to Nepalgunj. 
The economic burden of the community is reduced and it has also reduced individual 
economic burden.” PHO3 
“The human resources are increasing. In the past, there was one paediatrician and 
me. Now, we have one surgeon. Our confidence has risen about doing the 
complicated cases too. The team is ready even if the case arrives at night like at 12.00 
or 1.00 am.” MS10 
The aim to recruit additional staff on contract to fill gaps is appreciated. The availability of 
more staff has encouraged district hospitals to accept more complicated cases and to move 
towards a 24/7 availability.   
However, there are some challenges as the following quotation shows. These are explored in 
the cross-case analysis below.  
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“Emergency obstetric care aims at saving the life of mother and child. The most 
important thing is to reduce maternal mortality and neonatal mortality. I think this is 
the strength of CEONC. The CEONC program was launched in Prithvi Chandra Hospital 
under the government of Nepal. The provision of recruiting doctors, nurses, 
paramedics, etc. in contract under the program is an extremely good aspect. 
However, there are also downsides of the project.” PHO2 
4.3 The Case Studies 
A map of Nepal showing the geographical location of the case study districts was included in 
Chapter Three. Using the 2011 census data the districts range considerably in population size. 
Using a 5% Caesarean rate for the districts those with a higher rate are classed as ‘performing’ 
and those with a below 5% are classed as poorly performing. One district had a Caesarean 
rate of 4.68% but the hospital rate was well above 5% and this will be classed as ‘performing’. 
Table 15 shows basic data for each of the case study districts.  
Only Rukum, a poorly performing district and hospital, was classed as ‘remote’ and its 
population has above average poverty levels. Nawalparasi has neither of these environmental 
problems but was a poorly performing district and hospital. Makwanpur, is a good performing 
hospital and, being only 87km, from Kathmandu is easily accessible. Ilam is a good performing 
district with a hospital which has a high caesarean rate. It is 525km from Kathmandu.  Whilst 
Rukum could be adversely affected by its remoteness and Makwanpur benefits from its 
proximity to Kathmandu, Nawalparasi and Ilam’s performance suggest that other factors, 
besides geography, are important. The case study analysis, using the theoretical framework, 








Table 15: District information for each case study. 
 Nawalparasi  Rukum Makwanpur Ilam 
 
Low Caesarean rate High Caesarean rate 
Low CEONC fund 
grant 
High CEONC fund 
grant 
Low CEONC fund 
grant 
High CEONC fund 
grant 
Region Western Mid-Western Central Eastern 
Type of district Terai Hill/Mountain Hill Hill 
Remote / Not remote Not remote Remote Not remote Not remote 
Area 2,162 Sq. Km 2,877 Sq. Km 2,426 Sq. Km 1,703 Sq. Km 
Distance from Kathmandu 251km 409km 87km 525km* 
Poverty levels against 
national average  
Below Above Below Below 
Est. District population (in 
2013/14) 
661,107 212,982 422,626 289,531 
Recorded no. of deliveries 
supported by health 
worker in the district (in 
2013/14) 
4,294 2,266 2,819 1,828 
Expected no. of Caesarean 
in the district based on 5% 
of recorded deliveries 
215 113 141 91 
Actual no. Caesarean 
(2013/14)** 
23 15 132 167 
District hospital size (no. 
of beds at time of data 
collection) 
25 15/25 50 25+ 
Overseen by 
DPHO/DHO*** 
DHO DHO DPHO DPHO 
Total deliveries in the 
hospital (2013/14)** 
979 449 1455 833 
Caesarean rate for the 
hospital 
2.35% 3.34% 9.07% 20.05% 
Caesarean rate for the 
district 
0.54% 0.66% 4.68% 9.14% 
CEONC fund grant 
(2013/14) 
900,000NPR 4,000,000NPR 1,200,000NPR 2,900,000NPR 
* Ilam is not classed as ‘remote’ because this term refers to various human development indicators and 
accessibility. Ilam is a hub for the Eastern region with good flight and transport connections. 
** from the HMIS hospital data. 
 
*** At the district level, depending on the size of the district hospital, responsibility for all health activities, 
including the organisation and management of district hospital, lies with either the District Health Offices 
(DHO) (if the hospital is a 15 or 25 bed facility) or the District Public Health Offices (DPHO) (if the hospital is 
a 50-bed facility). The DHO/DPHO has responsibility for administration of the budget and human resources, 
planning, monitoring and evaluation of district health service activities and supervision of health facilities 
activities and the activities of the peripheral health staff (see Appendix 7). 
Sources: DoHS (2014/15) HMIS; UNDP (2014) 
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4.4 Staffing and Qualifications 
Significant differences in staffing, qualifications and human resource management were 
identified from the analysis (Table 16).   
Table 16: Staffing and qualifications 
 
Low Caesarean rate – 
 poorly performing 
High Caesarean rate - 
performing 
Central level perspective Low fund High fund Low fund High fund 
Theoretical 
framework 
Nawalparasi Rukum Makwanpur Ilam 
Staffing • No sanctioned staff 
responsible for CEONC 
services employed. 
• No additional funding for 
staffing from HDC. 
• Only one doctor available 
fulltime.  
• One or no anaesthetist or 
anaesthetist assistant (AA) 
available fulltime. 
• Reliant on staff taking on 
multiple roles / task 
shifting. 
• Limited numbers of OT 
nurses.  
• No staff available at certain 
points of the year.  
• Sanctioned staff responsible 
for CEONC services 
employed. 
• Staff costs partly funded by 
HDC. 
• More than one doctor 
available fulltime (up to 
three). 
• Have anaesthetist, OT and 
other staff available all year. 
• In Makwanpur, multiple 
anaesthetists available.  
CEONC fund only 
intended to fill gaps in 
sanctioned staffing. But 
may still be insufficient if 
allocated sanctioned 
posts are inadequate for 
needs or non-existent. 








or training out 
of date. 
Staff have appropriate training 
before being employed.  
Acknowledge that in 
remote districts finding 
suitably qualified staff 
can be challenging.  
Local HR markets poor, 
particularly for some cadres 
of staff e.g. anaesthetists.  
Contracting difficult. 
Local markets sufficiently 
buoyant to be able source 
qualified and experienced 




Because of financial reliance 
solely on the CEONC fund 
when delayed budget release 
occurs, full year contract 
staffing is not feasible. This 
inhibits ability to 
continuously retain staff. 
New recruitment process is 
lengthy which adds to delay if 
late release of funds.  
Holders of sanctioned posts 
have permanent contracts. 
Because HDC will provide 
finance, additional contract 
staff can be appointed and are 
not subject to restrictive 
conditions which cause delay.   
No progress made with 
the MoF to allow multi-
year contracting. 
 
Ad hoc staff transfers made 
by MoHP without 
consultation affect ability to 
deliver. 
No mention 
of ad hoc 
transfers. 




Lack of HR planning 





4.4.1 Staffing, including recruitment 
Multiple staff in key cadres such as doctors, OT nurses and AAs are critical to continuous 
service delivery. However, the CEONC fund only finances one post in each cadre. The poorly 
performing hospitals had a common feature, namely insufficient numbers of staff to deliver 
services. They often only had the minimum number of people in each position (for example, 
one doctor or AA) and if a vacancy occurred this affected performance. Or, if a second 
qualified person was available, this was often only part time. For example, in Nawalparasi, an 
anaesthetist vacancy adversely affected the surgical team’s ability to undertake caesareans.  
“When there was an anaesthetic assistant, I could manage my time well. But since I 
have to do it all on my own now, this has affected my work directly and indirectly.” 
(MS4) 
In Rukum, if the doctor able to perform caesareans is absent no CEONC service is available 
and patients must be transferred elsewhere. 
“cases were referred some times when I was alone, with no support staff; and 
sometimes when I was absent. We do not do elective cases here. We do only very 
needy cases………..We did 29 cases of Caesarean last year; about 10 cases were 
referred out.” (MS7) 
Because the poorer performing hospitals were also entirely reliant on the CEONC fund they 
were particularly affected by budget release delays. This caused gaps in staffing and therefore 
in service delivery.  
“When CEONC grant is there, we can provide services for 2-4 months and when the 
project is not there, we can't offer services. It would be nice to provide services round 
the year and forever.” (MS2)  
Conversely, the better performing hospitals had at least three staff in key positions because 
they had diverse sources of funds. This meant services could be continuously provided and 
the hospital was less affected by delays in budgetary release. For example, Makwanpur has 
high staffing using budgeted sanctioned posts, CEONC funding and the HDC funding. Two 
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caesarean trained doctors, two staff nurses, six auxiliary nurse midwives (who are lower 
skilled than nurses) and one anaesthesiologist and two AAs. 
“I think it is good to have three staff. One should look after the emergency cases, the 
second should take the extra delivery and the third should see the post-operative ward” 
(MS10) 
This disparity in staffing arises because sanctioned post allocations and health service delivery 
arrangements were fixed in 1991 when the population was smaller.  They do not reflect the 
development of CEONC services nor the changing needs and size of the population. The cross-
case analysis shows the CEONC fund size and distribution arrangements do not properly 
reflect local needs and that not all hospitals have access to other sources of funds. Financing 
problems are compounded because significant fluctuations occur in grant allocations between 
years. For example, Nawalparasi experienced the grant doubling between FY 2013/14 and 
2014/15. This creates uncertainty and inhibits planning. 
“We don't have any idea at all how much budget is released, how it is described in 
the red book, which donor agency is involved, etc. As we don't receive clear 
information, confusion is created. The planning for the CEONC program is done by the 
centre.” (PHO2) 
The ability of district hospitals to appoint contract staff is affected by the buoyancy of the local 
HR market. Those markets in the districts of the better performing hospitals were more 
buoyant with hospitals able to recruit appropriately skilled staff. Makwanpur benefited from 
its proximity to Kathmandu. The poorer performing hospitals experienced inferior local 
markets. For example, in Nawalparasi, the AA position became vacant. The local market for 
suitably trained anaesthetists is poor, consequently, this position was vacant for a year.   
“For three years, we had an anaesthetic assistant in the hospital itself, but he has 
been transferred from here to a nearby health post. No one has applied for the 
position although we had put out an ad about this. We have needed an anaesthetic 
assistant for the last year.” (MS4) 
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Rukum, is another example of a remote district facing recruitment difficulties.  This ‘local 
market’ problem was acknowledged by central officials concerned with CEONC services as a 
major issue. The only solution offered was increased salaries paid for from the CEONC fund. 
This is an inadequate response. The solution requires a national policy review into recruitment 
and training including other HR matters such as pay, incentives and opportunities for personal 
development. 
Local HR market buoyancy adversely affects the poorer performing hospitals (Nawalparasi 
and Rukum) where they had long term sanctioned position vacancies and were reliant on 
contract staff funded by the CEONC fund. Delayed budget release, lack of financial 
predictability and lengthy tendering processes severely impacted their ability to provide 
regular services. Contract staff could only be appointed for short periods and each financial 
year the whole process had to be repeated once funding had been received (Figure 8). To try 
to overcome the problems and at least lengthen the period of availability of CEONC services, 
staff have been asked to work voluntarily or accept a period of time at the start of the financial 
year where they do not receive a salary on the promise of back pay once budget is released.  
This is a very unsatisfactory ad hoc arrangement.  
Figure 8: Example annual timeline of services of a poorer performing facility 
 
In the better performing hospitals of Makwanpur and Ilam, this staffing challenge was 
mitigated partly because fewer vacancies of sanctioned posts occurred and where there were 
gaps, the HDC financed contract staff. Contract staff appointment processes could therefore 
commence immediately in a new financial year and still meet the recruitment regulations.   
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Central interviewees acknowledged that the lack of multi-year contracting was an 
impediment to the smooth running of the CEONC programme. Whilst there has been pressure 
on the government over a long period to facilitate multi-year contracts, this has not been 
successful.  
“Lots of advocacy was done to do the multiyear contracting and people realise its 
need also, but there are other administrative issues on multiyear contracting. There 
are some clauses that if they work more than this number of years they have to be 
made permanent, that kind of thing so financial department is not ready to make 
multiyear contracts. Although for commodity purpose they have made multiyear 
procurement but for HR they said ‘Ya, Ya, Ya’ it should be that but no change in 
action ……… it has become an iron rule kind of thing.” CI3 
4.4.2 Human resource management 
Another problem is ad hoc personnel transfers by the MoHP, between districts or between 
hospitals and facilities within a district with little notice or coordination with the district 
hospital. For example, in Nawalparasi the AA was transferred in 2013 to a local health post 
(where anaesthetist skills were not required) without consultation. This adversely affects 
service planning and delivery and the effective utilisation of skilled staff. This was 
acknowledged by central level interviewees.  
“The MoHP also need to change the HR transfer, they have to think they shouldn’t 
change the team. So there are many districts that due to disruption of the team, the 
service has stopped” CI3, 2015 
“Sankhuwasabha had invested to train one of the Health Assistants to be an 
anaesthesia assistant. So he got trained and came back and the team was really 
happy that they have their own anaesthesia assistant and he would provide services. 
You know government transferred this person to a Health Post, to a health post!! So, 
this is a management issue, this is deployment not having the right person at the 
right place.” (CI3, 2015) 
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However, transfers do not just affect poorer performing hospitals. Ilam was also affected. 
Both a doctor and an AA had been transferred. This adversely affected service delivery. The 
hospital had to petition the director general (DG) of the DoHS to have staff returned.  
“Only one AA is currently available. The person who has the sanctioned AA post in 
this hospital is now working in Taplejung hospital. I am trying to return him back to 
this hospital and I have already sent letter to the DG.” (PHO6) 
“The HDC doesn’t know anything about the transfer of employees. We come to know 
about it only after the transfers are made. We have major problems when the doctors 
are transferred. For example, Dr _________ was working here but suddenly he was 
sent to Dhankuta. Then came Dr __________. He too got transferred. It’s our request 
that don’t transfer the doctors who carry out the operation. Patients from Panchthar 
and Taplejung come to this hospital by paying up to Rs 40 thousand to ambulances. It 
is sad to refer them to other hospitals because of the lack of doctors.” (HM7) 
Ilam was better able to withstand the impact as it had multiple staff in each cadre. Makwanpur 
did not note transfers as an issue. This is perhaps a result of their proximity to Kathmandu 
which makes it an attractive location.  
4.4.3 Qualifications 
Although every effort is made to recruit trained staff this is not always possible. Particular 
problems are that previous training may not be relevant or out of date. The better performing 
hospitals aim to recruit more appropriately trained staff so that they are operationally 
effective from the commencement of their employment. For the poorer performing hospitals, 
this seems less possible and may be due to a combination of factors such as remoteness and 
poor local HR markets. This particularly affects contract staff recruitment.   
To compensate for this, additional investment in training may be required. However, hospitals 
are not permitted to invest in training contract staff through the CEONC fund. This adds to the 
difficulties of those hospitals relying more heavily upon contract staffing.  
Nawalparasi and Rukum, both poorer performing hospitals, aim to recruit only qualified staff 
and have limited sanctioned posts allocated to CEONC services which are often vacant. They 
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therefore must rely on contract staff but because of poor local HR markets find this difficult 
and the ban on funding training through the CEONC fund, as well as the short contracting 
periods (see above), make this objective difficult to achieve.  
Both Makwanpur and Ilam, better performing hospitals, have an allocation of multiple 
sanctioned posts for the provision of CEONC services. Both aim to recruit trained staff. Ilam 
also benefits from being a training centre. Both hospitals have a strong HR market. 
Consequently, both have better qualified staff. 
4.5 Availability and quality of equipment and supplies 
Table 17 shows the themes that were identified which differentiated the experiences of the 

























Table 17: Availability and quality of equipment / supplies 
 
Low Caesarean rate –  
poorly performing 




Low fund High fund Low fund High fund 
Theoretical 
framework 










to supply drugs 
that should be 
provided free 
of cost. 
Drug supply adequate. Budgets are erratically 
available through the 
CEONC fund for 
equipment and 
supplies.  Some years 
this budget line is cut.  
CEONC equipment is in short 
supply and what is available is 
poorly maintained. 
Sufficient quantities of 
equipment available and well 
maintained. 
Infrastructure • Some or all infrastructure 
inadequate to meet service 
needs. 
• No NICU*. 
• Appropriate infrastructure for 
CEONC services available. 
• No NICU. 
No comment on 
infrastructure. 
Procurement • Reliance on Logistics 
Management Division 
centrally to manage 
procurement.  
• Delayed procurement 
caused by lack of proactive 
staff and supervision in 
Rukum. 
• Reliant on outside sources 
(CEONC fund or NGOs) to 
resource CEONC equipment. 


















Some budget for 
procurement 
devolved to districts 
but no training 
provided so 
inefficient/incorrect 
purchasing occurs.  
• HDC willing and able to 
source necessary equipment 
and supplies if required.  
• Overall better quality 
procurement arrangements. 
* Neonatal intensive care unit 
4.5.1 Quantity and maintenance of CEONC equipment 
A lack of equipment and supplies were particular challenges in poorer performing districts. In 
Nawalparasi, field observations noted the good quality maternity beds but, there was limited 
other CEONC equipment and what was available was 10 years old. Only a small number of 
complete sets of equipment for CEONC services with no drying equipment, were available. 
This created difficulties when patient numbers increase, for example, during the rainy season.  
“In circumstances where we have two caesarean cases, we will have used both the 
sets for operations and it would be difficult for us to sterilise them during this rainy 
season to serve a third case” (MS2) 
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Some equipment, e.g. OT tables, OT lights and equipment for anaesthesia are difficult to 
acquire because of cost, even from the central Logistics Management Division. This problem 
is compounded when the CEONC fund allocation is restricted to staffing costs. Whilst each of 
the hospitals ideally would prefer more equipment, the performing hospitals felt that they 
had sufficient or, if not, their access to alternative funding sources enabled them to purchase 
it. The exception was newborn care equipment, where lack of a NICU meant that some cases 
had to be referred elsewhere. This was true for all the hospitals.  
Provision of CEONC services demands a comprehensive range of facilities, including drugs and 
equipment. Where CEONC funds are restricted to financing staffing, those hospitals that rely 
more heavily or totally on the fund to provide CEONC services are more adversely affected.  
Nawalparasi and Rukum are examples. Again, lack of predictability in the availability of funds 
and how they may be used has a similar impact.  
4.5.2 Infrastructure 
Nawalparasi and Rukum each cited a lack of appropriate infrastructure as a barrier to the 
efficient delivery of services. This did not prevent services being delivered but raised quality 
of care issues, in particular, infection prevention in Rukum.   
“The building is not good for operations. Sterilisation is not there in the operating 
theatre so it may get contaminated. There should be separate building for 
operations. Now, post op room is also there in the operating theatre. It is an old 
building, leaking water.  There have been many repairs but it’s still leaking” (PHO3) 
Makwanpur and Ilam both had good infrastructure and were able to maintain sufficient 
facilities to deliver services. Even after the earthquake, Makwanpur could identify an 
alternative accommodation to perform caesareans.   
“the earthquake brought some problems. The upper floor where the operating 
theatre service was, has been damaged. This has created difficulty. The master plan is 
ready and as it incorporates the programme of building the new infrastructure, 
probably it will start within a year” (HM5).  
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When CEONC funding is not available for infrastructure and no other funding sources are 
available, maintaining continuity of CEONC services becomes difficult. Unpredictability of 
CEONC funds adds to this problem.  
4.5.3 Procurement and supply chain 
The poorer performing hospitals experienced difficulties with their procurement 
management systems, including timely engagement with the centralised procurement 
processes and ensuring supplies of high quality CEONC equipment. For example, in Rukum the 
management of this process was inadequate. Delays in obtaining supplies occurred and 
deliveries were not checked and neither was quality. These problems were ascribed to an 
inexperienced storekeeper and inadequate supervision by the MeSu. 
“We bought one washing machine for the operating theatre, which is not fixed yet in 
the room.…..blankets for patients were bought, but only 5 blankets were given to the 
hospital. Total 23 blankets were bought, [but] we have got only 5” (MS8)  
 “there was good support from the store before. I am feeling now we do not have 
support from the store as before. Many requests have been made for supply but we 
are not getting it” (MS5) 
Inadequate funding adds to the problem of procurement for poorer hospitals and especially 
when fund use is restricted as in 2014/15. Only if alternative arrangements could be made 
could supplies be obtained. Nawalparasi, for example, relied on equipment provided by donor 
agencies.  
Makwanpur and Ilam had a clearer procurement management process with staff specifically 
appointed. Ilam, had technically unskilled staff which could cause problems, but because Ilam 
had sufficient stocks, delays did not affect service delivery. Critically, the performing hospitals 
had available funding sources, other than the CEONC fund.  
The central interviewees noted that the intention is for procurement to be managed locally. 
However, a concern was about the technical capacity of the local procurement staff.  
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 “in Jumla they got solar lights and they bought few things but they didn't know that 
a small battery was needed and once the battery ran out there was no provision for 
that kind of battery to be available in the local market” (CI3) 
The evidence from this research suggests that hospitals do need support to build procurement 
capacity. They also need a regular and predictable source of funds. Having sources of finance 
additional to the CEONC fund is an advantage.   
4.6 In-service training, supervision and teamwork.  
Table 18 shows the themes that were identified differentiating the high and low performing 


























Table 18: In-service training supervision and teamwork 
 
Low Caesarean rate –  
poorly-performing 
High Caesarean rate - 
performing 
Central Level Perspective Low fund High fund Low fund High fund 
Theoretical 
framework 
Nawalparasi Rukum Makwanpur Ilam 
Induction of 
new staff 
No formal induction or 
shadowing.  
Introduction rather than 
induction. 
Planned induction process 
which lasts several weeks 
and includes shadowing 
current staff. 





Contract staff unable to access 
in-service training.  
All hospital staff have difficulty 
accessing staff training 
arrangements. 
Staff training out of date. 
All staff (contract and 
permanent) able to access 
necessary in-service 
training. 
Staff training mostly up to 
date.  
CEONC fund not intended 
for in-service training. 
Acknowledge that 
insufficient skills and 
experience are a barrier to 
service delivery. 
Reliance on CEONC mentor 












Day to day supervision by 
the MeSu and delegation of 
supervisory arrangement to 
department heads 
Insufficient emphasis on 
training and developing 




No structured approach to 
performance management.   
Structured approach to 
performance management 
with rewards for performing 






















Good teamwork and mutual 
cooperation between 
CEONC team and other 
departments. 
In Ilam, some tension 
amongst doctors in 
competition for financial 
incentives.  
High dependence on 
individuals to ensure the 
system functions e.g. a well 
performing and motivated 
MeSu – rather than 
systematic monitoring of 
performance and 
mechanisms to hold those 
holding specific roles to 
account for outputs. 
4.6.1 Induction of new staff 
Induction of new staff is critical, particularly when staff recruited lack the relevant training 
and experience and, in remote districts, often work on their own in difficult environments. 
The performing hospitals all had a lengthy process of induction, which included new staff 
shadowing existing experienced team members. In the poorly performing hospitals induction 
consisted of a brief team introduction and facility tour but no formal orientation process or 
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opportunity to shadow staff. For example, in Nawalparasi, the lack of an induction process for 
new medical staff resulted in patient referrals as staff were unclear on procedures. 
“I enquired about the reason behind referring the patient to Butwal. He clarified that 
the MeSu had not handed over necessary equipment, phone numbers of responsible 
staff members were not given to him and his terms of reference were not clear.” 
(HM2) 
This is a staff management issue which affects performance. Allowing the CEONC fund to be 
used to promote more effective induction arrangements would be a beneficial reform.   
4.6.2 In-service training of medical staff  
Given the difficulties of recruiting skilled staff in some local HR markets, there is a significant 
benefit in in-service staff training. In the poorly performing hospitals the lack of funding to 
provide additional training (particularly to staff on short term contracts) meant that staff 
providing CEONC services either did not have the appropriate level of training or it was out of 
date. In Rukum, the local HR market was so weak they were unable to find trained personnel. 
In Nawalparasi, in-service training has been relatively limited. The CEONC fund cannot 
currently finance training. Training is provided by the National Health Training Centre but 
restricted to sanctioned staff. Lack of training means lack of career development and this is a 
disincentive for medical staff to take up contracted posts.  
“You are well paid but there are no other incentives like training opportunities. This is 
discouraging. Next time, I won't apply for CEONC.” (MS3) 
Overall, OT training, AA training and infection prevention training were identified as the core 
gaps in the poorer performing hospitals. Most staff employed to provide CEONC services were 
“Skilled Birth Attendant” (SBA) qualified, although there were exceptions. However, the 
principle training that was highlighted as a beneficial addition was advanced SBA and OT 
training.  
The better performing hospitals, created more opportunities for their staff to access in-service 
training and made this available to both contract and sanctioned staff using non-budget 
sources of finance. For example, Makwanpur has a systematic approach to in-service training, 
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with either the matrons or doctors providing on-site training, or staff taking it in turns to 
receive training. Whilst sanctioned staff were prioritised, contract staff were also able to 
access training. In Ilam, CEONC service delivery has benefited from targeted in-service training 
to key staff members. An example was provided of an inexperienced doctor who did not have 
the confidence to perform caesarean on her own. She was helped to attend another hospital 
to build her experience enabling her subsequently to provide caesarean.  
“Then Dr._________ was transferred to Sindhuli. Dr________ didn’t have full 
confident for caesarean, she could not do caesareans alone. Then I sent her to 
another hospital for practice for 5/6 days where she did caesarean cases. Coming 
back to Ilam hospital, she started to do caesareans.” (PHO6).   
Centrally, there is acknowledgement that staff lack skills. The role of the CEONC mentor was 
created, in part, to provide clinical guidance and support (both on site and remotely) to less 
experienced or confident staff. But this too, they observed, is an inadequate solution because 
of the added burden it imposes on a single person (the CEONC mentor). This may have been 
appropriate when few hospitals provided CEONC services but now inappropriate when all 
hospitals are expected to provide such services. Three of the four case study hospitals noted 
the CEONC mentor visited infrequently. Only Makwanpur, close to Kathmandu, had regular 
engagement. Overall, all the hospitals felt that additional training would enable them to 
provide better CEONC services and training should be available for both sanctioned and 
contract staff.   
4.6.3 Supervision 
In Nawalparasi, Makwanpur and Ilam, the MeSu was acknowledged as the main supervisor of 
the programme. In Makwanpur and Ilam heads of department also had delegated 
responsibility for staff. Rukum had very unclear arrangements for supervision, although this 
could be in part attributed to a newly appointed MeSu.  
Makwanpur and Ilam utilised a systematic approach to performance management providing 
financial incentives and public appreciation to the best performing staff with a planned 
approach to managing poor performance. Additionally, Makwanpur had a standard 
programme protocol against which progress and accountability could be measured.  
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“We usually take 2 consecutive actions. First, we give verbal warning. Next time, we 
give it in written. Until now, it has not been necessary to go beyond this. They become 
aware after this. For the high performing staff, we gather them every 6 months and 
provide appreciative remarks in the mass and thus motivate them” (HM5) 
Neither poorer performing hospital had a structured approach to performance management.   
“I have not seen direct supervision on the spot within this 3-month period.” (MS6) 
Centrally, there is acknowledgement that hospitals lack good management processes. 
However, there is no initiative to develop improved management processes or to provide 
better quality information to the centre for policy making. There is no central appreciation of 
what ‘good management’ involves. 
“It’s more a system question, does the person have the reasonable system to work in, 
does he or she have a supervisor, who knows, who cares, who gives feedback, you 
know for us one of the things is…Is there a definition of what you are supposed to do 
this is what we called the minimum service standard” CI5.  
4.6.4 Teamwork and staff attitudes 
Quality and strength of teamwork was a relevant factor. Three hospitals reported a positive 
team environment including between sanctioned and contracted staff. This facilitated the 
delivery of CEONC services whether they were high performing or not. The attitude of the 
MeSu is critical. 
“All are active. We all collaborate to respond to any case. For example, I work for 
CEONC but I never say that I work only for CEONC. Suppose we have a caesarean case 
and they have a delivery case. If they complete the delivery case first, they will come 
to support us and if we complete our case first, we will go to assist them. Staff 
members from both sides are supportive.” (MS2) 
The exception was Rukum which had poor teamwork and a negative working environment. 
This inhibited recruitment and resulted in poor staff motivation. Field observations noted 
poor teamwork, low staff commitment and a staff unwilling to talk openly.  
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The central interviewees recognised that teamwork and positive staff attitudes were 
essential. Where there is a progressive MeSu and/or HDC acting as a local adaptive agent this 
will occur but this is not universal. Interviewees recognised that strong leadership and a 
committed team, make substantial difference to hospital performance.  
“It makes lots of difference on the manager’s role and the team if the team is 
committed, and if they can, if they have the attitude of saying ok, I need to do it I 
have to do it and it’s my responsibility and accountability towards what they are 
doing, I think that would definitely make a lot of difference.”(CI4) 
4.7 Managerial style, monitoring and leadership 
Table 19 shows the themes that differentiated the experiences of the performing and non-
performing hospitals across managerial style, monitoring and leadership.   
Table 19: managerial style, monitoring and leadership 
 
Low Caesarean rate –  
poorly-performing 




Low fund High fund Low fund High fund 
Theoretical 
framework 
Nawalparasi Rukum Makwanpur Ilam 
Interaction and 
communication 
Ad hoc, irregular management 
meetings. DHO undertaking 
administration of CEONC Fund. 
Regular management 
meetings, organised by the 
MeSu, exposure visits, 
public audit and media 
meetings; bi-monthly 
meetings between DPHO 
and hospital 
administration; DPHO has 
an advisory role. rather 
than direct management 
role.   
Districts where MeSu 
oversees CEONC fund 
management show 
higher provision of 
services. However, the 
DPHO has difficulty 
intervening and centre 
were unclear how to 






No formal targets set.  
Service delivery data unreliable.  






















Targets set through 
health strategy.  
Unclear how this is 
translated to individual 
hospitals. 
Limited monitoring due 
to resource constraints 
at FHD. 
No linkage between 
service performance 
and financing.   
Awareness of 
Progress 
Staff don’t perceive there is a 
problem in performance (in the 
months’ services are provided). 
Staff had an accurate 
perception of progress as 




Low Caesarean rate –  
poorly-performing 




Low fund High fund Low fund High fund 
Theoretical 
framework 
Nawalparasi Rukum Makwanpur Ilam 
Perceptions of service numbers 
hard to verify due to poor data.  


















Lack of local 
leadership 
Strong leadership by the 
MeSu, DPHO and HDC. 
Leadership and 
managerial support 
seen as critical, 
however no resources 
made available through 






















Collaborative team working 
between the MeSu, DPHO 
and HDC contributing to a 
positive local work 





Limited or no supervision and 
monitoring from the centre.  
















FHD lacks resources to 
adequately monitor the 
programme. 
CEONC mentor role 
created and seen as 
enabling factor in scale 
up of the programme 
and fund but more 
mentors required to 
cover all districts. 
Relationship 
with the local 
community 











engagement and quality 
and availability of services 
engenders public trust in 
the hospitals. 
Acknowledge that 
relationships can be 
fraught with the 
community. 
CEONC mentor can 
provide support to 
mediate relationships 
but is rarely on site.  
Oversight by 
HDC 
Financially weak HDC. 
HDC does not or cannot provide 
support in CEONC service 
delivery. 
Unwilling or unable to provide 
temporary financial support 
where CEONC funding shortfalls 
occur.  
Strong HDC, which provides 
additional financial support 
for CEONC services. 
Supportive of and 
prioritises CEONC services.  
Seeks to finance staffing or 
other requirements to 
enable CEONC services to 
run continuously.  
HDC seen to have a 
pivotal role in service 
continuity at district 
level. 
No common definition 
or tools that set the 
standard for how the 
CEONC service should 
be managed. 
Currently no resources 
to build capacity of 




4.7.1 Interaction and communication 
There was a clear division in hospital performance in terms of interaction and communication 
and CEONC fund management. In Makwanpur and Ilam there were regular staff meetings 
where issues could be raised and discussed, plus regular meetings between the hospital 
leadership and the district health office. However, in Nawalparasi and Rukum meetings were 
ad hoc or informal. In Rukum, there were general meetings, but none specific to obstetric 
services. Team communication was weak and there was poor coordination among the team 
members.  
“There is no separate meeting for only CEONC. We have general meeting where we 
have interaction. There was no formal meeting but we do meet informally.” (MS6) 
The relationship between the DHO/DPHO and the MeSu is seen as critical by the central level. 
In practice this is largely driven by whether the hospital has fewer than 50 beds and therefore 
comes under the oversight of the DHO like Nawalparasi and Rukum or whether it is larger, 
overseen by the DPHO and therefore runs more autonomously like Makwanpur and Ilam. 
Regardless of the hospital size, a high degree of cooperation is essential. 
In summary, clarity is lacking in the hierarchy of official hospital supervision arrangements and 
how they should occur. A need for ongoing cooperation, monitoring and supervision exists. 
For CEONC services this is limited to the role of the CEONC mentor and this is ad hoc.  
4.7.2 Target setting and monitoring of performance 
For all hospitals, no clarity existed about how, or if, goals or strategic objectives were set 
internally or externally either for the hospital overall or just for the CEONC services. 
Makwanpur appeared to have the clearest aim of increasing CEONC services annually. 
However, it was unclear if this was a formal target. It appeared more implicit than a widely 
publicised and supported objective. Generally, the lack of clear targets inhibited reporting and 
monitoring either by the DHO/DPHO or the FHD. As the FHD only put limited resources 




The only targets that do exist are overall health system targets set through the NHSS. 
Individual district hospital targets reflecting local circumstances are not available.  
Consequently, although monitoring is seen by the FHD as a crucial task of both the FHD and 
the DHO/DPHOs the lack of objectives and poor data quality meant that any monitoring is 
largely ineffective. Also, the perception of the DHO/DPHOs themselves in the case study 
districts is that they are not responsible for monitoring.  
There is also no linkage between the service activity information and the monitoring of 
hospital finances. There has also been no follow up to establish where CEONC grants are 
awarded what services result. 
“In Tanahun and Syangja for 3-4 years we [the FHD] have always put money but they 
didn’t start services.” CI6 
To summarise, provision of the CEONC fund finance is not conditional on meeting objectives 
or performance and the information systems to enable this to happen do not exist.   
4.7.3 Leadership  
In each district visited, except for Rukum, the MeSu was identified as the key person providing 
clinical leadership to the CEONC programme. The features of strong MeSu leadership were 
perceived by the key informants to entail: 
• good cooperation with the HDC and the local DHO/DPHO;  
• supportive of staff and delivery of CEONC services; 
• encouraging collaboration with clinical staff in other departments; 
• ready to engage with service delivery directly if needed; 
• working effectively with the community to build the hospital’s reputation; 
• establishing good communication mechanisms with the clinical teams; 
• fostering a positive working environment; and  
• providing a good example of work ethic.   
Where present, these factors had a positive impact on the working environment, on the 
reliability of its administrative support functions and on staff morale. In Ilam, for example, the 
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leadership qualities of the previous MeSu were deficient. The result was a hospital with a poor 
reputation, conflict between doctors and poor staffing levels. To overcome this, the DPHO 
intervened. 
At the beginning, the situation of Ilam hospital was not good. Gradually, I organised 
meetings and took leadership. I had managed with media people as well to promote 
the CEONC service. I had meetings with civil society, District Development Committee 
and political groups for CEONC service. Then after, political persons are supporting 
us.  (PHO6).  
The current Ilam MeSu is seen as a positive contributor to the overall reputation and 
operation of the hospital.   
After joining by Dr_________[current MeSu], the environment of the hospital 
changed and was good. There has been good reputation of the hospital. (PHO6) 
The 2011 Devkota study recommended that where the DHO and MeSu posts are not held by 
the same person, responsibility for CEONC fund management should be shifted to the MeSu 
as they have overall responsibility for hospital services. Districts where this has occurred with 
the MeSu having greater budgetary control the benefit has been a higher level of CEONC 
service provision (Makwanpur and Ilam).  
From the central interviewees, leadership is perceived to be key which really makes a 
difference in service utilisation.   
“It worked very well in Gulmi, for example, where the doctor was dynamic, the local 
MeSu was co-operative and the population was generally progressive. They went 
from 0 to 80 caesareans within a few years of the doctor getting there. They tripled 
the number of patients from 15 to 45 thousand.” CI5 
To achieve good leadership requires an ability to manage the dynamics of the team and its 
composition. Even though the need for good leadership is recognised by the central 
authorities, no steps are taken to promote this and there is no formalised system of holding 
hospital leaderships to account for results.   
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4.7.4 Managerial support and teambuilding  
Systematic management systems and processes can have a positive impact on the staff 
working environment and on performance management. Makwanpur and Ilam both had a 
formalised process of minuted management and clinical staff meetings (including those 
responsible for CEONC services). Meetings occurred between the clinical staff, MeSu and the 
HDC and between the HDC and the DHO. These meetings enabled concerns over equipment, 
supplies, infrastructure and staffing to be addressed on a regular basis. Staff felt they were 
listened to and had avenues available to them to raise any issues. Whilst management 
meetings occurred in the other hospitals, they were more ad hoc and could be infrequent. 
In Nawalparasi, Makwanpur and Ilam the MeSu encouraged collaboration and mutual support 
between the CEONC teams and other hospital departments, although the actual benefits 
appeared to be greater in the performing hospitals. This facilitated a more positive working 
environment and service delivery.   
“We should observe other departments also. I should not stay here saying I belong to 
CEONC. When need, I should assist in surgery and emergency.” MS12 
In Nawalparasi, a poorer performing hospital whilst the MeSu was reported to be a good 
leader, several management processes were lacking including regular meetings, performance 
management and induction.   
“Our system management is not up to the mark. We need to make changes in it. If we 
make changes to our management, CEONC activities will never be stopped.” (PHO2) 
Hence, to facilitate hospital performance, effective leadership must be underpinned by 
systematic management systems. Best practice should be identified and promoted, coupled 
with more effective information systems and monitoring. The MoHP or the FHD should 
encourage management development. This should be regarded as a general problem, not one 
specifically related to the provision of CEONC services.  
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4.7.5 Relationship with the MoHP/FHD 
Except for Makwanpur, the hospitals felt that they did not receive much support or oversight 
from the FHD for the development and delivery of CEONC services. They were unable to 
effectively raise issues and because there was no regular monitoring of CEONC services by the 
FHD there was no ‘learning’ feedback. The CEONC mentor visited intermittently. Makwanpur 
benefited from participating in a pilot programme to develop a quality of care assurance 
mechanism, which resulted in regular visits from the FHD and the CEONC mentor. Its proximity 
to Kathmandu is likely to have increased the chances of being selected for pilot programmes 
as well as facilitating short visits by FHD staff.  
“We have good support from the FHD. They make visits 2 to 3 times a year.” (PHO4)  
Frequent engagement with the FHD was not a driver of good or poor performance of a 
hospital.  However, all the case study hospitals saw benefits in regular monitoring and closer 
supportive supervision by the FHD and the CEONC mentor.  
At the central level, the introduction of the CEONC mentor in 2013 has been regarded as very 
important and successful in improving both the quantity and quality of CEONC services. 
However, with only one CEONC mentor not all hospitals can be supported.  
“There is no monitoring from the district. Dr_______ [FHD CEONC mentor] had come 
here once in the course of four years. This apart, I don’t think any agency or any 
person has come here for monitoring.” (MS4) 
The evidence from the research shows there is little effective supervision by the FHD and 
inadequate information flows (financial and statistical) for effective monitoring. The only 
supervisory resource is provided by the CEONC mentor. This person is also responsible for 
training for mediating in disputes between the service providers and local communities and 
for making the decisions about the allocation of the CEONC fund. With the expansion of the 
CEONC fund to all 75 district hospitals this present arrangement is unsustainable.   
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4.7.6 Relationship with the local community 
The key factor affecting relationships with the community is the availability, continuity and 
quality of services. In Nawalparasi, views expressed included that it would be better not to 
provide CEONC services at all than provide them for only a short time period. 
“It greatly hampers other services also. If this is the situation, there is no trust of 
people on the organisation. Clients think that if the organisation is providing services 
just for a couple of months or so, why go there? People need quality services without 
loss of time, in a quick way. So, it is natural for them to choose other places and this 
may put our performance in a negative light.” (PHO2) 
Also in Nawalparasi there was a perception that the community lacked trust in the hospital, 
particularly after an adverse event where an infant died. This drove down the number of 
clients seeking services.  
“After I came here, we used to perform 140-150 deliveries a month but following the 
incident [an infant death], the number has reduced to a mere 70-80.” (MS4) 
Makwanpur and Ilam both reported a positive relationship with the community resulting in 
increased patient numbers. Rukum, too, reported a positive relationship with the community. 
As a remote district the expectations of the community are low about the level of services 
they can access. In Rukum, even an intermittent CEONC service was an improvement on the 
previous situation where patients had to endure lengthy or expensive trips to hospitals in 
other districts, or alternatively, receive no care at all.  
The central interviewees acknowledged that the relationship with the community can have 
an impact on the delivery of CEONC services. In some districts, they accepted that clinical staff 
feel insecure in delivering services as the community can be aggressive and even violent, 
particularly if there has been a death because of a complicated delivery. The doctors may 
refuse to undertake any caesareans for fear of repercussions from the community. 
“The Arghakhanchi community is violent so the staff there are afraid. After there was 
a death from a PPH [post-partum haemorrhage] case, they have not been doing 
caesareans again for 8 months, although doctors are available.” CI1 
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Where there have been poor community relationships the CEONC mentor has supported 
meetings between the hospital management, the DHO/DPHO, the HDC and the local 
community and also provided information to key stakeholders and the media as an advocate 
for CEONC services. A single CEONC mentor will be unable to undertake this responsibility 
when all 75 districts need to be covered. 
4.7.7 Role of the hospital development committee (HDC) 
A critical factor affecting all hospitals was the leadership and strength of the HDC.  This 
includes its ability to generate funds locally for all health purposes and to provide financial 
supplements when central budget distribution was delayed or insufficient. HDCs are 
encouraged to appoint members with a specific interest in safe motherhood programmes. 
However, the evidence is that HDC strengths are variable, that their financial resource 
availability or willingness to support CEONC services is also variable and that the memberships 
of HDCs does not necessarily represent the structure of the local community or the patient 
categories, such as CEONC patients supported by the hospital. 
Makwanpur and Ilam had strong HDC leadership with a willingness to commit funds to CEONC 
services.  
“Our role is to make the hospital’s services more effective. We watch the service 
delivery by the hospital and play a constructive role in making it more effective.” 
(HM7) 
In Nawalparasi the HDC lacked financial resources (although it had an enthusiastic chair).  
“Reforms may have been made in other areas but not in the sphere of human 
resources. It is because the hospital development committee lacks funds. If there is no 
money in the committee's account, how could things happen? For example, it is very 
difficult to appoint doctors and paramedics.” (PHO2).  
In Rukum the HDC was ineffective in supporting CEONC services.  
108 
 
These differences of approach suggest that a financially strong and supportive HDC leadership 
can have an impact on a hospital’s ability to deliver CEONC services, if only in providing an 
alternative funding source.  
A critical relationship is that between the HDC and the MeSu. The performing hospitals had 
well-functioning and organised HDCs with regular meetings and seeking to develop local 
sources of funding. The perceptions of these HDCs by CEONC staff within the hospitals was 
that they played an active role in meeting their needs and were responsive if issues arose. In 
the non-performing district hospitals knowledge and interest of the HDCs in supporting 
CEONC services varied. Even if they were positive towards the programme they lacked the 
capacity to generate additional financial resources. The management relationships with the 
clinical staff and the MeSu were ad hoc and unsystematic. Further, the inclusion of those 
responsible for the safe motherhood programmes in the HDC, either as permanent or invited 
members varied and, as a result, the priority placed on the programme was mixed.  
The reliance upon HDCs for funding is a function of the out of date staffing and hence 
budgetary arrangements for hospitals, the unstable CEONC fund distribution and payment 
arrangements. The HDC potentially acts as a temporary financier but its ability to do so 
entirely depends upon the priorities and finances of the HDC.   
4.8 Financial management 
Table 20 shows the themes differentiating the experiences of the performing and non-
performing hospitals from a financial management perspective.  
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Table 20: Financial management 
 
Low Caesarean rate – 
 poorly-performing 





Low Caesarean High Caesarean 
 Central Level Perspective 
  Low fund High fund Low fund High fund  










General hospital budget imposed on the district hospitals. Reflects 1991 allocation 
of sanctioned posts. Sanctioned posts include staff able to provide CEONC services 
but not based on updated population need. 
Additional CEONC specific budget imposed by FHD based upon assumptions of need 
made by CEONC mentor. Some years this budget can only be used for staffing. 
No formal process to engage hospitals with budget setting by FHD. 
 
No forecasts of likely patient demand are available. 
Administrative resources needed to undertake a 
participatory approach not available. 
DHOs prepare district budgets which are then 
summarised by MoHP and submitted to the MoF and the 
National Planning Commission. However, neither the DHO 
nor the hospital has any influence over the budget for 
sanctioned posts which are wholly determined by the 
MoHP and based upon a 1991 policy (see Appendix 7).  
Central government budgetary processes then dictate how 
the fund envelope is developed considering all other policy 
pressures on Government.  
Nepal currently employs a top down system to allocate 
budgets to hospitals. Allowing local flexibility in the 
allocation of budgetary or CEONC fund resources is seen 
to be incompatible with national budgetary procedures.  
FHD and CEONC mentor deem they “know” the needs of 






Reasons why financial planning impossible:  
• Fluctuations in grant amounts year on year. 
• No awareness of the total amount of grant available until it arrives so planning is 
impossible. 
• Rigidity in grant guidelines makes it an “inflexible” grant in practice. 
• No local input based upon forecast need.  
FHD promises that funds spent whilst awaiting budget 
release will be reimbursed (but some hospitals do not rely 
on this). 
There is a lack of trust from the centre to the districts that 
funds will be managed appropriately, legitimising, in their 
view, continued central control.  
Delays in budgetary release have a 
significant impact on continuous 
provision of services – effectively 
preventing it. Gaps in budget not 
Delays in budgetary release cause concern 
but not significant impact on continuous 
services because these are mitigated by 




Low Caesarean rate – 
 poorly-performing 





Low Caesarean High Caesarean 
 Central Level Perspective 
  Low fund High fund Low fund High fund  
  Nawalparasi Rukum Makwanpur Ilam 
mitigated by HDC covering costs in 
interim or by funded sanctioned posts.  
presence of sanctioned posts to which 
multi-year contracting rules do not apply. 
Letter sent by 
FHD accepted, 
but did not have 
local funds to 
act on it.  
 
Few staff were 
aware of the 
CEONC fund and 
were also unaware 
of the letter sent 
by the FHD. 
Staff aware of letter 
and acted upon it. 
 
Staff were aware of 
the letter but 
unsure of legal 
basis as not from 
MoHP and did not 

































reported to FHD.  
 
FHD does not effectively engage in financial management. 
Budgetary control is limited to ensuring that grant 
allocations do not exceed the national budgetary 
allowance. 
Financial reporting only introduced in 2014.  Not 
consistently followed up. 
No review of TABUCS reports of expenditure. 
Review of expenditure not linked to service outputs.  





Audits occur regularly. 
Auditors unfamiliar with CEONC programme requirements and make inappropriate 
recommendations. 
Not useful in supporting financial management. 
Not clear what value of audit is given the discrepancies referred to in ‘Financial 
reporting’. 





District hospitals have limited opportunity to become involved in the budgetary process. 
Budgets for sanctioned posts are MoHP determined, and for CEONC services, as previously 
explained, hospitals have no input at all. District hospitals can only influence, via submissions 
to the DHO/DPHO proposed budgets for equipment and supplies for mainstream hospital 
activities. CEONC grants represent only a small proportion of the overall hospital budget. 
Consultation with hospitals about CEONC budgetary allocations would facilitate planning and 
management.   
“The CEONC budget is determined by the centre and the DHO receives authorisation 
to make expenditures. We spend the money under the same headings as we are told 
to. We should provide salaries to doctors, nurses and other employees. Similarly, we 
should purchase necessary tools, equipment and machines. Some money goes to 
medicines, while some is allocated for miscellaneous purpose, as per the headings. All 
this is done as instructed by the Centre………..If the district is allowed to design budget 
to make purchases accordingly, it would be much better.” (PHO2) 
Significant variations occur in CEONC grant allocations each year and in how it can be spent. 
For example, in Rukum the CEONC grant allocation was more than halved between the 
FY2014/15 and 2015/16). This caused confusion and inhibited planning.  
“There was a meeting. Only 5-6 persons involved in the meeting and decided how to 
use budget; We were angered” (MS8) 
The central level interviewees explained that, whilst the CEONC fund is from the government 
budget, in some years it has been added to by bilateral agencies such as the UK’s Department 
for International Development). The total CEONC fund budget depends on the number of 
districts receiving the fund. This has increased annually since its inception in 2008. The budget 
is developed by the FHD, then submitted to the MoHP who then submit it to the MoF and the 
National Planning Commission (NPC). The CEONC fund size has been increased as the number 
of hospitals involved but not necessarily in proportion. The exception was 2015 when the 
budget was cut to divert money to earthquake relief.  
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There are several challenges for the FHD in determining the size and allocating the fund. 
Firstly, previous year’s expenditure on CEONC services is a key factor. However, expenditure 
reporting is unreliable and no consideration is given to the consequences of delayed budget 
release affecting spending. 
“The MoF say that when 2 years back we had Rs.27 thousands budget allocated then 
the MoHP was only able to utilise Rs.23 thousands. So, next time when we asked for 
Rs.35 thousand and the MoF said when we gave you 27 you only utilise 23 then why 
shall I give you 35, I will not give it to you.” CI1 
“Some problems are there because finance allocate budget from July, but we are 
getting budget funds only after about 6 months, so for 6 months our programme 
collapses. The MoF take back the money and say you are not utilising it. I told them 
send the money in proper time then it will be utilised in entire 12 months.  This is the 
quarrel between the minister of health and finance minister.” (CI8) 
Secondly, the relevant MoHP official must personally justify the budget requirements. If this 
official fails to do so the budget can be cut. Because of frequent senior government official 
changes this can result in inexperienced officials being involved.  
“All departments write and send documentation on how much budget is needed to 
the MoF through the MoHP.  The MoF call the director and programme manager and 
discuss the need for this fund. If you can’t advocate and your explanation isn’t good 
they can cut the budget. For example, this year the budget was 9 crore8 but after 15 
days they cut the budget because the director changed and the new director could 
not adequately advocate to the planning person.” (CI1)  
Thirdly, CEONC fund allocations are not distributed through a transparent formula considering 
such objective factors as population, distance between birthing centres, number of posts 
required to be filled, the existence of referral hospitals. The allocations also do not consider 
more subjective factors such as training requirements, age and quantity of equipment, or 
investment requirements. No account is taken of alternative sources of finance such as the 
 
8 A crore denotes ten million and is equal to 100 lakh in the Nepali numbering system 
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hospital budget or local HDC funds. Because distribution is based on the CEONC mentor 
personal knowledge of district needs this exposes the allocation process to political and other 
influences.  
Fourthly, the evidence from the case studies shows the financial data available to the FHD is 
unreliable, and no statistical data is available showing the demand for CEONC services and the 
impact that the fund has had on service provision. However, none of the central interviewees 
mentioned this. A central interviewee said where districts have specific requirements they 
may contact those developing the budget in the FHD, but this is ad hoc and no formal process 
exists. No case study interviewee referred to this. Another FHD interviewee said: 
“we calculate here and on the basis of whether a doctor is available or not similarly if 
an anaesthesia assistant, OT nurse, lab assistant are there or not on that basis we put 
money.” (CI6) 
“After getting a bulk amount e.g. 9 crore, I email the people [in the FHD] who are 
heavily involved in the division of this budget……….they will sit together and display 
the districts. Suppose it is hard to find doctor in Dolpa so put more budget, easy to 
find doctors in Bhaktapur put less budget, equipment and these things they will sit 
and make the planning.” (CI8)   
Overall the present CEONC budgetary and fund distribution arrangements are inadequate to 
properly support the 24/7 delivery of CEONC services. They lack transparency and ignore key 
objective and subjective factors.  
4.8.2 Financial planning 
Financial planning is an integral element of operational planning. A hospital cannot properly 
plan service levels for the following year(s), employ the necessary staff and ensure it has the 
appropriate facilities, drugs and other supplies, without knowing at least in broad terms what 
financial resources will be available.   
Unfortunately, financial planning is not possible because: 
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• No grant distribution formula exists which enables a hospital to predict what its grant 
allocation might be; 
• Grant levels can vary significantly between years; 
• How the grant may be spent also can vary significantly between years; 
• Payment of the grant can be delayed in an unpredictable manner beyond the start of 
the financial year. 
The consequence is that CEONC grant cannot be used efficiently or effectively. 
For all hospitals delayed budget release was a major frustration. The only solution for some 
hospitals was to divert sanctioned posts (which reduces capacity for other services) or seek 
other financial support such as from the HDC (which may or may not be forthcoming). Gaps 
in funding had a more catastrophic impact in the poorer performing districts with no 
alternative financial resources. Additionally, budgetary rules that prevent multi-year 
contracting stop the longer-term recruitment of contracted staff or their training if recruited. 
In Rukum, delays in budget release caused difficulties in paying staff. The HDC could not 
provide alternative financial support and this meant individuals working without pay for a 
period on the understanding that they will receive back pay once the funds are received.   
“[Two Staff Nurse] are working voluntarily. We do not have operational guidelines 
yet, so we are not clear on how to pay for them and management of their salary. 
They will be paid from CEONC budget as per contract made with them. Because of 
budget could not be received on time, we are not able to pay them.” (HM4) 
Budgetary delay is identified centrally as a critical factor in the inability to deliver continuous 
services. Delay is caused by bureaucratic factors rooted in parliamentary processes and 
contribute to the complexity of the arrangements for CEONC service delivery. These factors 
are perceived to be insurmountable and lie beyond the control of the MoHP.  
Central determination of local needs coupled with limitations in how the CEONC fund can be 
used adds to financial planning difficulties. Originally the concept of the fund was to provide 
a flexible pot of money that the districts could spend in line with their needs. This initial 
flexibility has been replaced by specific guidelines about how the grant may be used and those 
guidelines can change without warning.  
115 
 
“if you put a flexible fund that’s very good. Then you would be able to mobilise for 
different things but sometimes it might be misused and now the implementation 
guidelines are also quite strict ……. I think the concept was to give that pool of flexible 
fund so that they can spend as they need.” (CI4) 
4.8.4 Financial reporting and budgetary control 
Financial reporting is unsystematic across all the hospitals, and the quality of financial data, 
except for Makwanpur, is questionable. Only Makwanpur completed financial reporting to 
the MoHP and the FHD and reported the same data to both. This suggests that only 
Makwanpur exercised effective budgetary control. Without accurate financial reporting 
assessment of the utilisation of the CEONC fund is impossible.  
The implementation of the TABUCS system in 2014 potentially improved the quality of 
financial reporting. However, the FHD does not compare actual expenditure against the fund 
allocations and no one has this specific responsibility. (TABUCS has a capacity to enable 
monitoring to occur although this has yet to be applied.) 
There are problems. Hospitals do not properly record CEONC expenditure against the CEONC 
budget line. Either no financial reports are made in the TABUCS system or they are 
inconsistent with the separate CEONC programme financial reporting system to the FHD. The 
fund is only included in the TABUCS financial reporting as a lump sum. Consequently, analysis 
over different types of expenditure is impossible. The process of downloading reports from 
TABUCS is time consuming as each individual district hospital or district health office financial 
report must be accessed separately. A monthly analysis of expenditure is not shown so the 
impact of delayed budget release on expenditure is hard to demonstrate financially. Finally, 
some hospitals confuse spending of CEONC grant with other grants they receive (see 4.9.3). 
To improve the analysis available from TABUCS the FHD introduced an additional financial 
monitoring tool in 2014. This tool was designed to analyse expenditure over specified 
subjective headings. However, only a limited number of hospitals are using it, making it 
ineffective as a monitoring mechanism.  
116 
 
Overall, the significance of having available, reliable and detailed financial information about 
the utilisation of the fund appears not to be appreciated by the FHD whose main concern is 
limited to ensuring that the overall fund budget is not overspent. No analysis is undertaken of 
whether individual hospitals have over or underspent their allocations or if the fund resulted 
in increased delivery of CEONC services or whether there is any correlation between the 
allocation of the funding, the service level outputs and the outcome results (i.e. reduced 
maternal and infant mortality). Establishing this is the critical challenge for the FHD.  
The initial study assumption was that there would be a relationship between CEONC funding 
and activity. The analysis showed there is no such relationship. The likelihood of such a 
relationship is unlikely without significant reform given the very large swings in funding from 
year to year, the lack of updating of sanctioned post allocations, the lack of financial and 
statistical information on which to base fund allocations, the late payment of funds, variations 
in how funds can be used, the complexities of the staff contracting arrangements. 
4.8.5 Regularly scheduled independent auditing 
An audit occurred at all district hospitals. However, the lack of technical knowledge of the 
auditors on the nature of the CEONC programme led to inappropriate audit recommendations 
and the process was not seen as supporting CEONC fund financial management. The audit 
focus was on compliance with budgetary limits rather than the utilisation of the fund to 
achieve the policy objectives of the government. Audit reports did not address the 
weaknesses in the financial reporting arrangements which affect the reliability of budgetary 
compliance information. 
4.9 Additional themes that were identified 
Beyond the conceptual framework, several further themes were noted as drivers for levels of 













Low Caesarean High Caesarean Central Level Perspective 
Low fund High Fund Low fund High fund  
Nawalparasi Rukum Makwanpur Ilam 
Referrals Low levels of referral into the 
hospital. 
Referrals out to surrounding 
districts common. 
High levels of referrals into 
the hospital. 
Limited onward referrals as 
hospitals have capability to 
deal with complex cases. 
Volume of referrals not 
considered when 
allocating the fund 
Quality of 
Care 
Poor quality of care noted, 
including untrained staff 
providing services and poor 
staff attitudes and behaviour. 
Systematic mechanisms in 
place to measure, monitor 
and address quality of care. 
The FHD recognise that 
untrained staff provide 
caesarean services in 
some districts which 




Confusion present between the maternal health programmes, 
particularly between Aama and CEONC 
Appreciation that multiple 
funding streams cause 
inaccurate financial 
reporting. This makes 
impossible accurate 










Nepal is a poor country, prone to natural disasters. The CEONC 
financing arrangements demonstrate a focus on financial 
control but with no focus on efficiency and effectiveness. The 
incidence of natural disasters such as the severe 2015 
earthquakes makes the focus on efficiency and effectiveness 
even more important. A feature of this is a need for longer 
term planning. 
The MoHP feel unable to 
influence the MoF leaving 
all budgetary and financial 
decisions to the MoF 
Staff 
motivation 
Low service levels mean staff 
don’t get sufficient exposure 
to maintain skill levels. 
Hospitals find it difficult to 
attract staff onto local 
contracts as career prospects 
are limited. 
Limited availability of training 
opportunities impacts staff 
morale as well as competence 
(particularly for contract 
staff). 
Hospitals are attractive to 
staff as they gain sufficient 
exposure to further their 
careers. 
Pursuit of financial 
incentives can harm 
teamwork as individuals are 
perceived to take on 
workload purely for financial 
gain.  
Availability of training 
opportunities for all staff, 
including contract, increases 
staff morale. 





Lack of trust between district 
and the FHD. 










Limited trust in the 
abilities and motivation of 
the district hospital 
management. Lack of 
detailed engagement with 
hospitals (e.g. the CEONC 
mentor is the only FHD 






In the poorer performing districts, Nawalparasi and Rukum, their inability to provide services 
24/7 and the lack of appropriate facilities (for example an adequate blood supply or NICU) 
meant that cases would be referred to other hospitals.  
When complicated cases come from the community, we have to refer them to well-
equipped hospitals. Reasons behind the referral of cases is due to inadequate staff 
and the lack of NICU. (MS3) 
The better performing hospitals noted that referrals to them from both lower level medical 
units within the district and from neighbouring districts generated high numbers of 
caesareans. This could be driven either by the hospital providing (or being perceived to 
provide) a higher quality of care, patients by-passing lower level units or an unwillingness of 
the district hospital to refer patients on as they have already travelled long distances to reach 
the district hospital.  
There was no doctor in Panchther, so cases are coming from there also. If doctors are 
not available for caesarean in Taplejung, then they also come here. (PHO5) 
Further, a focus on community engagement and mobilisation towards institutional delivery, 
including campaigns about the importance of BEONC and CEONC services and improved 
recognition of the danger signs which indicate a potential need for interventions also drove 
referrals from lower level units to the district hospital. Conversely the poorer performing 
hospitals had low levels of referrals to them and were more likely to need to refer complex 
cases onward to other hospitals. These problems are not reflected in the CEONC funding 
arrangements. 
4.9.2 Quality of care 
There is a clear disparity in the quality of care between the performing and non-performing 
hospitals. Whilst quality of care issues lie beyond the scope of this research the management 
mechanisms associated with ensuring quality services appears to show clear variation 
between hospitals. Interviewees at the better performing hospitals expressed pride in their 
positive interactions with their clients.  They noted use of protocols and tools for dealing with 
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issues such as complicated case management and infection prevention. At the poorer 
performing hospitals management of care quality was hampered by poorly trained staff and 
poor infrastructure. Few staff were motivated to improve quality of care and exhibited 
disempowerment that they would be able to effect change. Centrally, it was acknowledged 
the lack of suitably qualified doctors (in particular obstetricians) was a key impediment to 
delivery of quality services and task shifting to general practitioners who don’t necessarily 
have advanced skilled birth attendant training or to the private sector, compromised quality 
services.   
4.9.3 Multiple overlapping programmes 
At the district level, there was some confusion between The Aama Surakshya Programme 
(Aama) and the CEONC fund. This is apparent regardless of how the hospital is performing. 
Aama is a programme focussing on increasing the proportion of deliveries that occur in health 
institutions, thereby reducing related morbidities and mortality. With Aama, hospitals receive 
payment per service provided which is included in hospital budgets. These can be used to 
provide financial incentives to staff and to purchase equipment and supplies. CEONC fund use 
is more restrictive, awareness of the fund more limited and sometimes conflated with the 
Aama arrangements. The result is hospital confusion particularly over the utilisation of CEONC 
funds.   
“Interviewer: Do you know how CEONC budget is managed? 
Interviewee: I know about it. There are incentives for doctors, can be used for repair 
maintenance if required. I think incentives can be given to nursing staff and AA, but I 
don’t think they get it. 
Interviewer: Don’t nursing staff get incentives? 
Interviewee: That’s what I am telling you. They received incentives out from 7000 per 
caesarean, but I guess they have not received incentive from CEONC budget.” (PHO5) 
Lack of clarity affects district financial reporting as the two funding streams may be also 
conflated in the reporting. Central level interviewees recognise there are multiple funding 
streams with multiple budget headings and this makes accurate recording difficult. This is 
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compounded by aggregated reporting to the MoHP which means confusion between the 
multiple overlapping programmes cannot be identified and addressed. This points to a need 
for the much better training of administrative staff and better quality information systems. 
4.9.4 Managing public sector spending pressures 
Shortage of funds for public services and an inability to plan over the longer term affected all 
hospitals. Whilst multi-year budgeting is nominally a feature of central government 
budgeting, funding decisions are actually made annually. There is no practical focus on 
improving efficiency and effectiveness in public expenditure. A lack of financial resilience also 
means that unforeseen events, such as the 2015 earthquakes, overtakes any financial 
planning decisions. This affects funding for CEONC services even though the policy of 
expanding the availability of the fund to all hospitals is being maintained. Although the need 
for and ability to deliver efficiency and effectiveness lie beyond the scope of this study the 
obvious evidence is that the present hospital and in particular CEONC fund staffing and 
financing arrangements are a significant cause of inefficiency and ineffective service delivery.  
Reforms arising from this study will help improve efficiency and effectiveness in the use of 
public resources other changes are also required, not least in the arrangements for managing 
major disasters. 
4.9.5 Staff motivation 
Staff appeared to be motivated by various factors. Good leadership and management are 
important as are career progression, training and work load. Financial incentives affect some 
but appear not to be a main motivating factor. These were important factors at the better 
performing hospitals but not at the poorly performing hospitals.  
In the highly performing Ilam hospital, staff felt they had opportunities to build their skills 
which improved their career prospects overall.  
“The working environment is good here. We get to see interesting cases here. So, if 
you work here for some time, it’s easier to work at other places.” (MS16) 
In Nawalparasi, a low performing facility, recruitment of contract staff was difficult because 
career prospects weren’t as good as those in government sanctioned positions.  
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The government staff get promoted and transferred, which increases their career 
prospect but the staff members hired by the CEONC fund don't have transfer 
opportunities and they have limited scope for promotion. (HM2) 
A low case load in poorer performing hospitals with limited exposure to complicated cases 
meant that staff became deskilled because they lacked experience and this hindered career 
progression. The converse applied in the better performing hospitals. Availability of training 
opportunities for all staff (including contract staff) in the better performing hospitals also 
contributed to improved staff morale, as well as staff skills.  
4.9.6 Trust between district hospitals and MoHP/FHD 
Evidence exists of a lack of trust between the central authorities and at least some district 
hospitals. Trust is an important factor facilitating the development of delegation and 
accountability which in turn are essential to improve efficiency and effectiveness.  Lack of 
trust develops form lack of contact and regular ‘feedback’ arrangements. 
Makwanpur benefits from regular contact with FHD staff and this raises trust that the hospital 
needs are understood and championed at the FHD level. Equally this encourages the central 
authorities to use Makwanpur to introduce new initiatives, for example, to improve quality of 
care. Interviewees from all other hospitals (both high and low performing) expressed 
dissatisfaction with the relationship between the hospital and the MoHP who felt largely 
abandoned. This had adverse effects such as reducing their willingness to provide private 
funding for CEONC services when budget delays occurred. Overall, lack of trust encourages a 
more risk averse approach to service delivery. From the FHD perspective there is also distrust. 
The abilities and motivations of those working in the districts are questioned. This leads to a 
more centralised approach to planning and management as the capabilities of those at the 
district level to develop and manage activities, are doubted.  
4.10 Statistical information 
What is noticeable in the discussions about the CEONC fund is the lack of linkages between 
financial and operational performance. The focus of the CEONC fund is entirely upon finance, 
not what it is achieving. How this fund promotes the objectives of NHSS (2015-2020) or has 
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an impact upon maternal and infant mortality in the different areas of the country is not 
identified. Yet, establishing this would be an important step in improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the CEONC fund. 
4.11 Summary  
Overall the CEONC programme and the fund (despite its deficiencies) is positively viewed. It 
supports the provision of much needed services that can contribute to a reduction in maternal 
and neonatal mortality. There are clear differences in the institutional culture, leadership and 
management, and staffing between hospitals with high rates of caesareans and those with 
low rates. Key differences were continuous service availability; sufficient numbers of staff and 
ability to hire suitably qualified staff; provision of in-service training to all cadres; sufficient 
quality and quantity of equipment and quality of infrastructure. Underpinning the 
effectiveness of the CEONC programme is the availability and predictability of continuous 
funding. Here fundamental problems do need to be solved. Also, the relations between the 
FHD and district hospitals needs improvement and the workload falling upon the single CEONC 
mentor means that, as all 75 district hospitals are now involved in the CEONC programme, 
this single person approach is inappropriate. The CEONC fund cannot address an inadequate 
central staff planning system, or encourage a change in the system to allow more local 
discretion in appointments. These require other reforms including a review of the staff 
recruitment and assessment process to shorten the period involved. Other central/hospital 
relationships also require review. These include HR management with outdated sanctioned 
staff allocations and uncoordinated staff transfers. A strengthening of the MoHP financial 
management capabilities is also required. Other financial reforms needed include greater 
predictability by hospitals of the availability and utilisation of funds with less variance 
between years. Linking CEONC fund financing with operational performance data is essential 




Chapter Five: Discussion and conclusions  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the key findings, interprets and discusses the answer to the research 
question “Why do some district hospitals in Nepal achieve better provision of CEONC services 
than others?”. There are wide disparities. The aim of this study is to understand why. The 
findings presented in the previous chapters are discussed, interpreting the case study and key 
findings to: 
• Identify the factors (both funding and other factors) affecting CEONC service 
availability at hospital level.   
• Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the CEONC funding arrangements in 
securing a better utilisation of the CEONC services at the hospital level. 
• Determine factors which enable or inhibit utilisation of the CEONC fund at the FHD 
level as a contributor to the delivery of more efficient and effective CEONC services.  
• Explore lessons learned and make recommendations for future financing, 
management and delivery of CEONC services within hospitals in Nepal.  
This discussion demonstrates the contribution to new knowledge that this study makes, 
identifies the revised context/mechanism/outcome configurations that lead to understanding 
what works for whom in what circumstances, and provides implications and 
recommendations for future financing, management and delivery of CEONC services. Finally, 
consideration is given to the strengths and limitations of the study and recommendations for 
further research. 
5.2 Factors affecting CEONC service availability at hospital level.   
The case studies illustrate clear differences between the well performing hospitals as 
measured by the caesarean rate and those that aren’t. The key factors affecting CEONC 
service availability are the: 




ii.) Quality of HR management i.e. the staffing arrangements, induction and training. 
iii.) Quality of the infrastructure. 
iv.) Ability of the hospital to predict the financial resources that will be available to 
provide CEONC services. 
v.) Financial autonomy of the hospital. 
vi.) Role and support of the HDC, particularly over community accountability. 
vii.) Accountability to the MoHP/FHD. 
viii.) Referrals. 
These factors and their generalisability are discussed in the following sections and compared 
with the international literature.  
5.2.1 Leadership and management 
This study identified that leadership and management are critical to a well performing 
hospital (section 4.7). These qualities include: having a vision about the objectives to be 
achieved and being able to communicate that vision; development of a supportive staff 
committed to delivering healthcare (and CEONC services in particular), including an effective 
administrative staff, and in turn supporting those staff; encouraging collaboration between 
clinical staff across the hospital; fostering a positive work ethic; a reputation for quality 
patient care; and working effectively with the community to build the hospital’s reputation. 
The presence of these factors influenced all hospital functions from clinical willingness to 
provide support where necessary, to staff training, to infrastructure and procurement and to 
the hospital administrative support functions. The well performing facilities adopted a holistic 
approach to clinical, institutional and staff management arrangements, including training. 
This included systems for setting and monitoring overall performance, supervision of staff and 
individual performance, establishing internal and external communications with the HDC, the 
DHO/DPHO and the local community and managing the finances of the hospital. Strong 
hospital leadership was critical to the overall functioning and ability to deliver CEONC services 
of the well performing hospitals. Conversely, poorer performing hospitals had weaker 
leadership and management which impacted staff engagement and motivation, as well as 
external accountability.  
125 
 
These findings, and how they affect provision of CEONC services, within Nepal are new. (No 
published research on leadership and management within health in Nepal was identified.) 
They are corroborated by other country studies. For example, World Bank assessments have 
been undertaken of the capacity of local health structures and the challenges faced in the 
implementation of full decentralisation in Thailand (Hawkins et al, 2009), Ghana (Couttolenc, 
2012) and Ethiopia (El-Saharty et al, 2009). Whilst these are all from grey literature, they each 
undertook a systematic and robust approach to the study design, required to effectively 
inform the World Bank Country Status Reports. These studies included extensive analysis of 
the policy and management environments supplemented by multiple qualitative interviews. 
They identified that regions or districts within countries with strong leadership and 
management capacity led to stronger performance of the health system. Critically, they 
identified that managerial capacity was a prerequisite for devolved health services to achieve 
their goals. Mckee et al (2000) identified a potential reason for the relationship between good 
management and positive performance, namely good leaders can translate their vision into 
practices that inspire others with their values and principles, which may lead to shared ways 
of thinking and commitment that support a strong organisational culture. This resonates with 
the findings from the better performing facilities in this study, particularly Makwanpur 
(section 4.7.3). 
Another feature of the impact of the quality of management was established by Marchal 
(2010) in Ghana who identified that the relationship between managers and staff has a direct 
impact on staff attitudes and behaviour in terms of task behaviour, absenteeism, staff 
turnover and the organisational culture. Mckee et al (2000), Puoane et al (2008), Mathole et 
al (2018) and Aberese-Ako et al (2018) similarly noted there were tangible benefits to patients 
from a supportive culture among clinical staff with professional job satisfaction being a strong 
measure of quality of care and that developing informal and formal internal structures, 
processes and mechanisms of communication facilitated problem resolution, development of 
motivation and trust and job performance. This is reflected in the case study findings, 
particularly from Makwanpur (section 4.7.3). Couper et al (2005) found that purposeful 
management meetings were a key ingredient to a facility functioning well. Puoane et al (2008) 
noted that clear and close supervision and leadership supported positive health outcomes. 
This is reflected in the data from the better performing facilities, for example, in Ilam a change 
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to a more supportive leadership was felt to have had a positive impact on the working culture, 
operations and reputation of the hospital (section 4.7.3).   
Those case study hospitals with stronger management and leadership also made training 
available to all staff (sanctioned and contract) because they had an independent financial 
capacity and had overall better outputs in terms of service availability. Conversely the poorer 
performing hospitals either provided no, or limited, training even to those in sanctioned 
posts. Training also benefits a facility because it results in a more highly skilled workforce and 
stimulates commitment (section 4.6). This confirms work of previous studies (ibid; Couper et 
al, 2005), who noted that staff development was one of the key success factors in the 
management of well-functioning hospitals in South Africa. Training and capacity building also 
fosters a positive work environment (Couper et al, 2005).   
This study also found that better performing hospitals placed more emphasis on formalised 
induction processes for new staff. A planned and comprehensive induction process facilitated 
the integration of new staff (section 4.6.1). This did not occur at the poorer performing 
facilities. Puoane et al (2008) demonstrate the importance of this finding, noting that 
formalised induction processes were correlated with better service provision. This helped 
newer staff become confident in case management and developed a social role for the 
inductor (often a senior official), creating opportunities to build relationships and informal 
communication networks. These social aspects have been linked to greater absorptive 
capacity for new knowledge and an increased likelihood that an innovation will be assimilated 
and sustained (Greenhalgh et al. 2004).  
Another feature of effective management is in ensuring that supplies and equipment required 
to deliver services are available. This study found that hospitals which managed procurement 
effectively had fewer supply problems (section 4.5.3). By contrast, the hospitals that were not 
proactive and simply waited for supplies to arrive directly from the MoHP were not always 
able to determine which supplies would be sent and when from central stockpiles. This 
adversely affected their ability to maintain service quality and continuity. However, this 
finding contrasts with some grey literature which identified that some hospitals in Nepal 
purchased inappropriate maternal care equipment because procurement staff were unaware 
of the appropriate specifications (Devkota et al, 2011).  
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The data from the central interviews also indicated nervousness about the ability of hospitals 
to manage procurement (section 4.5.3). Geyndt (2017) identified that in 11 countries where 
hospital autonomy existed, delegating authority to hospitals to procure supplies and civil 
works encounters central resistance, partially due to rent seeking behaviour by suppliers (i.e. 
seeking to manipulate public policy or economic conditions to increase profits). In Kenya, the 
devolution of procurement responsibilities to the county health management teams was 
initially accompanied by significant delays in procurement of essential drugs (Tsofa et al, 
2017). However, ultimately health facilities reported a better order fill-rate compared to the 
period prior to devolution (ibid). Further, Funk et al (2013) and Mathole et al (2018) identified 
that hospitals with a dedicated procurement officer responsible for managing the supply 
chain could ‘‘stay lean’’ yet avoid shortages. These alternative experiences suggest that where 
delegation is to occur it must be accompanied by transparent purchasing procedures and 
training in procurement is essential.  
5.2.2 HR management and staffing 
This research identified that managing staff effectively as well as having sufficient numbers 
available is a key factor in service availability and quality. This uncontroversial finding has 
been replicated in many different studies. For example, in Kenya in 2015, Wamalwa et al 
reviewing the introduction of free maternity services identified that staff shortages were a 
major problem, not only for the delivery of services but also because of the increased staffing 
workloads. The Global Health Workforce Alliance (2013) has stated that the sufficient supply 
and stock of health workers, with the relevant competencies and skill mix that correspond to 
the health needs of the population is essential to availability of services. There is consistent 
evidence from high-income countries that nurses value practice environments that ensure 
enough staff to provide adequate patient care (Aiken et al, 2002). A broad consensus also 
exists on the relationship between job demands (such as workload, time pressure and staffing 
levels) and burnout, particularly emotional exhaustion (Opie et al, 2010; Maslach et al, 2001). 
A positive, significant association has also been shown between high-nurse patient ratios and 
burnout (Sheward et al, 2005).  
In Nepal, staff management is divided between the MoHP and individual hospitals. There are 
basically two types of staff employed in hospitals, viz. sanctioned and non-sanctioned or 
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contract staff. The MoHP HR interest is in the sanctioned staff, appointed via the Public 
Services Commission (PSC) (Appendix 7), and the district hospital interest is in contract staff. 
Each hospital is allocated “sanctioned” positions across different cadres by the MoHP based 
on the number of beds the facility has. However, the allocation has not been updated since 
the 1991 National Health Policy (when the population was 20 million, it is now approximately 
30 million). The 2014 Joint Annual Review between government and development partners 
found, in 2013, 47% of sanctioned doctor posts at hospitals were filled. Only 39% and 55% of 
sanctioned posts for nurses at clinics and hospitals, respectively, were filled. Not one hospital 
had the required combined complement of a doctor, obstetrician, 5 nurses (SBA trained) and 
an anaesthetist (Anderson et al, 2014).  
Sanctioned staff are automatically eligible for training but contract staff are not. Contract staff 
receive higher pay than sanctioned staff but their employment periods can be much shorter 
and more erratic. 
The primary CEONC fund purpose is to provide finance to employ contract staff where 
“sanctioned” positions are vacant. The findings from all case studies noted the number of 
“sanctioned” positions allocated to each hospital was insufficient to be able to provide CEONC 
services 24/7. The better performing hospitals, where they had private financial resources, 
endeavoured to meet demand through employing privately financed contract staff and by 
switching resources between different medical requirements. Sometimes where funding is 
not immediately available, hospitals resort to unconventional practices to maintain services 
such as asking contract staff to work without pay in the expectation that ultimately funding 
will become available when they can be paid.  
Ozcan and Horny (1999) recognised that “institutional staffing norms based solely on 
population or institutional size do not adequately take into consideration variations of need 
within a country. This necessarily creates real problems in health service provision, not only 
through under- or over-provision of health service staff but also through the inappropriate 
allocation of different cadres of staff.” (p.210). The current staffing allocations in Nepal have 
these deficiencies, they are: 
i.) Well out of date and do not reflect population movements or economic changes; 
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ii.) Not reflective of current developments in medical care policy or medical practice, such 
as the development of CEONC services; 
iii.) Basing staffing simply upon a nominal bed capacity which is too limiting a factor; 
iv.) Not reflective of changes in hospital capacity since 1991; 
v.) Not reflective of locality specific factors or objective based and related to local service 
needs, staff utilisation and actual workload. (For example, it does not consider the 
effect of referrals.) 
Staffing allocations should reflect a realistic and current assessment of need and funding 
should follow. If staffing allocations are inappropriate staff morale could be adversely 
affected and services may deteriorate. This is exacerbated where hospitals are required to 
deliver new services, such as CEONC services.  
The existence of the CEONC fund demonstrates awareness of this problem but this study 
shows that the arrangements for fund management are inadequate. These inadequacies have 
caused some hospitals to look for alternative financing from non-budgetary sources including 
the local HDC.  (This financing problem is discussed below.)  
Another factor in HR management is that CEONC funds and funds available from non-
budgetary sources can only be used to employ contract staff (Section 4.4). Contracts can only 
be issued for a maximum of 12 months if financed from the CEONC fund. In practice contracts 
are for even shorter periods if financed from CEONC funds because of their late availability. 
Contracts expire at the financial year end. Appointments may also be delayed by the 
complexity of the appointment process. Advance staff planning cannot occur because there 
is no certainty about the level of funding that will be available prior to the start of the financial 
year. Contract staff financed from other sources such as the HDCs are not subject to the same 
constraints but such funding is not comprehensively available and availability may also vary 
annually. Also, the CEONC fund may only be used to finance a single staff member per cadre 
which is inadequate to secure 24/7 service provision. 
The study results show that, due to the topographical circumstances of Nepal and the variety 
of local languages and cultures (section 4.4.2), the centrally managed systems of recruitment 
and appointments for sanctioned posts is not particularly effective. The study identifies the 
existence of multiple labour sub-markets, local to each hospital, whose strength varies 
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substantially. This affects the ability of hospitals to recruit appropriately qualified contract 
staff. Both low performing case study hospitals had severe problems attracting qualified 
permanent staff selected by the PSC and attempts to recruit locally contract staff were 
unfeasible given the local staffing market. The converse was true for the high performing 
hospitals which were in areas with buoyant local staffing markets (section 4.4.2).  
Whilst the PSC is responsible for the selection of sanctioned staff the MoHP is responsible for 
the management of the sanctioned staffing cohort. This centralised arrangement can result 
in HR management decisions being made centrally which have little regard for local 
circumstances. Thus, sanctioned staff may be switched between hospitals to fill urgent 
vacancies without either any long-term staffing strategy or regard to the immediate impact 
upon the hospital losing the staff. For example, in Nawalparasi, an AA was transferred to a 
primary healthcare unit: this transfer ignored both the creation of skills gap in the hospital 
and that in a primary healthcare unit anaesthetist skills would not be required.  
Reliance on short term contractual arrangements to effectively manage the deficiencies of a 
centralised allocation system has itself problems as the literature indicates (Bossert et al 2000, 
Bossert et al, 2002, Grundy et al, 2003; Kyaddondo et al, 2003; Kolehmainen-Aitken et al, 
2004; Munga 2009). Bossert et al (2002) studying decentralisation of the health systems in 
Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and the Philippines, noted that poorer, remoter and more rural 
districts had greater difficulty attracting qualified personnel with the converse for wealthier 
urban districts. Several studies reported that decentralising health workforce recruitment was 
associated with better attraction and retention of lower cadre staff, but poor attraction of 
specialised health workers. In Tanzania, for example, after undertaking decentralisation of HR 
functions to districts, rural districts were unable to attract and retain highly skilled staff such 
as medical specialists, leading the country to recentralise some of the HR management 
functions (Frumence, et al, 2013). In Nepal, newly qualified doctors must undertake 
compulsory service in remote rural areas, but this does not result in longer term retention of 
specialists and senior staff in such areas.  
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5.2.3 Quality of the equipment and infrastructure; 
There is a distinct contrast between the low and high performing hospitals in the availability 
and quality of equipment and infrastructure. Low performing hospitals had inadequate and 
poorly maintained equipment and some, or all, of the infrastructure was inadequate for the 
purpose. This potentially affects the quality of care. High performing hospitals did not have 
these problems. Remedying infrastructure defects and updating equipment is impossible 
when CEONC funds usage is restricted to staffing as occurred after the 2015 earthquakes, 
even though some hospitals’ infrastructure were adversely affected by those earthquakes. 
5.2.4 Procurement 
Procurement arrangements appeared to be weaker in the low performing hospitals affecting 
the availability of supplies and hence continuity of all, including CEONC, services. Local 
management should address this problem but whether they do so depends upon the quality 
of that management. 
5.2.5 Financial predictability and autonomy  
Financing of core hospital services through the budget is predictable. However, the linkage 
between funding, demand for, and the 24/7 provision of, CEONC services is not, nor how 
funding can be used. Payments from this fund are also made after the start of the financial 
year with no guarantee when they will be paid. There is no transparent formula for fund 
distribution and no reliable collection of data about CEONC activity or spending that has been 
incurred. Fund allocations vary significantly between years. Consequently, forward planning 
for CEONC services is impossible. 
Reference has been made above to a potential source of additional funds, namely the HDCs 
but this depends upon the finances of the HDC and its willingness to provide funds to support 
the delivery of CEONC services. Where HDCs were able and willing to support their hospitals 
financially they had better CEONC performance (section 4.7.7). However, HDC funds are not 
evenly available across Nepal and HDCs in the poorer areas tend to have less funds available. 
A further problem is that evidence of confusion exists about the financing of CEONC services 
because other funds exist such as the Aama fund, which is basically an incentive scheme to 
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assist a woman and her family financially for child bearing. Hospitals can be confused about 
how these different funds may be used and this is reflected in the annual financial returns of 
spending to the FHD and the MoHP. Inaccurate reporting exists over the utilisation of 
budgetary funds, CEONC funds and other funds such as the Aama fund.  
At the time of data collection (2015) there was no linkage between the allocation of CEONC 
funds and the key performance identifier i.e. the WHO caesarean guideline, or any other 
performance information. Therefore, there was no way of enabling the FHD to utilise the 
CEONC fund allocation process to specifically assist those hospitals with low caesarean 
performance rates or to identify any impact. That some hospitals can be classed as 
‘performing’ appeared to be simply a function of local circumstances, rather than a response 
to a centrally focussed policy.  
Together, this lack of accurate financial information and no performance information means 
that neither the MoHP nor the FHD have the output or outcome information to justify to the 
MoF what an appropriate budgetary allocation should be for the provision of CEONC services. 
This also undermines MoF confidence in the ability of hospitals to make effective use of the 
funds being made available.  
To improve efficiency and service delivery effectiveness, hospitals not only need certainty 
about funding they also need some discretion about how funds can be spent. Mathauer 
(2013), London (2013) and Mathole et al (2018) each identified that to improve efficiency, 
management needs discretion to move financial (and other) resources to their most effective 
use. Managerial capability is therefore an important factor in this. However, the central level 
interviews indicated that granting such discretion was likely to be resisted. (section 4.8, Table 
20). These difficulties are also reflected in the international literature. For example, Geyndt 
in an 11-country study (2017) identified key systemic issues which reduced the success of 
policies granting autonomy to public hospitals, including central level officials’ being reluctant 
to lose authority, ministries of finance wanting to maintain control over revenues and 
expenditures, public service commissions’ wanting to maintain control over HR issues and 
ministries of health fearing a loss of detailed control. Yet, increased hospital autonomy has 
been shown to result in greater efficiency, improved quality of services, expanded 
accountability, increased understanding in communities about how hospitals operate and 
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serve the communities and improved equity in distribution of hospital services (London et al, 
2013; Barasa et al 2017). In Nepal, despite the original conception of the CEONC fund as a 
flexible fund, in practice centralised policy control of the CEONC budget allocation and of 
routine hospital budgeting and staffing coupled with the unpredictability of CEONC funding 
and its late payment, significantly limits local managerial discretion and in turn the 
development of 24/7 CEONC services. What might have been an adequate arrangement to 
secure the delivery of CEONC services when only a few hospitals were beneficiaries is no 
longer adequate with all 75 district hospitals involved. At a minimum CEONC financial reform 
coupled with a link to policy achievement is essential to achieve more effective financial and 
hence operational CEONC services. 
5.2.6 The role of the HDC including accountability to the community 
One role of the HDCs is to act as the accountability link between the hospital and the local 
community. This is expressed in their structure. But it can only effectively provide that 
accountability link if it has a responsibility for policy, for agreeing objectives and performance 
and that they are achieved, and by holding the operational leadership to account. Operational 
leadership and day-to-day management should reside with the MeSu or the DHO for smaller 
units. Other roles include that the HDC provides support to the operational leadership in its 
judgements about priorities and in some circumstances, financial support. 
This study identified that poor community relations have an impact both on the willingness 
of the community to access services and on the quality of the relationship between health 
staff and the people they serve. This study revealed that the better performing hospitals had 
a community outreach policy and a consistency in service delivery to the community (section 
4.7.6). A study by Thomas et al (2012) looking at barriers to accessing services by the 
community in Nepal noted similar findings where staff absenteeism and short opening hours 
affected trust in services and deterred people from travelling to facilities, which might incur 
fruitless costs. However, the study by this author found that in the remote district, even 
intermittent availability of services was appreciated by the local community.  
The need to work with the community has long been a tenet of health service delivery but 
services need to be acceptable otherwise the community will not access them (Tanahashi, 
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1978). To achieve this, hospitals need to work cooperatively with the community. This is a 
two-way process (Couper, 2005). This study emphasised the importance of community 
engagement and accountability (section 4.7.6). Results from Molyneux et al’s (2012) 
systematic review of published literature of empirical papers on topics related to community 
involvement at peripheral health facilities in LMICs supported this finding. They identified 
how direct engagement of communities or users can enhance quality of care, appropriateness 
of health service delivery for users and patient satisfaction.  
5.2.7 Accountability to and engagement with the central authorities (the FHD and 
MoHP) 
Not only are hospitals accountable to their local community they are also accountable to the 
central authorities (the FHD and the MoHP). This occurs through the provision of clinical 
statistical information, and financial information, but for effective accountability this needs 
to move beyond reporting of facts and figures, and requires the central authorities to set and 
monitor performance against policy objectives and in addition the central authorities need 
the ability of to ask for explanations and justifications (Brinkerhoff, 2003). That statistical and 
financial information also needs to be reliable. The case studies showed both financial and 
statistical reporting were either unreliable or not sufficiently specific and linked to enable 
policy judgements to be made.  Whilst policy objectives are set (section 2.3), it does not 
appear that the financial resources made available are compatible with achieving these 
objectives, principally that amendments to official staffing levels that would allow for 
continuous service delivery have not been done since 1991 and the CEONC fund allocation 
arrangements do not reflect specific hospital needs to be able for them to meet that desired 
outcome. A result of this lack of hard data is that resources required for the delivery of CEONC 
services and the need (or not) for funding are driven by perceptions of central officials, and 
rely heavily on the individual knowledge of the CEONC mentor rather than locally informed 
by individual hospitals. 
At the time of data collection, health districts existed as part of the health service delivery 
structure (health district responsibilities are described in 4.3, Table 15 and Appendix 7).  The 
DHO/DPHOs have responsibility for administration of the budget and human resources, 
planning, monitoring and evaluation of district health service activities and supervision of 
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health facilities activities. However, this process excludes the CEONC fund. There is no 
accountability by hospitals to the DHO for the utilisation of the CEONC fund, e.g. not even 
basic financial expenditure reports are requested or provided.  
The main source of accountability (with the practical definition of accountability being 
extremely limited) is between individual hospitals and the FHD.  However, in practice only the 
CEONC mentor has oversight of the delivery of CEONC services and this role is not currently 
official government staff. The case studies showed the CEONC mentor role is beneficial in 
terms of providing operational support and training when the mentor could spend time in the 
hospitals (section 4.7.5) but this is not for accountability purposes. However, the evidence is 
that even the mentor contact is very limited with the exception being one high performing 
hospital (Makwanpur) where there is exchange of information with the FHD for other 
purposes (e.g. a quality of care pilot study). The case studies also showed that demand exists 
from poorer performing facilities for the mentor relationship to be developed. Such an 
exchange develops knowledge, understanding and confidence. But this CEONC mentor role, 
is not, and should not be, responsible for holding the district hospitals accountable for CEONC 
service delivery.   In practice, formal accountability arrangements do not exist (for example, 
no formal and consistent process of tracking the financial expenditure of the CEONC fund is 
in place) and consequently the FHD policy management role is not being performed. The 
unreliability of the statistical and financial information points to a need for a better quality 
financial management and audit process than exists currently because for effective 
accountability independent assessment of accountability robust data is necessary. 
There is a key role for clinical mentors to help improve service quality, but with the 
programme now covering all hospitals, one mentor is insufficient. While the lack of mentor 
engagement was felt by both performing and non-performing facilities those with stronger 
management used other mechanisms (such as in-service training) to mitigate this. Quite 
separately there is also a need for effective accountability mechanisms to be developed to 
make it possible for the FHD to properly exercise its CEONC service managerial 
responsibilities.  
Institutional weaknesses and limited resources to support the implementation, monitoring 
and control of local services exists in other developing countries. The grey literature provides 
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an example from Kenya, in an evaluation of the capacity of the Department of Family Health. 
This found that performance of the health system locally was affected by the limited staff 
numbers at the central level who were capable of providing appropriate advice, support or 
capable of sufficiently holding hospitals accountable beyond reporting of facts and figures, 
i.e. asking for explanations and justifications (USAID, 2013). Mathole et al (2018) identified in 
South Africa that both well and poorly performing hospitals experienced frustrations with the 
organisational culture of the central government, which was seen as not respecting the needs 
of health facilities. Within the education sector, also in Kenya, it was noted that effective 
implementation and utilisation of the education block grant benefitted from ministry auditors 
and inspectors visiting schools more often and offering guidance to school committees and 
head teachers on a continuous basis (Ayako, 2006). For Nepal, this would suggest that having 
a central function specifically designed to support improved delivery of CEONC services, 
would be a valuable reform but it does not provide the accountability channel necessary to 
enable the FHD to ensure that health policy is actually delivered.  
Therefore, there are two distinct roles. The mentor role would though have to be properly 
staffed and capable of providing advice and support on a continuous basis. In Nepal, this 
would mean building on the role of the CEONC mentor. The responsibilities of the mentor 
should also be clarified. Is it to be just a training activity and acting as an arbitrator in disputes 
with the local communities? Or should it have a wider role determining how the CEONC fund 
should be allocated (i.e. the distribution arrangements) setting objectives and performance 
standards and monitoring individual hospital performance including financial and operational 
performance against objectives? This is a quite different role which would require the 
development of statistical, financial and performance information and ensuring that that 
information was reliable. This would impact upon the administrative quality of hospitals as 
well as upon the interpretive quality of the FHD in setting and assessing the performance of 
hospitals.  
Accountability should be a two-way process. Information flows to the centre providing the 
basis for an assessment of the effectiveness of policy, financial and operational management 
at the hospital level. But this can only happen if the centre is clear about the objectives it 
wishes to see achieved and uses the information coming from hospitals to ensure that they 




High levels of referral from outside a district may be a cause of high levels of caesareans in 
some facilities and effectively vice versa. Referrals can occur for several reasons with an 
important reason being the quality and 24/7 availability of local CEONC services. Good referral 
pathways are critical in the delivery of CEONC services. Further, functional relationships and 
adequate referral interventions and systems between primary, secondary and tertiary 
facilities are crucial in saving the lives of mothers and newborns (Murray et al, 2006). 
However, in recent years, in Nepal, concerns have been raised that the changed demand for 
services i.e. increasing levels of institutional delivery (NDHS, 2016) may not have been 
matched by the distribution of supply, resulting in overcrowding of some facilities (NHSSP, 
2013). Central policy should therefore be designed to ensure facilities that are referral centres 
receive appropriate levels of support to manage increased demand. This will require updating 
the arrangements for staffing and the distribution of CEONC funds including the 
arrangements for the investment in new buildings and equipment. However, there is no 
evidence this is occurring and the continued use of 1991 data for hospital staffing purposes 
and inadequacies of the CEONC funding arrangements demonstrate this. 
5.3 Factors which determine the effectiveness of the CEONC fund as a 
contributor to the delivery of more efficient and effective CEONC services 
This study has identified several systemic factors impacting the utilisation of the CEONC fund 
and the ability of health facilities to consistently deliver CEONC services. These are: 
i.) A lack of clear objectives for the utilisation of the CEONC funds;  
ii.) Intermittent and unpredictable funding flows including delays in release of funds and 
uncertainty over how those funds can be used; 
iii.) Incoherent financial and no specific/linked CEONC statistical reporting; 
iv.) Poor leadership and management including HR management and planning; 
v.) The existence of several overlapping programmes with a lack of clarity about their 
objectives, and  
vi.) Quality of engagement with the FHD.   
A more detailed discussion of each of these is set out below.  
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5.3.1 A lack of clear objectives 
This study has focussed on the different performance of hospitals as measured by the 
proportion of caesarean operations. The WHO established an optimal caesarean rate of 
between 10-15% of normal births to avoid death and severe morbidity in the mother. A rate 
of up to 10% would show improvements in neonatal outcomes (Betran et al, 2015). A 
maximum optimum caesarean rate is also relevant with a study noting that whilst health 
outcomes improve when caesarean rates are below 15%, they decline with a caesarean rate 
above 15% (Betran et al, 2007). Given the importance of this ratio, a key factor in the 
distribution of the CEONC fund would be expected to be how the fund availability impacts 
upon this ratio in the benefitting hospitals and if not, why? The purpose of the CEONC fund is 
not simply to spend money, it is to achieve an objective. However, no such objective is set or 
statistics gathered to demonstrate impact. Consequently, there is no appreciation of the 
effectiveness of the funding arrangement or how its distribution affects the efficiency with which 
CEONC services operate. Similarly, there is no recognition in the centralised HR policy 
arrangements, which are based upon an out of date allocation of sanctioned posts, of how that 
policy impacts on the delivery of CEONC services. 
5.3.2 Intermittent and unpredictable funding flows 
Without a major reform of hospital funding which reflected the need for CEONC service 
availability, a major problem is the annual unpredictability of CEONC funding flows and how 
those funds can be spent. Significant variations between years exacerbate the problem. This 
prevents longer term planning and results in short term ad hoc decisions which cause 
inefficiency and prevent, for some hospitals, 24/7 service delivery. These adverse effects 
could only be partly alleviated where HDC or other alternative funding sources were available. 
Budgeting is annual and this prevents multi-year, or even full year, service planning and the 
inability to predict possible levels of CEONC funding, or when it is likely to be received, 
prevents effective planning for this service. Ideally fund flows should be predictable and 
timely with consistent terms of usage or, if conditions of usage are to change, this should be 
signalled well in advance. Predictability usually comes with the development and utilisation 
of a robust, agreed with recipients, distribution formula. In Ghana, Aberese-Ako et al (2018) 
identified that erratic and unreliable sources of funding constrained hospital managers’ 
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capacity to practice transformational leadership and left hospital managers feeling 
disempowered and frustrated. Adhikari (2013) noted, in his analysis of Nepal’s health 
financing schemes, that allocations of financial resources for health care services are always 
critical and frequently unstable due to an annual budget process, small fiscal space, possible 
corruption and uncertainties in contributions of external development partners. Similarly, in 
Kenya, Wawaru (2014) demonstrated that health facilities in receipt of direct funding, delays 
in receiving funds and arduous financial reporting requirements created challenges to 
effective implementation and affected the ability of facilities to deliver services effectively. 
Unstable funding flows are a common factor in the financing of health systems in many 
developing countries. 
Overall in Nepal, Krause et al (2013) outlined that budget preparation is formally well 
governed by detailed guidelines and procedures, but these are not always adhered to in 
practice as political elites and top officials have consistently influenced the decision-making 
process. The budget manual specifies a clear annual budget calendar, but this is not 
necessarily adhered to resulting in late approval. According to a 2008 worldwide survey by 
the OECD, Nepal in practice lags behind most countries surveyed on every key deadline of the 
budget calendar. In addition, expenditure ceilings set by the MoF have yet to become a 
credible constraint, which undermines efforts to link budget allocations to policy priorities. 
Although outside the scope of this study, multi-year or “medium-term,” budgeting is a critical 
issue that needs to be addressed in Nepal and until it is, efficient and effective utilisation of 
the CEONC fund will be adversely affected. However, a responsibility of the central health 
authorities is to work to alleviate the adverse effects. Examples would be the provision of 
indicative budgets in advance of the financial year and stability, transparency and 
predictability in grant distribution arrangements. 
In Nepal, hospitals are not consulted about what CEONC funding is required nor is indicative 
information provided by the FHD. How the CEONC fund is allocated depends upon the FHD 
perception (primarily that of the CEONC mentor) of local needs. No transparent formula is 
used to distribute funds. Although originally designed as a general fund, to be allocated by 
hospitals over the different CEONC spending activities, conditions have been imposed limiting 
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how hospitals can use the fund. These conditions can vary annually and are unpredictable 
making forward financial and hence service planning impossible.  
Research from the education sector in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique shows that 
early and good planning is an imperative for effective implementation of grant mechanisms, 
and that transparency and accountability are improved when block grants are given using well 
known formula and eligibility criteria (Ayako, 2006). However, the formula for awarding of 
grants needs to be sufficiently nuanced to reflect differences between districts. For example, 
as noted by Ayako, instead of awarding equal amounts to schools solely based on enrolment, 
grant aid should differentiate between the needs of urban and rural schools. However, this is 
only possible where performance information is precise and not easily capable of 
manipulation. Vague categories, such as ‘busyness’ and ‘utilisation’ as used in Kenya led to 
confusion and resentment among schools who felt they had been misclassified (Opwora, 
2009).  
5.3.3 Incoherent financial and statistical reporting 
A related factor is that with any centrally funded activity or service the central government 
through the MoHP also ought to know how the funds have been utilised and what that 
spending has achieved. This should influence the total sum available and the distribution 
arrangements for future year’s funding. However, as indicated above, financial and statistical 
reporting can be incoherent and confused or even lacking, partly because of the existence of 
different information systems, coupled with poor quality financial administration. 
Solving this problem will require a different approach to the management and utilisation of 
the CEONC fund. New performance information systems and better trained administrative 
staff are required.  
5.3.4 Leadership and management including human resource management and 
planning 
The quality of leadership and management within hospitals is crucial to the efficient and 
effective delivery of CEONC services. Yet no element of the CEONC fund resource is put into 
improving the quality of that management and leadership. The evidence from the case studies 
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points to the importance of this feature of hospital administration.  Leadership and 
management do not occur spontaneously. The Kings Fund (a UK based charity) has identified 
five key cultural elements are necessary for sustaining organisational cultures that ensure 
high quality, compassionate care for patients, these include: inspiring visions operationalised 
at every level; clear, aligned objectives for all teams, departments and individual staff; 
supportive and enabling people management and high levels of staff engagement; learning, 
innovation and quality improvement embedded in the practice of all staff; and effective team 
working (West et al, 2015). 
A feature of effective leadership and management is the ability to manage the key resource 
of staffing.  Yet this is not possible within the Nepal system. As noted in section 5.2.2, the 
centralised allocation of sanctioned posts to each hospital is inadequate and outdated. This 
is a major systemic issue compounded by the inability of hospitals to enter multi-year 
contracts for staff in non-sanctioned positions and by central decisions to move staff without 
due regard for the consequential implications of such moves. No longer term staff planning 
exists. The disparities in the training arrangements between sanctioned and contract staff and 
in pay rates can cause friction. Management arrangements for contract staff are 
inappropriate as contracts can be for very short periods with no training opportunities unless 
non-budgetary sources of funding exist. These are significant disincentives having adverse 
effects upon service quality. This compares with sanctioned staff who are permanently 
employed and have training opportunities. These employment differences require careful 
management and materially affect the quality and 24/7 delivery of CEONC services. They also 
have adverse effects upon the efficient utilisation of CEONC funds. Within Nepal, Krause et al 
(2013) found that restrictions on local government’s ability to engage in multi-year 
contracting (for fear of over-committing subsequent years) has led to an inability to ensure 
service continuity.  
Worku (2013) identifies that to save mother’s lives maternity staff should have access to a 
medical professional who has the skills and equipment. In Nepal, as in many developing 
countries, health facilities do not perform at the expected level or continuously. In the poorer 
performing hospitals CEONC services cannot be provided 24/7 because skilled staff are not 
available. Devkota et al (2011), noted that delays in CEONC funds distribution caused a lack 
of adequately qualified contract staff which together with a lack of sanctioned posts with 
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many unfilled positions created a serious HR problem. The similarity of these findings with 
this study demonstrates that little progress has occurred since 2011. Further, Bossert et al 
(2002) in their analysis of decentralisation of health systems in countries in Africa and the 
Philippines identified that where locally hired staff went months or even years without being 
paid, this resulted in a deterioration of care quality.  
5.3.5 Multiple overlapping programmes and understanding the differences between 
them 
One potentially important determinant of the success of the CEONC fund is the extent to 
which hospital staff, particularly managers, are aware of its purpose, objectives and how 
these relate to other programmes such as Aama. So far as the CEONC fund is concerned, this 
study identifies, for the first time, considerable differences in understanding about its 
purpose comparing the case studies and the central level interviews. This is despite the 
issuance of CEONC fund guidelines. The FHD regards it as a ‘top-up’ fund, to be utilised to 
supplement existing hospital budgets, whereas some recipient districts regard it as the sole 
source of funding for the provision of CEONC services. This misunderstanding is further 
compounded by real or perceived restrictions on the way in which the funds can be used, 
such as to meet salary costs only or for general use. Other funding sources such as the 
separately financed Aama programme, and special arrangements for the reimbursement of 
obstetric care were frequently conflated in discussions with the hospital teams. This affects 
the quality of financial reporting and creates confusion. Similar to Michael Lipsky’s (1980) 
classic analysis of ‘street-level bureaucracy’, the officials in the hospital and DHO are unable 
to implement them all successfully. Instead, the case studies show that at the hospital level, 
the regulations of the different programmes are disregarded, and local routines are 
established which, depending upon the quality of management, are designed to meet local 
objectives rather than those of the government.  
5.3.6 Quality of engagement with the FHD 
Engagement with the FHD is limited and with some hospitals appears to be non-existent or at 
best infrequent and intermittent. The principal reason for engagement is to obtain support 
from the CEONC mentor to address training and community relationship issues. There is no 
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engagement which would develop an accountability relationship and such a relationship 
would be beneficial to both the FHD and hospitals. The mentoring and accountability 
relationships are conflated. Accountability is essential for the development of an efficient and 
effective CEONC service. But effective accountability requires the definition of objectives and 
adequate statistical and financial reporting showing for the CEONC service what is the 
objective of the CEONC fund allocations and how those allocations link with other hospital 
resources (which will require an updating of sanctioned post allocations and the budgets that 
accompany those allocations). 
Quite separately there is a need for the development of the mentoring role. This is especially 
important given the expansion of the CEONC allocations to all district hospitals. The mentor 
should not have the CEONC fund allocation responsibility and that responsibility should lie 
elsewhere within the MoHP and ideally should be based upon a transparent formula agreed 
with potential fund recipients.  The mentor should be able to advise on and even influence 
that formula but as a participant with others in its development and future modifications as 
experience unfolds. 
5.4 A CEONC funding arrangement to secure a better availability of CEONC 
services in hospitals  
This study has identified design faults in the CEONC fund that limit its ability to promote 
efficient and effective CEONC services. The main faults are: 
i.) Lack of objectives to be achieved. 
ii.) Lack of clarity as to how the totality of the fund is determined. 
iii.) Significant changes in fund allocations between years and the funds cannot be used 
to improve the quality of hospital management and administrative arrangements. 
iv.) Lack of consistency between years in how funds can be used with the FHD 
determining the subjective headings over which the fund can be spent, rather than 
the hospital manager. 
v.) No transparent distribution formula compounded by no consultation between the 
FHD and hospitals over the size and distribution arrangements leading to an 
allocation process which is inconsistent with needs. 
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vi.) Delayed budget release. 
vii.) No fund flexibility between financial years and, as a result, staff contracting is limited 
to a single financial year. 
viii.) No recognition of the fact that some hospitals provide CEONC services within the 
financial and staffing limitations of their existing allocations. 
ix.) Inaccurate financial information and no statistical information available to the FHD 
about what is happening with CEONC service provision. 
x.) No effective accountability arrangements with accountability being subsumed into 
mentoring and therefore the FHD do not know how the fund is actually spent by 
hospitals or what has been achieved with the spending or why what has been aimed 
for has not been achieved. 
xi.) No recognition of the impact of referrals both into and from a district. 
The result is that hospitals have no ability to plan and the FHD has little substantive knowledge 
of the impact of CEONC funding policy on maternal and newborn health. 
These findings compare with other research. Bossert et al (2002) undertook a secondary study 
of existing studies on decentralisation of health systems in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and the 
Philippines. Whilst restricted by the limited amount of primary research available in the four 
countries they could identify some key themes that resonate with the findings of this study. 
They identified that devolving budgetary responsibility can result in improved quality, 
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy owing to user oversight and participation in 
decision making; and that there is potential for greater equity through distribution of 
resources toward traditionally marginal regions and groups. The data from this study suggests 
that funds could be more appropriately allocated to the needs of the hospitals and by 
extension their clients, if they had more influence over the budgeting and allocation process. 
Further, Funk et al (2008) identified that in better performing hospitals annual reviews were 
conducted by independent auditors and their report was made available to donors and other 
interested individuals. In their study the poorer performing health facilities had neither 
control over their budgeting process nor were they held accountable for how allotted funds 
were spent. In Kenya, Opwora (2009) noted that hospital involvement in the decisions about 
funding and its allocation was perceived to have had a highly positive impact, increasing 
utilisation of the hospital services and improving access. The ability of hospitals to manage 
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their own financing had improved the operational environment, including the availability of 
supplies, infrastructure quality, and by allowing them to hire more support staff. Overall, 
making clear what hospitals are to achieve with CEONC fund allocations and giving local 
management more autonomy in determining how those funds should be used as well as being 
directly accountable for their use maximises efficiency, transparency and accountability and 
is a key recommendation towards improving the functionality of the CEONC fund.  
Mathauer et al (2013) in their extensive systematic analysis of research on hospital payment 
mechanisms in LMICs identified substantial efficiency gains, such as a decrease in hospital bed 
numbers and in average lengths of inpatient stay, could be made by reforming hospital 
payment mechanisms regardless of patient income level.  
Overall, if policy-makers in Nepal want to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in the 
utilisation of public funds the CEONC fund should address specific hospital needs, be based 
upon a transparent and predictable formula linked to objectives. The central health 
authorities also need better information on how hospitals, whether in receipt of CEONC funds 
or not, are using all their resources to deliver CEONC services. Linked to this, allocations of 
sanctioned posts need to be updated to reflect current needs and advances in medical 
practice as well as the development of medical services (including CEONC). Consistent and 
reliable reporting of finance, service utilisation/provision and health outcomes is necessary 
(Bossert et al, 2002). This would provide better quality oversight and monitoring by the FHD 
and result in improved CEONC service outcomes. 
5.5 Other factors 
Currently Nepal is establishing a federal state. This will impact on the provision of CEONC 
services. The problems this study has identified should be addressed otherwise provision of 
an effective 24/7 CEONC service under a federalised structure will be infeasible. 
This study has not researched how federalisation will affect CEONC service delivery and 
therefore it cannot make specific recommendations. However, the research does show that 
unless significant reforms occur to CEONC service funding, hospital staffing and HR 
management processes, and that the central authorities have more regard to managerial 
standards and reporting quality, then federalisation carries significant added risks. 
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5.6 Revised theoretical framework 
During the literature review for this study, two frameworks were identified that could provide 
the building blocks of an appropriate contextual theoretical model. These were the human 
resource management framework developed by Puoane et al (2008) and the five 
management domains identified by Funk et al (2013).  These two frameworks were selected 
as they were developed from studies that sought to identify how different facets of 
management of a health facility impacted on its ability to deliver services.  However, each of 
these models had their limitations (see Chapters 2 and 3) and in order to apply a framework 
that was appropriate for the Nepalese context, these frameworks were combined, added to 
and adapted to develop a third novel framework that sought to provide a model of how the 
availability and delivery of CEONC services in Nepal should function.  This model was used to 
guide both data collection and the data analysis presented in Chapter 4.  
However, based on the results of the study and comparison against the international 
literature, it was identified that the existing theoretical framework did not adequately explain 
all the results of the study.   Whilst the original model facilitated the identification of the 
critical factors that needed to be explored to understand what should be taken into account 
when researching the provision of CEONC services in Nepal, they did not allow description of 
the interplay between systemic issues and local factors which appear from this study to have 
an influence on the provision of CEONC services.   
The CEONC fund serves a valuable purpose but the fund itself does need to be separated from 
the CEONC service itself.  The case studies have identified critical deficiencies that affect the 
provision of CEONC services and these include: 
i.) Inability to recruit skilled clinical staff because of the remoteness of the district; 
ii.) Inadequate induction training; 
iii.) Inadequate clinical staff refresher training; 
iv.) Poor quality or inadequate infrastructure given the likely demand; 
v.) Poor quality or inadequate equipment; 
vi.) Unreliable delivery of drugs and other clinical supplies; 
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vii.) Poor quality or inadequate management; 
viii.) Lack of clear objectives, performance measures and HR management generally; 
ix.) Lack of skilled administrative staff. 
Some of these deficiencies can be remedied (or attempt to be remedied) through the use of 
the CEONC fund but others may need to be remedied in other ways. The revised framework 
(Figure 9) incorporates the critical factors that need consideration for the CEONC fund, or 
indeed to any new fund for district hospitals, to be functional.  It focuses upon the hospital 
and the relevant central ministry.  Efficiency and effectiveness also depend upon other central 
ministries, in particular on prompt release of budget funds and allowing multi-year 
contracting.  Unless these occur the benefits available from a revised approach to CEONC 
services and the CEONC fund will be much diminished. 
This revised theoretical framework has 6 meta-themes with a further 24 sub-themes. It draws 
on the models of Puoane and Funk but includes other factors that are relevant to the delivery 
of CEONC services in Nepal. One factor is the integration of the CEONC service into the 
management of the hospital generally, a second is the quality of the data (both operational 
and financial data) which should affect the distribution of financial resources, goal setting and 
supervision, a third is the relationship between the central authorities and the hospitals with 
the central authorities making decisions without consultation with the hospitals and which 
effectively constrain or remove the local managerial discretion of the hospitals and a fourth 
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5.7 Summary of findings, contribution to new knowledge  
This study demonstrates a complex interplay of factors and actors impacting on the delivery 
of CEONC services. Improvement of service quality depends upon different actors operating 
at different levels in the health system. The CEONC fund is a focussed functional fix to issues 
that have a systemic cause. A major one being the failure to update the arrangements for the 
distribution of sanctioned staff to reflect population changes, new services (such as CEONC) 
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and improvements in medical practice. Improvements in hospital service delivery depend 
upon many factors of which clinical practice is an important one but effective clinical practice 
depends upon a good quality of administration with effective leadership and management. 
Therefore, only improving the functioning of the CEONC fund will have limited impact. Ideally, 
a review is needed of health system financing and that in turn depends upon a review of 
national budgetary processes. As this is unlikely, in the short-term reform to CEONC service 
management arrangements, including developing a clarity about the objectives to be 
achieved, linking the funding to those objectives, coupled with better quality accountability 
arrangements so that the FHD can appreciate how the policy is working in practice, is 
essential. In addition, to secure current assessments of hospital need for additional financial 
support, updating hospital staffing allocations, coupled with hospital/FHD/MoHP level CEONC 
administration/management reform is necessary.  
One critical factor, cited by both multiple hospital and central level interviewees, is the 
removal of intermittent and unpredictable funding flows. These together with uncertainty 
about how the funds can be used leave particularly poorly resourced hospitals unable to fund 
salaries, procure equipment and supplies or improve infrastructure. This also prevents any 
hospital, whatever its circumstances, being able to effectively plan service provision and 
therefore utilise its resources efficiently and effectively. As the fund is ‘rolled out’ to all district 
hospitals these problems will become more significant. Financing gaps resulting from late 
budget release add to this problem. These problems are compounded by the way in which 
the CEONC fund allocation process operates. This is based upon a simple assessment of 
financial need made centrally by the FHD without consultation with hospitals to identify 
needs or objectives to be achieved.  
In a newly federalised Nepal, there will be a greater focus on decentralised planning and 
management of finances with implications for the provision of health services in general and 
CEONC services in particular. Reform will become essential. 
Other systemic bottlenecks besides funding that can have a major impact on CEONC services 
provided by some hospitals are: 
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• lack of clear clinical and institutional leadership coupled with a lack of a substantive 
performance culture; 
• lack of active support from HDCs; 
• inadequate HR management caused by outdated allocation of “sanctioned” posts, 
inability to enter multi-year contracts, ad-hoc staff transfers and inconsistent 
arrangements for training, supervision and support; 
• the existence of multiple overlapping programmes which cause confusion both in 
terms of expenditure and reporting, (the CEONC and Aama programme); 
• inadequately trained administrative staff and inadequate audit arrangements; 
• lack of accountability arrangements to the FHD resulting in inadequate monitoring 
and feedback arrangements; 
• a need to separate accountability from mentoring. 
This study shows that where a hospital has strong leadership and management this provides 
a positive performance environment with increased service availability. It also facilitates a 
better quality administration, improved induction arrangements, staff training, stronger 
procurement mechanisms and supports performance management. It has a positive impact 
on the hospitals’ ability to deliver services. Where that management is also supported by a 
functional, interested and engaged HDC, ideally with some financial resources willing to use 
them to support CEONC services, this is particularly beneficial.  
This study shows, additionally to the current literature, that thinking that problems can be 
solved simply though the provision of additional funding to support a new activity is not 
enough. Clear policy objectives and accountability arrangements, which have specific regard 
to the variety of managerial/operational environments and to the physical and cultural 
environments that exist across a country, are essential concomitants to additional funding. 
The central authorities should consider how far local managers also need policy support and 
guidance and they should consider how far other policies might support or inhibit the 
development of the new service, and how different contexts might respond in different ways 
to the same policy intervention. This means that the central authorities need to be properly 
staffed to monitor performance. Another key factor is how far centralised decision making 
supports or inhibits a particular service development. In Nepal with its move to a federal 
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structure, consultation and devolution of decision making would appear to be a necessary 
component of policy development. 
The next section seeks to identify these varying contexts through a revised CMOC and how 
different contexts respond in different ways to the CEONC fund (Table 22).  
5.8 Revised context/mechanism/outcome configuration 
As noted in 3.2.2, this was not a fully-fledged realist evaluation. However, this study did draw 
on aspects of that approach.  A key part of realist evaluation that was drawn on was the 
revisiting and revision of the initial CMOC (described in Chapter Three).  Therefore, following 
the data analysis and with reference to the international literature, a reconfigured CMOC was 
developed.  This was based on the interpretation of the evidence-based findings presented in 
Chapter Four with the dual purpose of identifying recommendations that reflect the realities 
of implementation (section 5.8). As shown in Table 22, a reconfigured CMOC better captures 
the realities of implementation i.e. what works for whom in what circumstances. This 
reconfigured CMOC recognises that, in reality, there is not a single context but several and 
that there are, in effect, potentially two sources of intervention. The context is that all 
hospitals have limited funds and all hospital staffing of sanctioned posts is based upon 1991 
assessment of needs and that in turn affects budgetary availability. In addition, categories of 












Table 22: Revised CMOC 
Context 
 
Intervention Mechanism Outcome 
Hospitals with strong 
local management 
and leadership 
committed to CEONC 
provision, with 














Management use the fund to 
supplement available resources + 
clinicians feel supported by 
management and operating in an 
environment of reciprocity 
Performance objectives, integrated 
hospital and CEONC staffing, training 




climate that includes 
recognition, 
respect, commitment 
and trust which 
facilitates regular 
availability of CEONC 




Hospitals with strong 
local management 
and leadership 
committed to CEONC 
provision, with weak 






Performance objectives, integrated 
hospital and CEONC staffing, training 
and induction, widely disseminated 
information but local management feel 
frustrated by inconsistent budgetary 
funding flows. Lack of flexibility in 
funding makes it difficult to spend on 
alternative approaches (e.g. training). 
HDC unwilling or unable to plug CEONC 
resourcing gaps. Lack of trust in FHD. 
 
Positive organisational 
approach to CEONC 
service provision but 
little or no increase in 
availability of CEONC 
services. Community 
trust in hospital may 




Hospitals with poor 
local management 















Additional financial resources in 
themselves are insufficient to 
motivate local management to focus 
on CEONC. Management does not 
regard provision of CEONC services as 
integral to overall health service 
provision which also mitigates against 
provision of appropriate training. 
No change in 
availability of CEONC 
services 
 
Hospitals fitting any of 
the above three 





pilot programmes or 
with regular CEONC 
mentor support 
 






As above but with an Increased trust 
in support and improved technical 
skills in CEONC delivery 
 
Increased availability 
of CEONC services and 
improved capacity of 
service providers 
 
Hospitals fitting any of 
the above three 
categories but at a 
physical distance from 
Kathmandu with 
limited access to 










Inability to access CEONC mentor 
increases mistrust in FHD. Perception 




impact on availability 
of services or capacity 




The revised and expanded CMOC reflects the analysis of the study results and assimilates 
evidence from the international literature. This indicates that a wider response is required to 
achieve the desired outcomes that goes beyond a funding mechanism. From this, 
recommendations that contribute to the design and implementation of a more effective 
programme are set out below. 
5.9 Implications and recommendations for policy and practice 
Drawing from the revised CMOC, the implications and recommendations for policy and 
practice arising from this study for the provision of CEONC services are focussed at three 
levels: the health system and policy making environment; management and governance at 
the hospital and finally financing the CEONC fund itself.  
5.9.1 The health system and policy making environment 
A broad consensus exists that increasing availability of CEONC services is an important 
component of reducing maternal mortality. It ought to be an integral element of district 
hospital health service provision. However, not all district hospitals are properly staffed, 
equipped or financed to allow this. An attempt to solve the consequential problems has been 
the introduction of the CEONC fund. The challenge for achieving success from a mechanism 
such as the CEONC fund is that it assumes a simple cause and effect and linear direction 
between providing financial resources and achieving increased availability of CEONC services. 
However, this study shows the delivery of CEONC services demonstrates many of the facets 
of a complex problem. There are a variety of dynamics involved, with interactions between 
them; the incentives potentially available through the CEONC fund are weak as are 
information and monitoring systems. Problems may be generated by central or local actions 
and solutions can equally come from central or local initiatives. Trust may not exist between 
the central and local officials. This makes the system difficult to stimulate and steer, and 
requires consideration of the rules of interaction within the system and the extent to which 
they are adhered (Cairney, 2012).  
The ODI (2008) identified ten key characteristics of complex problems which have been 
compared against the characteristics of the delivery of CEONC services (Table 23).  
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Table 23: Complexity and CEONC services in Nepal 
Concepts of 
complexity 
Characteristics of complex 
problems 




1. Systems characterised 
by interconnected and 
interdependent elements 
and dimensions  
CEONC system is characterised by interconnections 
and interdependent elements at all health system 
levels i.e. from the hospital level, to the district 
public health system, to MoHP divisions, to 
ministries beyond such as the MoF, the PSC and the 
NPC and between the hospital and the local 
environment (including population cultures) local 
jobs markets and HDC effectiveness in developing 
local accountability and its financial resources. It is 
also impacted by external pressures such as the 
WHO and country aid agencies. The fund itself, even 
as a nominally simple intervention, is influenced by a 
wide range of actors i.e. the MoHP, the FHD, the 
CEONC mentor, the MoF and the NPC, but notably 
not by individual hospitals. 
2. Feedback processes 
shape how change 
happens within a complex 
system.  
Multiple feedback processes should occur, but do 
not. These should affect, for example, hospital 
actions in the delivery of CEONC services, qualities 
of training and mentoring, qualities of facilities as 
well as funding arrangements. All potentially have a 
dynamic influence on the CEONC services. 
3. The behaviour of 
systems emerges – often 
unpredictably – from the 
interaction of the parts, 
such that the whole is 
different to the sum of the 
parts. 
The CEONC fund is operating in an environment of 
multiple policy interventions including those 
affecting healthcare generally, specific interventions 
affecting obstetric services (e.g. Aama), and the 
move to federalism. The CEONC fund is not isolated 




4. Relationships between 
dimensions are frequently 
nonlinear. 
The effects of the policies towards CEONC services 
are not linear, multiple other parties are acting on 
the delivery of obstetric services simultaneously 
(e.g. DHO, DPHO, hospital management, routine 
hospital service provision, the Aama programme, 
NGOs, etc.). Responses to other factors such as 
natural disasters affect the relationships between 
the FHD, DoHS, MoHP and MoF who influence the 
CEONC fund and individual actors’ capacity to 
respond to the needs of the system. There is no 
clear coordinating leader. 
5. Small differences in the 
initial state of a system 
can lead to major 
differences later. 
 
The most important difference is the scaling up of 
the CEONC fund from support to a few hospitals to 
support to all. This impacts upon the effectiveness of 
the fund as a policy support, unless accompanied by 
equivalent change to how the fund is managed and 
that other changes occur.  
6. The dimensions of a 
system change over time.  
Staff involved in the CEONC system regularly change 
at central and hospital level. The system is highly 
reliant on the ability of individuals to take ownership 
and provide leadership. No clear measures exist 





Characteristics of complex 
problems 
Characteristics of CEONC services in Nepal  
accountable. This results in instability of leadership 
poor management and variable team dynamics. 
 
Currently Nepal is undergoing a radical governance 
change as it moves to federalism. This will 
significantly impact the system and hence on CEONC 
service delivery. Further the interrelatedness 
between different aspects of the system from the 
budget, to HR, to community engagement are 
constantly evolving and changing. 
7. Chaos and edge of 
chaos describe the order 
underlying the seemingly 
random behaviours 
exhibited by certain 
complex systems.  
The Nepali health system is a moving, evolving 
multi-faceted organism especially within the context 
of federalism, which a simple financial intervention 




8. Adaptive agents react 
to the system and to each 
other. 
Some local agents, e.g. the local managers and HDCs 
adapt to their environment and support or inhibit 
the availability of CEONC services by their 
willingness to allocate resources (financial and 
human) towards sustaining continuous year-round 
services or to address problems. For example, in 
Rukum the HDC was not willing to support CEONC 
services, but in Makwanpur additional resources 
were made available thus countering some systemic 
problems. The CEONC mentor can adapt CEONC 
fund allocations based on his perception of ‘need’. 
9. Self-organisation  
 
Some local agents, the managers and HDCs, self-
organise to compensate for the inefficiencies in the 
system, particularly in regards to delayed budget 
disbursement.  
10. Within a system of 
adaptive agents, co-
evolution occurs, such 
that the overall system 
and the agents within it 
evolve together, or co-
evolve, over time.  
 
To maintain delivery of CEONC services hospitals 
have developed local policies where they are 
utilising hospital resources, seeking other funding 
sources and support. The system evolves on a 
reactive basis to circumstances which change 
annually. The CEONC fund itself has been adapted 
and developed, as circumstances change: i.e. major 
natural disasters affected how it can be used with 
the fund evolving from supporting a small number of 
hospitals to one that supports all hospitals.  
Adapted from Ramalingam and Jones (2008). 
As this is a complex problem, recommendations for policy and practice need to acknowledge 
that traditional policy and programme tools may be insufficient or inappropriate for 
developing impactful interventions (Love et al, 2017; Jones, 2011). Cairney (2012) identified 
four insights from complexity theory that are relevant for policy making and implementation. 
Firstly, that the policy process and its implementation is guided by a variety of forces and that 
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outputs of policies working on complex problems will only be realised under particular 
conditions. A policy that was successful in one context may not have the same effect in 
another and hence the need to develop and understand the CMOC (ibid). Secondly, systems 
self-organise and therefore are difficult to control. Thirdly, local contexts and the agents that 
operate within them are unstable and change rapidly, therefore both agents and 
organisations must adapt quickly and not rely on a single policy strategy (ibid). Finally, policy 
makers often seek to concentrate more power at the centre rather than understand the policy 
making environment and that top down implementation models might link success to 
simplicity and to a clear goal and select several officials to carry it out, without acknowledging 
that implementers will have to adapt the policy to respond to the context (ibid). Further, 
complex environments are dynamic, with a variety of actors engaging on issues in an array of 
different ways and generating effects that are unknown to each other (Cairney et al, 2015). 
Therefore, the effects of single policy interventions are not always linear where multiple other 
parties are acting on the same issue. So, although a policy might be created with specific 
outcomes in mind, the intended result cannot be guaranteed. The actions and behaviours of 
other interested parties may interrupt the linearity between action and outcome and this is 
reflected in the revised CMOC.  
This has implications for the delivery of CEONC services and the CEONC fund arrangements. 
Firstly, Cairney et al (2015) note that the systems that are best able to reproduce in a complex 
environment are those which are highly adaptive. In Nepal, those hospitals that are more 
adaptive, because of better management aided by additional local financial resources, are 
more capable of responding to extraneous and unforeseen factors affecting the delivery of 
CEONC services. A feature of ‘better management’ may be, as recommended by Geyer et al 
(2010), ‘soft management methods to replace traditional hierarchical practices’. In Nepal, this 
would involve updating some central controls over hospitals giving them more freedom to 
learn from their experiences and adapt to their environment. It would also mean that the 
form of central controls would need to change to make them more relevant (e.g. updating 
the staffing controls) and make financing more predictable. At the local level, it would mean 
encouraging the MeSu to adopt transformational leadership practices and create space for 




This study has focussed on CEONC services only, but a more flexible, adaptive and locally 
managed health system and policy environment affecting hospitals generally would support 
CEONC service provision. Without that, not only are reforms required to the CEONC fund 
arrangements, but also central controls over hospitals, particularly over staffing and 
budgetary allocations to reflect CEONC service needs, require reform. Merely focussing on 
reform to the CEONC fund is insufficient. Changes to the way in which district hospitals and 
the FHD operate and interact in the provision of CEONC services are also required. To secure 
the advantages of these reforms more attention is required to the integration of CEONC 
service management and hospital management generally. This includes, the overall quality of 
management and the relationships between hospitals and the FHD, not least over the setting 
of objectives for the CEONC services, the monitoring of performance and the associated 
feedback arrangements which should emerge from better accountability arrangements. It 
would also mean being clear about the objectives to be achieved for the delivery of CEONC 
services, some of which would be funded through main hospital budgets and some through 
specific CEONC fund allocations. Those objectives would focus on securing a minimum 24/7 
service provision and, at a more sophisticated level, aim at, for example, achieving a minimum 
target of 5% caesarean births at all hospitals. This would require a more sophisticated fund 
distribution formula and better quality performance information. The overall size of the fund 
would depend upon the national budget settlement for health purposes. A reform of this 
type, because it would increase the localist role, would be compatible with the move to 
federalism. 
Such a reform facilitates ‘bottom-up’ policy making which acknowledges the realism of 
professional discretion (Cairney et al, 2015). This would allow professionals, like the MeSu to 
become involved in local policy development and MeSu representatives in the negotiations 
with the FHD about the size and distribution of the CEONC fund. This would strengthen 
communication between hospitals and the FHD and, as suggested by Cairney et al, 
communication should allow individuals to identify interdependencies in roles, shared and 
conflicting points of view, interests and values. 
Improved communication and feedback about CEONC services, which is currently of poor 
quality, tells policy makers and hospital managers about programme implementation 
(Mathole et al 2018). Reporting should provide the FHD with actual evidence against 
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performance targets and how additional CEONC funds have been spent. Annual reports 
should be independently checked which means improved audit arrangements. Funk et al 
(2008) identified that in better performing facilities annual reviews were conducted by 
independent auditors and their report was made available to donors and other interested 
individuals. Independent audit should not just be a financial audit and it should look at 
performance. The medical quality of CEONC service provision also should be subject to an 
independent professional medical review.  
All policy changes may produce unintended consequences and especially where operating in 
a complex environment. Consequently, exactly how policy changes will make a difference will 
be unclear (Sanderson, 2009). These types of reform require the development of a ‘learning 
process’ meaning acceptance of ‘trial and error’ and a willingness to accept accountability. 
The FHD should be clear about the objectives it wishes to achieve for CEONC services and it 
will also require the building of ‘trust’ between central and local officials. The focus of FHD 
support should then be on hospitals falling outside the boundaries set by the FHD (Geyer, 
2012). A feature of reform should therefore include periodic review of its impact. 
As Nepal adapts towards a federalised state, as Cairney et al noted “policymaking systems 
change so quickly, and are so difficult to predict and control, policymakers should not be 
surprised when their policy interventions do not have the desired effect” (2015, p.10). This 
may require CEONC policy to adapt quickly to reflect the policy dynamics that federalisation 
generates.  
5.9.2 Hospital management and leadership 
This study shows that a key focus of change should be on developing management and 
leadership and in particular the softer skills of leadership. Current policies, such as the CEONC 
fund, imply that hospital performance is often largely attributed to resource availability and 
“bottleneck” issues, such as finance, human resources, equipment, drugs and supplies. This 
ignores important skills and attributes of leadership and management such as values, trust, 
motivation, interrelationships and entrepreneurship, commitment, and specifically for health 
services, concern for quality of care and ultimately health outcomes. Even in resource limited 
settings, these skills can contribute to improved functioning of facilities as managers use 
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entrepreneurial skills and innovative ways to motivate staff and ensure hospital efficiency and 
effectiveness. This has been demonstrated by the high performing case studies. 
5.9.3 Financing and the CEONC fund 
Provision of CEONC services should be an integral responsibility of a district hospital. The 
funding arrangements should reflect that. This study has identified limitations in the CEONC 
fund’s design and its allocation arrangements. These affect its ability to impact on systemic 
bottlenecks. These limitations need to be addressed along with reforms to hospital staffing, 
funding and management arrangements along with relations to the FHD, to ensure that 
CEONC services can be provided consistently and to a high standard.  
The purpose of the CEONC fund also should be clarified – is it a ‘top-up’ fund or a financing 
fund for all CEONC services? If a ‘top-up’ fund, hospitals should themselves identify what ‘top-
up’ funds are required and for what purposes. This would mean more local involvement in 
decisions about fund allocations. Hospitals may not receive all they require because of an 
overall shortage of funds, but they would have more involvement and hence commitment to 
the fund. Therefore, to what extent is local involvement to be permitted in the fund 
distribution arrangements? Bossert et al (2002) identified that devolving budgetary 
responsibility can result in improved quality, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy 
owing to user oversight and participation in decision making; and that there is potential for 
greater equity through distribution of resources toward traditionally marginal regions and 
groups. A decision also needs to be made as to whether the CEONC fund is to be for specific 
activities or is to be a general grant towards the totality of CEONC service costs.  
A further question is, is the fund intended simply to support costs or to achieve specified 
outputs. Initially it may only be practical to develop the fund to support costs rather than 
outputs but an aim ultimately should be to provide funding to achieve outputs.  
Is the fund for specific purposes only or used as a general fund to support locally determined 
CEONC service priorities? The latter would mean developing a distribution formula and such 
a formula would be affected by how far hospitals were staffed and financed to provide CEONC 
services and that would mean updating the present sanctioned posts allocation arrangements 
and the related budgetary provisions. If that were to occur, the fund would then need to be 
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focussed upon the impact of exceptions such as referrals and whether or not local funding 
support was available. If, however, hospitals were not staffed and financed to provide CEONC 
services such a formula should reflect a current staffing needs based on forecast demand for 
CEONC services, including referrals, and other costs such as, drugs, equipment and 
infrastructure needs. The aim should be to make possible 24/7 provision. A hospital (and HDC) 
should be able to predict the level of funding that would be available to it for at least the 
following year. Major changes in funding between years should be avoided. 
5.10 Strengths and limits of the study 
5.10.1 Strengths 
Strengths of the study lie in the number and breadth of participants across clinical, public 
health, managerial and governance functions at both the district and central levels (a total of 
39 key informants). This broad insight allows an in-depth understanding of the factors 
affecting the delivery of CEONC services to emerge. Given the case study approach, the 
generalisability of qualitative work is not possible in the statistical sense. Yet, it can be argued 
the multiple case study design facilitates interpretation beyond the four field sites as the 
number of case studies were selected in line with Eisenhardt’s (1989) recommendation. This 
states a cross case analysis from this number of cases and the breadth of participation 
between clinical, public health, management is a good basis for analytical generalisation i.e. 
generalisation from empirical observation to theory (Gibbert, 2006) (Chapter Three). This 
research design was aimed at selecting hospital sites that represented a range of cases to 
exemplify the critical factors that were required for CEONC services to be functional 24/7. 
Once the sampling sets were established secondary criteria were applied which sought to 
select district hospitals that would give access to a wide variety of demographic and 
geographic features to allow conclusions to be drawn beyond the immediate implications of 
the geography of the study sites. Thus, case study sites were selected from 4 of the 5 regions 
in Nepal, two of the geographic zones were represented (hill and terai) and district hospitals 
represented a mix of remote and non-remote districts. The use of local researchers also was 
a methodological strength. For access reasons, because of the 2015 earthquakes, this enabled 
a wider universe from which to select the case objects. Additionally, removing language 
barriers from the interviews enabled more in-depth discussion and ease of observation at the 
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facility sites. Further, capturing data from the central level, triangulates the findings of the 
four case studies and facilitates the application of the findings beyond the four study sites. 
Generalisabilty of the study is also supported by the strong links to published research which 
also supports the validity of its findings.  
5.10.2 Limitations 
The limitations of the study that reflect the scope and boundaries of the research are as 
follows. The study used the provision of caesarean as a key indicator. Whilst this is a widely 
accepted proxy indicator for CEONC services, the study does not consider the provision of 
other CEONC services or whether they may be more clinically appropriate. The study also did 
not consider services provided in the private sector which may skew service provision away 
from public facilities – particularly for elective surgeries. However, the decision to focus 
purely on the public sector reflects the services accessed by most of the Nepali population, 
and particularly those for whom private services are financially impossible. Private hospitals 
also cannot benefit from CEONC funding.  
The study also does not cover quality of care, but the literature review showed that the better 
the management of the hospital the likelihood that the quality of care would improve. So 
even though quality of care was not covered, improvement in the management of the CEONC 
services should have an impact on care quality. 
Whilst the scope of the participants was broad from the perspective of those engaged in both 
service delivery and policy development, there was no direct patient engagement or with 
local community interests. This limits the study scope to fully test the perceptions of the 
community on the services provided by hospitals. Investigating barriers to community access 
to services was necessarily beyond the scope; however, this would warrant further 
investigation.  
In Chapter Three the impact of the earthquakes was discussed in the research design. Being 
unable to physically reach the case study sites did require a redesign of the data collection 
and increased reliance on local researchers. The challenge this presented was mitigated by 
substantial training and discussions with each of the researchers prior to field visits, detailed 
discussions with each of them before, during and after the field work and the familiarity of 
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the author with Nepal, the context and with the field researchers. Whilst this presented 
challenges, it also presented opportunities on which the study capitalised (see 3.5.4). 
Limitations of time and resources are always an issue when completing a piece of research, 
and this was no exception in this study.  
5.11 Future research 
An improved availability of CEONC services ought ideally to be accompanied by a quality of 
care study (Soto, 2013). This study could be extended by including an analysis of the quality 
of CEONC services in both high and low performing districts. Further this study has considered 
the supply side barriers to provision of services. A complementary study would be an in-depth 
analysis of those socio-economic factors in the specific districts which drive demand for and 
uptake of services. Also, if policy makers are to understand how to refine the CEONC fund, 
and indeed any other similar funding mechanism, information should be available on how 
hospitals are using the resources and on what they are achieving i.e. health outcomes. Given 
the CEONC fund has now been expanded to all districts in Nepal, an important requirement 
for the FHD should be to establish hospital needs and what hospitals are doing with the 
resources made available to them. This could further test the CMOC identified under this 
study to allow for further refinement. Further research is also needed on the distribution 
mechanisms for the CEONC fund, but this would depend upon whether or not changes were 
made to the staffing and financing of hospitals and this should be coupled with clarification 
of objectives and the monitoring of outputs and outcomes. Such research would also be 
affected by how federalisation affected the delivery of health services in general and CEONC 
services in particular.  
5.12 Conclusion 
This study aimed to understand why some district hospitals achieve a better provision of 
CEONC services than others. A feature of this was to ascertain how the CEONC fund in Nepal 
impacts the availability of CEONC services and to identify other factors that contribute to 
service availability. The questions asked in this study concerned the financing and 
management arrangements for CEONC services and addressed the perceptions of both local 
district hospital and central officials. The motivations for studying these areas were the 
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expansion of the CEONC programme to all districts in Nepal and the institutionalisation of the 
CEONC fund as a grant mechanism in the NHSS (2015-2020). This study identified additional 
factors contributing to a facility either performing or non-performing as a provider of CEONC 
services. There has been no academic or peer reviewed study which incorporated an analysis 
of the CEONC fund grant mechanism and its linkages with other health service funding 
arrangements. This study therefore adds to the body of literature by filling this gap. Further, 
the study takes a novel analytical approach to the delivery of CEONC services. It recognises 
this is a complex problem being addressed in a highly complex environment. The 
recommendations are aimed at how policy makers should consider developing CEONC policy 
and the extent to which specific funding could aid policy development utilising the lens of 
complexity.  
The critical factor affecting CEONC service availability 24/7 is qualified staffing continuity 
underpinned by management and leadership. Achieving this requires an updating of hospital 
staffing and financing coupled with clarity about the purpose of the CEONC fund and then 
consistency and predictability. This study demonstrates that whilst improvements can be 
made to improve the effectiveness of the CEONC fund as a single intervention, substantive 
improvement depends upon the reform of other factors affecting the provision of CEONC 
services and not just reform to the CEONC fund distribution arrangements.  
In summary, not only is a CEONC fund grant alone insufficient to ensure 24/7 service 
availability, several other critical factors are important to ensure that CEONC services are 
consistently and universally available. Ultimately the CEONC fund is a functional fix to issues 
that have a systemic cause. Currently distribution is not based on objective factors nor is there 
any local input into needs assessments. Distribution over time is inconsistent and restrictions 
on utilisation vary. Distribution is also not linked to the achievement of objectives nor does 
any accountability assessment exist to establish whether or not those objectives have been 
achieved.  CEONC service availability is heavily influenced by the quality of leadership and 
management of the hospitals and its capacity to maintain or develop the service as financial 
resources permit. The fund’s utility as a single mechanism to improve CEONC services is 
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Appendix 1: Direct Observation Guide  
Guide for direct observation of district participants including organisational culture, behaviours and 
environmental conditions during field visits. 
Purpose: to help triangulate the data collection from the interviews and to be able to reflect any 
circumstances witnessed that might not be represented in the interviews.   
We’ll achieve this through formal field notes and research diary 
Try to keep in mind the conceptual framework and to observe any interactions within the facility that 
appear relevant to the framework and helping us answer the overall research question i.e.  Is the 



























• Procurement  










• Managerial support 
and team building 
• Interaction and 
communication 
• Target setting and 
monitoring of 
performance 
• Awareness of 
progress 
• Perception of their 
role 
• Relationship with 
MoHP/FHD  
• Relationship with 
local community 





• Financial management 
• Financial Reporting 
• Independent auditing   
 
Things to look out for…………. 
• Observe formal staff meetings (if they take place).  Note interactions between senior and 
junior staff members – e.g. how (if at all) do junior members of staff able to express opinions 
– put forward ideas in formal meeting settings. 
• Observe informal interactions between staff – e.g. between the DPHO and the Hospital in-
charge.  How do they behave towards each other? 
• Note conditions within the facility – e.g. motivated / unmotivated staff; sufficient / 
insufficient resources 




• Observe any informal training – e.g. on the ward through ongoing mentoring of junior staff 
• Observe any meetings taking place which involve financial decision making. Note the nature 
of the involvement of finance officers – e.g. are they active participants in decision making, 
providing advice or do they simply report the figures.  
 
Structure of field notes (see how to take field notes document) 
1. Date, time, and place of observation 
2. Specific facts, numbers, details of what happens at the site 
3. Sensory impressions: sights, sounds, textures, smells, taste 
4. Personal responses to the fact of recording fieldnotes 
5. Specific words, phrases, summaries of conversations, and insider language 
6. Questions about people or behaviours at the site for future investigation 
7. Page numbers to help keep observations in order 
 
This will be complemented by taking a research diary which is an opportunity to reflect on your own 
personal feelings of the research site which might influence the research.  
Reason for doing a diary: The research diary provides a form through which the interaction of 
subjective and objective aspects of doing research can be openly acknowledged and brought into a 
productive relationship.  The field notes may be more objective and the research diary an opportunity 
to reflect on this from a more subjective perspective and bringing your own thoughts and prior 
experience to bear – this is one way as well that we’ll be able to acknowledge any potential bias that 
might influence results. The research diary can be seen as a melting pot for all of the different 
ingredients of a research project - prior experience, observations, readings, ideas - and a means of 
capturing the resulting interplay of elements. 
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Appendix 2: Semi Structured Interview Tool 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
What are the things that you think effect availability of CEONC services at this hospital? 
Probe: positive impact; negative impact 
Section 2: Case-load, staffing and training 
How are CEONC staff managed at this hospital?  
Probe: Who oversees the management of CEONC services – individual or group, what 
approach do they take? Who makes decisions about staffing levels? 
Probe: How many emergency cases are seen in a day / month? 
What staff are regularly available for CEONC services? 
Probe: obstetrician, skilled birth attendants, nurses, etc.; what staffing levels would enable 
them to deliver more services (are current levels sufficient) 
Probe: How often do new staff join the team? 
Probe: What formal training do staff have prior to working in the obstetric unit? 
Section 3: Availability of Equipment / supplies 
What changes in equipment / supplies / infrastructure would help you deliver more CEONC services? 
Probe: What equipment do you have to perform CEONC services? What else would be 
beneficial? 
Probe: if you needed to perform a c-section today, what would you need to have in place? 
Section 4: In-service training, supervision and teamwork 
Why do they think there are lots of / few c-sections at this hospital? (depending on sampling) 
Probe: Describe how the team work together to provide CEONC services? 
Probe: What happens when a new obstetric staff member joins the team – talk me through 
the process of them becoming part of the team.  Who manages this process? 
Probe: How much in-service training do staff receive?  
Probe: How is this organised? Who organises it? Who receives training (e.g. just clinical staff 
or others as well?) 
Probe: Who supervises staff providing CEONC services? How often does this happen? What 
mechanisms are used? (e.g. audit) 
 
Section 5: Management style, monitoring and leadership 
What do they see as their role in managing CEONC services in the hospital? 
Probe: What guidelines do staff follow in delivery of CEONC services? What do they know 
about ideal levels of CEONC service provision? 
Probe: How do staff and managers communicate? What more / less would they like to see? 
Probe: What happens if a staff member isn’t performing or is regularly absent? 
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How would they describe the leadership on CEONC services in the hospital? 
Probe: What are the attitudes of the hospital managers towards CEONC services?  
Probe: do they prioritise them? What are their other priorities? How do they support team 
building?  
Probe: How motivated are the CEONC team to provide services? 
How is the MoHP involved in supporting the delivery of CEONC services in the hospital? 
How is the local community involved in supporting the delivery of CEONC services in the hospital? 
Section 6: Financial oversight. 
What is the process for budgeting for CEONC services? 
Probe: what communications do they have with the MoHP? Who makes decisions on how 
money is spent? 
Probe: How do they manage their finances during the year? 
Probe: what happens if they don’t have enough money; what happens if money isn’t timely 
from the MoHP; when do they receive the CEONC fund money 
What do they use the CEONC fund money for? 
Probe: How would they like the fund to be allocated? What more could they do with the 
money? 
Probe: How and how often do they report on finances and who to? 
Probe: How are accounts independently verified? How often? 
Section 7: Close 
Is there anything else they’d like to add about CEONC service availability at the hospital? 
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Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet  
 
Project Title: " Why do some district hospitals in Nepal achieve better provision of comprehensive 
emergency obstetric and neonatal care than others? A study of the funding, systems and structures 
that influence the availability of CEONC services."  
 
Project context: Nepal has seen a significant decline in maternal mortality since 1990. To reduce the 
Maternal Mortality Ratio to the Millennium Development Goal target of 134 per 100,000 live births 
by 2015 further action is required.  As one response to achieve this, in 2008/9, the Government of 
Nepal developed a policy, providing service specific funds directly to district hospitals in low human 
development index districts (i.e. 36 districts out of 75), purely for Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric 
and Neonatal Care (CEONC) services. The intention has been that this “CEONC fund” should only be 
used for this, and not for any other hospital, purpose with the aim of helping district hospitals identify 
their local needs and acquire the appropriate resources to provide the full range of CEONC services. 
As a policy mechanism, the fund was initially a ‘quick fix’:  now the fund is being viewed as a longer 
term policy. The government wants to increase its utilisation and extend its application to more 
districts hospitals. However, routine data on fund utilisation is limited. What is available indicates that 
utilisation of allotted funds varies substantially by district hospital (from 12% to over 90% of allocated 
funding) and service data also shows that the actual provision of CEONC services continues to vary 
widely.   
 
The purpose and value of the study: There has been very little research on the uptake and effect of 
the fund on CEONC availability and why variation might exist. This study will fill this gap by reviewing 
how the fund operates in practice and what other factors might impact the uptake of funding and 
availability of CEONC services. Employing a multiple case study design, looking in-depth at four district 
hospitals, this research will analyse how the district hospital respond to offers of funding and the 
availability of these services with the aim of identifying the reasons for variations.   From this, 
recommendations will be developed for changes to government policies to support increased 
availability of CEONC services. 
 
The particulars of the study are as follows: 
 
▪ The project is aimed at making an analysis of the availability of CEONC services at District 
Hospitals. For this purpose, semi-structured interviews will be conducted with key informants.  
Potential participants have been invited to take part because they are key members of staff from 
the District Hospital, the Ministry of Health and Population and NGOs working with the 
government in the delivery of CEONC services 
 
▪ The study has received ethical clearance from the Nepal Health Research Council and the Research 
Ethics Approval Committee for Health of the University of Bath in the United Kingdom  
 
▪ Potential participants can ask questions about the study before they decide whether to participate 
 
▪ The study will consist of observation of activities within the obstetric ward of the district hospital 
and semi structured interviews which will last for about one - two hours and will be held within 
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the District Hospital or other convenient location for the interviewee.  Questions will deal with the 
management of CEONC services at district and central level.  
 
▪ At any time, participants can refuse to answer certain questions, discuss certain topics or even put 
an end to the interview without prejudice to themselves or to the hospital.  
 
▪ Participants can withdraw from the project at any time up to the point that data analysis has begun 
by advising the researchers of this decision.  
 
▪ No direct benefits will be provided to participants.  Indirect benefits will include opportunities to 
contribute to improved delivery of CEONC services at the District Hospital and improved utilisation 
of the CEONC fund.  There are no risks are involved in the study 
 
▪ To facilitate the interviewer's job, the interview will be recorded and understand that this 
recording will also be transcribed.  If this is agreed to by the participant.  
 
▪ This study is a case study which means that it may be difficult to exclude data that identifies the 
specific district hospital.  
 
▪ All interview data will be handled so as to protect confidentiality as far as possible. Therefore, no 
names will be mentioned and the information will be coded to protect annonymity. 
 
Data Protection 
▪ Any personal data will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
 
▪ During the project data will be annonymised and kept on a password protected laptop and USB 
with access only by the research team.  
 
▪ After the study annonymised project data will be kept in a password protected area on the server 
of the Nepal Health Sector Support Programme (NHSSP) 
 
Sarah Hepworth is a Professional Doctorate Student at the University of Bath in the United Kingdom 
and Assistant Director of Programmes at Options Consultancy Services who deliver the Nepal Health 
Sector Support Programme.  She is principal researcher of this study. 
 
Suresh Mehata is Research Associate for the Nepal Health Sector Support Programme and will 
support the study.  
 
For any information about the project, contact Sarah Hepworth on seh45@bath.ac.uk or 
s.hepworth@options.co.uk or Suresh Mehata on Suresh@nhssp.org.np.  
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Appendix 5: Case Study Sample Universe 
 
The below table shows the 32 districts disaggregated by allocation of the fund and percentage of 
caesareans and includes additional geographical information.  The final districts selected are shaded 





















 Low caesarean rate; Low fund 
Bhim Hospital, 
Rupandehi 
  Western 5 terai 900  No data No data No data 
District Hosptal 
Sindhupalchowk 
X Central 3 mountain 900 0 210 0.00% 
District Hospital, 
Syangja 
  Western 4 hill 900 0 399 0.00% 
Tikapur Hospital, 
Kailali 
  Far 
Western 
7 terai 1000 7 1459 0.48% 
District Hospital, 
Dhankuta 
  Eastern 1 hill 900 3 288 1.04% 
Kalaiya District 
Hospital Bara 
  Central 2 terai 1900 52 2482 2.10% 
District Hospital 
Dhading 




  Western 5 terai 900 23 979 2.35% 
District Hospital, 
Taplejung 
  Eastern 1 mountain 1200 15 376 3.99% 
Trisuli Hospital 
Nuwakot 
X Central 3 hill 900 70 1482 4.72% 
                 








  Western 4 hill 2400 0 0 0.00% 
District Hospital, 
Rolpa 
  Mid 
Western 
5 hill 2400 0 114 0.00% 
District Hospital, 
Arghakhanchi 
  Western 5 hill 2800 4 583 0.69% 
Gaur Hospital 
Rautahat 
  Central 2 terai 2300 30 1775 1.69% 
District Hospital, 
Bajura 
  Far 
Western 
7 mountain 3000 3 165 1.82% 
District Hospital, 
Mugu 
  Mid 
Western 
6 mountain 2500 5 243 2.06% 
District Hospital, 
Terhathum 
  Eastern 1 hill 2400 8 247 3.24% 
District Hospital, 
Rukum 






4000 15 449 3.34% 
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  Eastern 1 terai 2400 103 2106 4.89% 
                 
 High caesarean rate; Low fund  
District Hospital, 
Dailekh 
  Mid 
Western 
4 hill 1000 24 433 5.54% 
District Hospital, 
Baitadi 
  Far 
Western 
7 hill 1000 21 314 6.69% 
Makwanpur 
District Hospital 
X Central 3 hill 1200 132 1455 9.07% 
District Hospital, 
Gorkha 
X Western 4 hill 1500 128 1075 11.91% 
District Hospital, 
Panchathar 
  Eastern 1 hill 1200 97 769 12.61% 
  
               
 High caesarean rate; High Fund,  
District Hospital, 
Achham 
  Far 
Western 
7 hill 3000 29 318 9.12% 
District Hospital, 
Udayapur 
  Eastern 1 hill 2400 195 1334 14.62% 
District Hospital, 
Khotang 
  Eastern 1 hill 2900 50 342 14.62% 
District Hospital, 
Bhojpur 
  Eastern 1 hill 3200 54 298 18.12% 
District Hospital, 
Sankhuwasabha 
  Eastern 1 mountain 2900 24 130 18.46% 
District Hospital, 
Ilam 
  Eastern 1 hill 2900 167 833 20.05% 
District Hospital 
Solukhumbu 












This appendix provides the rich descriptions of the individual case studies and the central level 
interviews. It draws on archival data, semi-structured interviews and field observations as 
well as desk based research on the context of each district. The structure of each case study 
broadly follows the same format, although depending on the findings there is variation in the 
reporting against the theoretical framework and breadth and depth of the results. The case 
studies are divided into two parts. Firstly, a description of the operational environment of the 
health facility. This enabled understanding of the variety of factors that influence how the 
hospital operates and the relationship it holds with the District Health Office (DHO) or District 
Public Health Office (DPHO) (see Appendix 7 for a description of the health system in Nepal).  
The theoretical framework was used to analyse the data and key systemic and local enablers 
and barriers were identified.  Additional factors identified through the case study research as 
influencing availability of CEONC services are also presented, as are the results from the 
central level interviews.  
Nawalparasi  
The hospital was categorised, through the sampling process, as having a low percentage of 
caesareans (2.35% of deliveries within the facility) and in receipt of a low CEONC fund grant 
(900,000NPR) for the year 2013/14.  
Operational environment 
Nawalparasi is a Western Region district. Geographically in the terai it borders India. Several 
industries are located here including production of sugar, cement and paper (MoFALD, 2015). 
The district is populated by a variety of different castes the largest of which is Muslim 
(22.09%) followed by Magar (17.21%), Brahman Hill (16.86%) and Tharu (16.48%) (MoFALD, 
2015). The Human Poverty Index9 (HPI) for Nawalparasi is 27.99, better than the national 
average for Nepal which is 31.12. The district falls within the top half of all 75 districts for 
most other development indicators e.g. adult literacy rates and access to safe water (UNDP, 
2014). The district headquarters and location of the District Hospital is Parasi. The district was 
not severely impacted by the 2015 earthquakes, however, it was the location of several 
violent protests during the blockade of the Nepal–India border in 2015.   
In 2015 the district hospital had 25 beds and was integrated with the DHO. The main hospital 
building is 5 years old. The maternity ward, labour room, post-operative ward and the 
operating theatre (OT) are housed in an old building. The hospital had 9 maternity and 5 post-
natal beds along with all requisite infrastructure (functional toilets, running water and 
 
9 The Human Poverty Index (HPI) was an indication of the standard of living in a country, developed by 
the UN (UNDP, 2014) 
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electricity with generator back-up). Residential facilities were also available for the doctors 
and nurses.  
Results against the theoretical framework. 
Staffing and qualifications 
Staffing  
The hospital has not been allocated the sanctioned posts to enable it to provide CEONC 
services and therefore its only financing source is through the CEONC fund. Three staff, a 
caesarean trained doctor, a nurse and an auxiliary nurse midwife, were employed on short 
term contracts to deliver CEONC services. Additional ad-hoc support was provided by the 
Medical Superintendent (MeSu) of the hospital (a sanctioned post) who was experienced in 
delivering CEONC services. This level of staffing is inadequate to provide 24/7 cover. There 
are particular shortages of auxiliary nurse midwives, staff nurses and paediatricians. The lack 
of a paediatrician meant neonatal cases had to be referred to other health facilities. The lack 
of an anaesthetist adversely affects the surgical teams who undertake caesarean.   
“When there was an anaesthetic assistant, I could manage my time well. But since I have to do it 
all on my own now, this has affected my work directly and indirectly.” (MS4) 
In emergencies, health assistants trained in anaesthetics employed in private sector facilities 
could be utilised although this was not regarded as a desirable practice.  
Qualifications 
In Nawalparasi, only trained and experienced staff are employed on the CEONC team e.g. staff 
nurses should have passed a staff nurse national health training centre (NHTC) course and 
doctors, should have a bachelor degree in medicine and surgery (MBBS) plus additional skilled 
birth attendant (SBA) training.  
Human resource management arrangements 
Some vacancies within the hospital arose from ad hoc (and badly planned) transfers of 
sanctioned staff by the MoHP. For example, the anaesthetist assistant (AA) position became 
vacant as he was transferred in 2013 to a local health post (where anaesthetist skills were not 
required) without consultation and not replaced. The local market for suitably trained 
anaesthetists is poor and as a result this position has been vacant for a year.   
“For three years, we had an anaesthetic assistant in the hospital itself, but he has been 
transferred from here to a nearby health post. No one has applied for the position although we 
had put out an ad about this. We have needed an anaesthetic assistant for the last year.” (MS4) 
The DHO is responsible for the recruitment of CEONC contracted staff. The DHO adheres to 
the requirements of PSC appointments. This process takes several weeks which delays 
appointments. This delay is added to if, as there frequently is, a delay in the release of the 
CEONC grants from the MoHP. For example, in FY 2014/15 the recruitment process could only 
commence 5 months after the start of the FY.  
 
The delayed budget release also leads to staff only being contracted for short periods of time. 
In FY2014/15, this meant that CEONC staff in Nawalparasi could only be employed for 
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between 3 and 6 months leaving a gap of 6 months at the beginning of the FY when no staff 
were available. Apart from the impact on service provision, this was a barrier to recruitment 
as the local team found very few candidates want to apply for such short-term positions. It 
also causes an inefficient use of resources as the DHO had less negotiating power when the 
contracting period was so limited. Overall, the short-term nature of contracts was seen as a 
major barrier to the provision of continuous CEONC services 
“When CEONC grant is there, we can provide services for 2-4 months and when the project is not 
there, we can't offer services. It would be nice to provide services round the year and forever.” 
(MS2)  
Availability and quality of equipment and supplies 
Quality of CEONC equipment and supplies 
Appropriate medicines are available for CEONC services from hospital resources and blood 
supplies are managed locally by the Red Cross. The maternity beds were of good quality, 
however, there was limited other CEONC equipment and what was available was 10 years old 
(FO). The hospital only has two sets of surgical tools and instruments. This has not, as yet, 
prevented the hospital undertaking caesareans, but it does mean that overall, the equipment 
has to be very carefully managed and can mean a delay for some patients. A third set would 
be preferable and if service provision did increase to 24/7 year-round more and better 
equipment would be required.  
“In circumstances where we have two cases, we will have used both the sets for operations and 
it would be difficult for us to sterilise them during this rainy season to serve a third case” (MS2) 
Neonatal care equipment is a key deficiency and this lack has caused some patients to be 
referred to other facilities. 
“Referrals were made for lack of NICU10 and for the safety of the child.” (PHO1) 
Infrastructure  
Poor infrastructure for CEONC services is a serious problem with no separate CEONC unit, 
waiting room or store room, no NICU and the OT room is congested. This affects the quality 
and efficiency of services as normal delivery, vacuum delivery and caesarean cases all take 
place in the same location.   
Procurement processes 
Delayed procurement and insufficient supplies of CEONC equipment were also a key issue in 
Nawalparasi. The district is reliant on donor agencies and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) to provide birthing equipment and even then much of this equipment is used for 
services other than CEONC.  
The routine budget for equipment is held centrally by the FHD, not by the DHO or the hospital 
and substantial procurement delays occur.  
“We place the demand but it might take six months or even a year to get them delivered.” (HM2) 
 




A further complication over procurement is that in 2014/15 CEONC fund finance was only 
allocated for salaries, not for funding for equipment and supplies, therefore they were reliant 
on the routine budget for procurement and subject to the delays noted above.  
 
In-service training, supervision and teamwork 
Induction of new staff 
No induction processes for new medical staff occur which has resulted in patient referrals as 
staff were unclear on processes and procedures. 
“I enquired about the reason behind referring the patient to Butwal. He clarified that the MeSu 
had not handed over necessary equipment, phone numbers of responsible staff members were 
not given to him and his Terms of Reference was not clear.” (HM2) 
In-service training  
In-service training has been relatively limited. Funds for this are not available through the 
CEONC fund and there is a reliance on the NHTC to provide trainings. NHTC training is 
restricted to sanctioned staff so those appointed on a contractual basis cannot access courses. 
This discourages applicants from applying for contracted posts. 
“You are well paid but there are no other incentives like training opportunities. This is 
discouraging. Next time, I won't apply for CEONC.” (MS3) 
In Nawalparasi only one staff member had received formal OT training and reliance was 
placed upon more experienced staff to provide training. 
“…..only one of our staff members has received training on OT. But I have provided guidance to 
the sisters (staff nurse) on how to scrub and do other necessary things from the very beginning. 
Therefore, I think all our staff nurses are capable of working in caesarean teams” (MS4).  
Supervision 
Supervision of CEONC services was provided by the MeSu. The perception of the MeSu is 
generally good. However, there is no formal HR management process. Consequently, poor 
performance is not penalised and good performance is not recognised.   
“There has been no such performance management arrangement so far. I think that should have 
happened.” (PHO1) 
Teamwork and staff attitudes 
Good teamwork existed. An emphasis was placed on developing a team spirit between the 
clinical and management leadership of the hospital and a strong relationship existed between 
the DHO and the MeSu. 
“A spirit of teamwork is essential for cooperative work, they should be able to work with a feeling 
of team spirit.” (PHO2) 
Interviewees explained that in the past there had been challenges in creating a team 
atmosphere as contract staff and sanctioned staff would only focus on their specific areas of 
responsibility. Mutual cooperation between nurses and doctors or between the contracted 
CEONC and other regular hospital teams, such as OT staff did not exist. The current MeSu 
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placed a strong focus on team building between contracted staff and sanctioned staff 
providing regular obstetric or surgical services.  
“All are active. We all collaborate to respond to any case. For example, I work for CEONC but I 
never say that I work only for CEONC. Suppose we have a caesarean case and they have a 
delivery case. If they complete the delivery case first, they will come to support us and if we 
complete our case first, we will go to assist them. Staff members from both sides are 
supportive.” (MS2) 
Managerial style, monitoring and leadership 
Interaction and communication 
There were mixed reports on interaction and communications in the hospital. Some 
interviewees reported open communications and a supportive environment between the 
medical staff and the management of the hospital. Others noted that there was rarely 
communication between them and whilst there was opportunity to discuss clinical matters, 
there was no place to talk about more personal issues. Formal meetings were irregular and 
infrequent.  
“things are not taking place in a step-wise manner as you think. In principle, meetings should be 
held every month but this has not happened.” PHO1 
Target setting and monitoring of performance 
No clear targets were set for CEONC service provision. However, a view was that during the 
months the services were operational, they were adequate for the needs of the community. 
“In my opinion, seven or eight cases a month are so-so. I think it is satisfactory. We offer the 
patients alternatives. If we were hell-bent on increasing the number of caesarean cases only, we 
would talk the patients into accepting our services by hook or by crook. But our purpose is not 
increasing numbers; our purpose is satisfaction of the patient party. We brief them about the 
alternatives also. If the patients are satisfied with our work, I don't think there will be any need 
of increasing the number.” (MS4) 
Monitoring of clinical CEONC performance is undertaken by the MeSu. Administrative 
arrangements are provided and managed by the DHO. The DHO also monitors progress on 
caesarean cases.  
“When there are more referral cases, we try to look for the reasons behind it. If a pregnant 
woman comes seeking health services and fails to appear second or third time, we should try to 
find out the reasons behind it.” (PHO1) 
There is no specific monitoring of the CEONC service provision by the FHD. Basic data appears 
to be unreliable. For example, there is a discrepancy between the number of caesarean 
reported to the HMIS and the number reported in the DoHS annual report.  Whilst this 
comparison is only available for 2013/14, it indicates a possible weakness in the recording of 
services that could provide a challenge to the setting of targets and the monitoring of 
progress.  
Awareness of progress 
There was a perception that numbers of patients had increased because of the introduction 
of the CEONC programme. An estimate was 7-8 caesarean being undertaken each month was 
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given. However, the potential weakness in the published service data (noted above) makes 
this perception of progress hard to verify.  
Perception of their role 
Staff had a clear perception of their roles and responsibilities in the provision and 
management of CEONC services. The MeSu provided clinical leadership and supervision; the 
DHO oversaw recruitment and management of staff as well as service monitoring. The HDC 
role was to ensure that the hospital operated efficiently, including in the provision of CEONC 
services. 
Leadership 
Leadership was good with the MeSu, DHO and HDC all supporting CEONC services. The MeSu 
in particular seemed very dedicated and was a key factor in the in the development of CEONC 
services despite all the difficulties.  
“It is because of Dr_________ also. He has made a significant contribution to make caesarean 
service a success.” (MS1) 
However, some key processes which are not in place in Nawalparasi, such as induction, 
performance management, formal mechanisms for staff communications and formal 
monitoring. This would indicate that whilst the leadership team is supportive, in practical 
terms they lack core management skills and tools.  
Managerial support and team building 
Whilst there is active clinical support from the MeSu and administrative support from the 
DHO there are management deficiencies, as indicated above and these can have an impact 
on the continuous delivery of services. 
“Our system management is not up to mark. We need to make changes in it. If we make changes 
to our management, CEONC activities will never be stopped.” (PHO2) 
This is in addition to the funding and HR problems previously referred to. 
Relationship with the FHD 
A poor relationship exists with the FHD. There was limited oversight and monitoring of both 
the CEONC fund finances and the delivery of CEONC services from the FHD. The FHD’s CEONC 
mentor has only visited once.  
 
“There is nothing like monitoring from the district. Dr_______ [FHD CEONC mentor] had come 
here once in the course of four years. This apart, I don’t think any agency or any person has 
come here for monitoring.” (MS4) 
 
Relationship with the community 
The lack of consistency in the availability of services has reduced trust in not only obstetric 
services, but also other hospital services (including potentially income generating services). 
As a result the community may choose to travel to other districts. Views expressed included 
that it would be better not to provide CEONC services at all than provide them for only a short 
period of time. 
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“It greatly hampers other services also. If this is the situation, there is no trust of people on the 
organisation. Clients think that if the organisation is providing services just for a couple of 
months or so, why go there? People need quality services without loss of time, in a quick way. 
So, it is natural for them to choose other places and this may put our performance in negative 
light.” (PHO2) 
Another problem is that deficiencies in service provision and the need to refer patients to 
other hospitals has resulted in situations where the community has become violent towards 
the staff. There was a perception that the community lacked trust in the hospital, particularly 
after an adverse event where an infant died. This drove down the number of clients seeking 
services.  
“After I came here, we used to perform 140-150 deliveries a month but following the incident 
[an infant death], the number has reduced to a mere 70-80.” (MS4) 
Oversight by HDC 
The HDC in Nawalparasi has the responsibility for streamlining administrative arrangements, 
ensuring better planning, improving hospital performance and HR management. Active 
support for CEONC services, including responding to community challenges, is provided by 
the chair of the HDC. However, the HDC lacks independent sources of funding to supplement 
the CEONC fund allocation and to ameliorate the problems caused by late payment.  
“Reforms may have been made in other areas but not in the sphere of human resources. It is 
because the hospital development committee lacks fund. If there is no money in the committee's 
account, how could things happen? For example, it is very difficult to appoint doctors and 
paramedics.” (PHO2).  
Financial oversight 
Budgeting 
There is no opportunity for the hospital, the DHO or HDC to influence how the CEONC grant 
is allocated. The FHD does not discuss with these bodies what the allocation should be and 
for what purposes. The financing problems are compounded because there is significant 
fluctuation in the grant allocated from year to year (the grant doubled between FY 2013/14 
and 2014/15). This causes confusion at district level and inhibits planning.  
“We don't have any idea at all how much budget is released, how it is described in the red book, 
which donor agency is involved, etc. As we don't receive clear information, confusion is created. 
The planning for the CEONC program is done by the centre.” (PHO2) 
 
“We know the figures only after we have received the budget. We don't know them prior to 
that.” (HM1)  
The CEONC grant represents only a small proportion of the overall hospital budget. Whilst the 
fund is nominally flexible, in practice the guidelines limit how it can be spent.  Consultation 
with local health organisations would facilitate planning and management.   
“A CEONC budget is determined by the centre and the District Health Office receives 
authorization to make expenditures. We spend the money under the same headings as we are 
told to. We should provide salaries to doctors, nurses and other employees. Similarly, we should 
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purchase necessary tools, equipment and machines. Some money goes to medicines, while some 
is allocated for miscellaneous purpose, as per the headings. All this is done as instructed by the 
Centre………..If the district is allowed to design budget to make purchases accordingly, it would 
be much better.” (PHO2, 2015) 
Financial management of CEONC Fund 
Financial management of the fund is seen by the clinical staff as the responsibility of the DHO. 
Spending has to remain within the given framework and whilst minor changes are possible if 
salaries, allowances or other essential expenses are inadequate, there is little scope for 
significant flexibility. If any budget lines have inadequate funds, the spending plan is moved 
to the following year and that requires approval from the MoHP and that is difficult to obtain.   
The critical issue for financial management is caused by delay in the receipt of funds and then 
trying to spend them within the remaining part of the FY. Failure to spend them is likely to 
lead to the following year allocation being cut. In FY 2014/15 the actual budget release did 
not occur until after November. As a result, the service was unavailable between July and, at 
least, November. Other funding sources are not available (e.g. HDC generated funds) at this 
hospital. The CEONC service therefore becomes entirely reliant either on sanctioned staff (for 
which there is inadequate staffing) or on staff to work on a volunteer unpaid basis.  
Instability in CEONC funding from year to year adds to the financial management problems. 
The funding for Nawalparasi over the last 2 years varied as follows and is compared with 
reported spending as the table below shows: 
Financial Reporting from Nawalparasi 2013 - 2015 
Financial 
Year 
CEONC Grant  NPR 
(000) 
Amount spent (000s) 
Reported to FHD Reported in TABUCS 
2013/14 900,000 0 2,254,000 
2014/15 1,800,000 0 1,545,000 
 
Financial reporting 
The above table also shows that financial reports through TABUCS and the CEONC financial 
monitoring tool demonstrate inconsistency and this consequently raises a question over the 
robustness of the financial management and financial reporting arrangements. There was 
apparently significant overspend against the CEONC grant in 2013/14. The reasons for this 
overspend are unclear, or whether it actually occurred. The lack of financial reporting to the 
FHD means that expenditure cannot be tracked by the FHD over the year and then used to 
facilitate future budgeting or to measure efficiency in the use of resources compared to 
service outputs.  
Auditing 
Both internal and external audits occur. The auditors focus on spending and comparisons with 
central allocations. They do not take into account factors such as delay in the release of funds 
from the centre.  
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“Budget is not released in time. If it is released at all, it is released at the eleventh hour. And, 
when the accounts get audited, auditors catch hold of us why the money is not spent as 
expected and if it is spent, why the money is spent.” (PHO2) 
Summary  
The figure below summarises the key systemic and local barriers and enablers to the delivery 
of health services in Nawalparasi identified through the case study. This demonstrates the 
imbalance between barriers and enablers, and the complex interface between systemic and 
local barriers and enablers.  
Enablers and practical barriers to service delivery in Nawalparasi. 
 
CEONC services provided in Nawalparasi are below optimum. Continuity of services is 
inhibited by interconnected and interdependent systemic and local barriers. Most critically, 
the lack of an adequate number of sanctioned posts at the hospital to be able to provide 
services 24/7 by permanent staff. The CEONC fund cannot fill this gap because of late grant 
disbursements and contract staff cannot be appointed for a full year. In addition, whilst the 
HDC is supportive of CEONC services (a local enabler and adaptive agent), the HDC does not 
have any independent sources of income that enable them to cover any breaks in funding and 
maintain a full complement of staff. Intermittent services are a deterrent to the community 
to seek care at the hospital. The process of planning and managing the CEONC grant is 
directed entirely by the FHD and there is minimal engagement with the centre so that the 
FHD adequately understands the needs of the hospital. As a result the grant is not directed 
towards the inputs that might have the best outcomes, such as in-service training and 
adequate equipment. Weaknesses in service and financial data together with uncertainty 
about the available level of finance from year to year make management, planning and 
monitoring difficult. The commitment of the leadership and a positive team environment are 






Rukum hospital has a low percentage of caesareans (3.34% of hospital deliveries) and was in 
receipt of a high CEONC fund grant (4,000,000NPR) for the year 2013/14. 
Operational environment 
Rukum is a remote district in the Mid-Western Region. Geographically it is in the Hill zone, 
although it does have some mountainous regions. Rukum is one of four hill districts classified 
as remote in the Civil Service Act (1993)11. The major occupation is agriculture. Its district 
headquarters is Muskikot where the hospital is located. The largest caste/ethnic group are 
the Chhetris (64%) followed by Janajatis (24%), Dalits (7%) and Brahmins (5%) (UNFCO, 2013). 
The HPI for Rukum is 39.02, poorer than the national average; the district ranks 55th out of 75 
districts on HPI and was identified as one of the 23 lowest performing districts on 
development in the Nepal Country Analysis 2011 (UNRCHCO, 2016). Rukum was not affected 
by the earthquakes in 2015.  
Rukum hospital is currently officially a 15-bed hospital (although it runs 25-28 beds for several 
months of the year) and is integrated with the DHO. Due to the remoteness of the district, 
patients sometimes have to walk several days to reach the facility. In FY 2014/15 the facility 
provided a range of services such as emergency services; video x-ray service; ultrasonogram, 
birth centre and minor operation services (DoHS, 2016a).  
Results against the theoretical framework. 
Staffing and qualifications  
Staffing  
The hospital budget includes no sanctioned posts for the delivery of CEONC services and 
therefore the only funding source is the CEONC fund. Staffing levels are locally perceived to 
be inadequate to deliver a continuous CEONC service. The CEONC team included one doctor, 
two OT trained nurses, one AA and one lab assistant. The doctor is able to perform caesarean 
operations but if he is absent cases are referred elsewhere and no CEONC service is available. 
“cases were referred some times when I was alone, with no support staff; and sometimes when I 
was absent. We do not do elective cases here. We do only very needy cases………..We did 29 
cases of caesarean last year; about 10 cases were referred out.”(MS7) 
The suggested ideal staffing is one surgeon, one assistant doctor, two OT nurses, one AA; and 
if possible one paediatrician, or at least one nurse who is trained on neonatal resuscitation. 
To assist the CEONC team, the public health nurse (PHN), a sanctioned post, has provided 
support even though this is outside of her official role. Similarly, before the arrival of the AA, 




11 Classification of remoteness is based on several factors including poor road network which are 




Contracted staff are drawn from the local market for clinical staff. But this is limited. Potential 
recruits are new nursing graduates but they lack experience and knowledge of CEONC 
services. A recently appointed AA was a new inexperienced graduate.  
The inability to recruit trained OT nurses caused a particular problem in delivery of caesarean 
and services have reduced as a result.   
“It is difficult to get skilled manpower from the local level for the CEONC program. There are 
fresh graduated nurses available in the local level but not experienced; they are not appropriate 
for caesarean.” (MS7) 
Human resources management 
Sanctioned staff are managed by the MoHP. A feature of this is that ad hoc transfers occur 
without consultation and this has affected Rukum hospital’s ability to deliver services. For 
example, one trained caesarean nurse was transferred. 
“__________[nurse] was here for OT, she stayed in quarter and provided 24 hour service. Now 
she was transferred and also difficult for doctor without her.” (PHO3) 
The delayed budget release also affects staffing in Rukum as staff can only be contracted for 
short periods of time. Rukum hospital relies on individuals working voluntarily in the periods 
when the CEONC grant has not yet been distributed. 
Availability and quality of equipment and supplies 
Quality of CEONC equipment and supplies 
Poor availability and maintenance of equipment and supplies were noted as challenges. 
Examples included, a lack of a consistent electricity supply as a back-up generator was 
required; insufficient suction machines available, the OT table was broken and the oxygen 
machine was not 100% operational. Blood supplies were unreliable and no NICU was available 
which made for difficulty when complications occurred. Medicines were provided to patients 
if they were available in the hospital, but if unavailable patients had to purchase them. The 
hospital was unaware of the government policy on providing completely free services to 
mothers. 
“interviewee: We provided whatever we have in the hospital free. Antibiotics like cipro etc. 
required, are not available in hospital, these are asked to buy from patient. 
interviewer: Mothers should get free services; have you seen the operational guidelines? 
interviewee: Ah…, we don’t know about these things” (MS5) 
Infrastructure  
Lack of adequate physical infrastructure did not prevent delivery of CEONC services. However, 
its poor quality (the OT which was in a state of disrepair with a leaking roof) risked infections 
developing. Ideally, a new OT is required.  
“The building is not good for operations. Sterilisation is not there in the operating theatre so it 
may get contaminated. There should be separate building for operations. Now, post op room is 
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also there in the operating theatre. It is an old building, leaking water.  There have been many 
repairs but it’s still leaking” (PHO3) 
Procurement 
The CEONC fund was used to purchase equipment and supplies. However, management of 
this process was inadequate. Delays in obtaining supplies occurred and deliveries were not 
checked and neither was the quality of repairs e.g. blankets purchased for patients appear to 
have gone missing and purchased equipment was not installed or necessary repairs 
undertaken adequately. These problems were ascribed to an inexperienced storekeeper and 
inadequate supervision by the MeSu. 
“We bought one washing machine for the operating theatre, which is not fixed yet in the 
room.…..blankets for patients were bought, but only 5 blankets were given to the hospital. Total 
23 blankets were bought, [but] we have got only 5” (MS8)  
 “there was good support from the store before. I am feeling now we do not have support from 
the store as before. Many requests have been made for supply but we are not getting it” (MS5) 
In-service training, supervision and teamwork 
Induction of new staff 
No formal mechanism for inducting new staff exists. There is poor coordination amongst the 
team members. New staff do receive a hospital tour and are introduced to other staff. 
In-service training of medical staff. 
In-service training is not accessed and some services are provided without sufficiently trained 
staff. Several staff require skills updating and refresher training, in particular in OT 
management and infection prevention. Two staff nurses had been trained in OT management 
but had not received any refresher training. Consequently, they lacked confidence in 
supporting caesareans.  
 “Last time operation was done without trained staff for scrubbing. Trained human resource are 
lacking here..………if medical officers were given ASBA [Advanced skilled birth attendant] training, 
the service will not be closed in the absence of Dr__________” (MS6) 
Supervision 
No formal supervisory arrangements were in place at the hospital.  
“I have not seen direct supervision on the spot within this 3-month period.” (MS6) 
Teamwork and staff attitudes 
Teamwork was weak, staff commitment low and staff were unwilling to talk openly (FO).  
These weaknesses might be partly a result of the CEONC team being new and relatively 
inexperienced. For example, the PHN had only been in post 5 months, a newly qualified AA 3 
months and the MeSu 2 months. There were few staff meetings with no formal mechanism 
for inducting new staff and poor coordination amongst the team members.   
Managerial style, monitoring and leadership 
Interaction and communication 
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Staff meetings were infrequent and mostly informal. There were general meetings, but no 
meetings that were specific to obstetric services. Team communication was weak and there 
was poor co-ordination among the team members.  
“There is no separate meeting for only CEONC. We have general meeting where we have 
interaction. There was no formal meeting but we do meet informally.” (MS6) 
A further problem was that many team members were relatives. This potentially makes 
management difficult if staff are unwilling to take direction from family members. 
“We all are local (from local place) and most are relatives. It is a problem ordering relatives to do 
a job or say something strictly. It is little difficult to work among team staff” (MS5). 
Target setting and monitoring of performance 
The expected number of caesareans for the hospital was noted as around 40 per year, 
however, it was not apparent who had set this target or who was monitoring whether it was 
achieved or not. Overall, there was limited monitoring of services and there was no medical 
statistics recorder. The recording/reporting system overall for the hospital was very poor and 
lacked consistency. Service data was inconsistently collected by paramedics with an 
unwillingness to take responsibility for recording data. What monitoring did occur was limited 
to clinical oversight by the CEONC fund contracted doctor. There was no oversight from the 
DHO. Monitoring would be welcomed.  
“Nobody came for it as I remember. I do not know if anybody came in public health office, but 
nobody came in hospital for CEONC programme monitoring.” (MS5) 
There is considerable discrepancy in the data between the number of caesarean reported to 
the HMIS and the number reported in the DoHS annual report (15 caesarean in the HMIS 
versus 82 in the DoHS annual report).  Whilst this comparison is only available for 2013/14, it 
indicates a possible weakness in the recording of services in Rukum that could provide a 
challenge to the setting of targets and the monitoring of progress.  
Awareness of progress 
Staff did not have the perception there was a low caesarean rate and felt that institutional 
delivery had increased over the last year. The perception was that the CEONC programme 
had reduced the need for referral to other districts and consequently, the economic burden 
on the community was reduced. However, the potential weakness in the published service 
data (noted above) makes this perception of progress hard to verify.  
Leadership 
Confusion existed over who had overall leadership responsibility for the programme with 
both the caesarean doctor and MeSu/DHO cited although the caesarean doctor did not regard 
himself as the leader.  
“management is not my task. I am neither a district level manager nor a central level manager.” 
(MS7) 
Critically, there is no-one ensuring that services are provided in line with government policy 
at the hospital and that women are able to access maternity services entirely free of cost. 
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Further no-one was ensuring that supplies, infrastructure repairs and equipment were 
appropriately managed.  
Managerial support and team building  
Managerial support of CEONC services was weak. There were limited staff meetings and 
CEONC services were not prioritised by management. Supervision of staff was limited. There 
was no performance management process.  
“I understand that an overall management is very weak. Looking to all these circumstances, it is 
difficult for CEONC.” (MS9) 
Relationship with the FHD 
There is no relationship with the FHD for CEONC services. No one has visited the hospital to 
support CEONC services.  
Relationship with local community 
There is a positive relationship with the local community. Since the initiation of the CEONC 
programme, trust has increased and there is increasing goodwill towards the hospital. Some 
cases that would have previously been referred out (by helicopter) could now be dealt with 
at the hospital. 
“This is a remote area. A helicopter has to be chartered for referrals out. Now, it is available 
here. For example, one mother in Taxara (name of village) gave birth to twins, one baby was 
born in home, and one could not. After 3 days, she arrived in the hospital, where she delivered 
another safely.” MS8 
Oversight by HDC 
The Rukum HDC does not take a lead in oversight and management of CEONC services or give 
them priority. The HDC has limited capacity and was unaware of the requirements of the 
programme or the availability of the CEONC budget.  
“The objective of HDC is not only organise meeting once in every three months but also they 
need to analyse it [services]. They should discuss what community can help. But they are not 
active discussing all these issues…… HDC does not have capacity for it ” (MS7) 
“I am not much informed on CEONC budget provided to the hospital. So, I do not know much 
about CEONC budget……… As I know there is one caesarean doctor for this program, but not 
from HDC. There was not much discussion on this issue, so I do not know much about it…….I was 
not informed about CEONC activities, and others related to it. It was also not discussed in the 




Neither the hospital nor the DHO can influence how the CEONC grant is allocated by the FHD 
and whilst according to the guidelines, allocations are for HR in general, in practice this has 
sometimes been for specific posts. This has led to an allocation of funds inconsistent with 
local needs.  
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“We received budget to contract lab assistant this year. We have enough lab assistant. Instead of 
lab assistant we need staff nurse.” (PHO3) 
There was fluctuation in the grant allocated to the district between FYs (the grant was cut by 
more than half between the FY 2014/15). This caused confusion, inhibited planning and open 
internal decisions about grant allocation.  
“There was a meeting. Only 5-6 persons involved in the meeting and decided how to use budget; 
We were angered; HDC complained; it was discussed that budget should transparent whoever 
handled it……” (MS8) 
Financial management  
Very few staff were aware of the CEONC fund or for what it could be used. Only the hospital 
accountant was able to provide a clear indication of how the grant had been allocated and 
what had been expended under each budget line.  
“There was no discussion about the budget, so we do not know about it. As I heard, it was used 
for recruiting human resources; advocacy; and purchasing equipment. These were told by [the 
CEONC mentor]. But I do not know if these were done or not” (MS7) 
Delays in budget release caused difficulties in paying staff. As the HDC had very limited funds 
it could not provide alternative financial support and this meant individuals working without 
pay for a period of time on the understanding that they will receive back pay once the funds 
are received. The hospital management were unaware of any letter authorising expenditure 
from the FHD.  
“[Two Staff Nurse] are working voluntarily. We do not have operational guidelines yet, so we are 
not clear on how to pay for them and management of their salary. They will be paid from CEONC 
budget as per contract made with them. Because of budget could not be received on time, we 
are not able to pay them.” (HM4) 
Financial reporting 
Financial management is poor with ad hoc reporting through both TABUCS and direct to the 
FHD through their CEONC fund financial monitoring system. Available financial reports 
through TABUCS and the CEONC financial monitoring tool demonstrate inconsistency. 
Expenditure was reported against the fund in TABUCS in 2013/14 with just over 50% of the 
budget expended (see below table). No expenditure was reported to the FHD as the 
accountant was unaware of the requirement. In 2014/15 no expenditure was reported, 
although interviewees reported that about 600,000NPR (i.e. about 40%) of the 2014/15 had 
been expended. The lack of financial reporting to the FHD means that expenditure cannot be 
tracked over the year nor understood to facilitate future fund allocations or to measure 








Rukum financial reporting 2013 - 2015 
Financial 
Year 
CEONC Grant  NPR 
(000) 
Amount spent (000s) 
Reported to FHD Reported in TABUCS 
2013/14 4,000 0 2,142 
2014/15 1,500 0 0 
 
Regularly scheduled independent auditing 
Financial audits have occurred of the whole hospital budget. No other official investigation, 
e.g. by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) has occurred in the 
last 5 years.  
Summary  
The Figure below summarises the key systemic and local barriers and enablers to the delivery 
of health services in Rukum identified through the case study. This demonstrates, similar to 
Nawalparasi, the complex interface between local and systemic factors and the imbalance 
between barriers and enablers, with the number of both systemic and local barriers 
outweighing enablers.  
Enablers and practical barriers to service delivery in Rukum 
 
CEONC services are intermittent in Rukum and whilst the mere presence of any services is an 
improvement and appreciated by the community (a local enabler), there are substantial 
challenges to the quality and consistency of service provision. Critical local and systemic 
barriers to service provision include weak overall management, insufficient numbers of 
qualified personnel, lack of access to in-service training (which compounds the already weak 
experience of staff that can be recruited from a challenging local market, poor infrastructure 
risking post-operative infections, inadequate management of equipment and supplies. A key 
problem is weak leadership from all sides, clinical, public health and hospital management.  
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This results in weak teamwork and an unsupportive work environment. The process of 
planning and managing the CEONC grant is directed entirely by the FHD with no engagement 
between the centre and the hospital and consequently a limited understanding of local needs. 
As a result the grant is not directed towards the inputs that are identified locally as lacking.  
 
Makwanpur  
The Hetauda Hospital in Makwanpur has a high percentage of caesareans (9.07% of deliveries 
within the facility) and is in receipt of a low CEONC budget (1,200,000NPR) for the year 
2013/14. 
Operational environment 
Makwanpur is in the Central Region. Geographically it is in the hill zone and is surrounded by 
terai districts to the south and mountain and hill districts to the north, east and west. Its 
border is only 34km from Kathmandu and Hetauda hospital is only 87km from the capital. 
Makwanpur is the third most industrialised district in Nepal, although much of its population 
relies on agriculture for their livelihoods (oneclickNepal, 2016). The district is predominantly 
populated by the Tamang community which make up 47.3% of the total district population 
(CBS, 2012). The HPI for Makwanpur is 28.44 better than the national average and the district 
has one of the lowest percentages of malnourished children under 5, ranking 5th out of 75 
districts (UNDP, 2014). The district headquarters, and hospital location is Hetauda. The district 
was categorised as a crisis hit/medium impact district from the two major earthquakes which 
occurred of 2015 (Asia Foundation, 2015). Infrastructure was significantly affected with 37% 
of houses destroyed, 13,500 people rendered homeless and many health facilities, schools 
and other municipal buildings damaged or destroyed (Reliefweb, 2015).  
The district hospital is a 50-bed hospital. It is separate from the DPHO and has more autonomy 
in the management of its budget. The hospital is situated close to road access and was rebuilt 
with well-planned wards and OT facilities in 2011. It has floors allocated for different 
departments with emergency and out-patient departments being located separately. It has a 
well organised labour ward, a spacious maternity ward with functional toilets and running 
water. The OT situated on the top floor is connected through ramps and steps. A separate 
post-operative ward, paediatric, male and female wards exist. Residential quarters are 
available for some health workers but insufficient for all of them. The infrastructure of the 
hospital was affected by the earthquake and the OT had to be temporarily moved from the 
top of the building to the same space as caesarean delivery.  
Results against the theoretical framework. 
Staffing and qualifications 
Staffing 
There are high levels of staffing in Makwanpur employed through sanctioned posts, CEONC 
fund and through the HDC’s own funds. There are two caesarean trained doctors (one 
consultant gynaecologist from a sanctioned post in addition to one CEONC fund contracted 
doctor), two staff nurses, six auxiliary nurse midwives (who are lower skilled than nurses) and 
one anaesthesiologist and two AAs.  
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During the study period the blockade of the Indian border existed. This increased patient 
numbers from nearby terai districts because patients were unable to access local facilities. 
This increased pressure and caseload in Makwanpur. In addition, the upgrading of the hospital 
to a 50 bed facility was not accompanied by an equivalent increase in sanctioned posts. 
Interviewees felt that even the relatively high current complement of staff is inadequate to 
provide services.   
“I think it is good to have three staff. One should look after the emergency cases, the second 
should take the extra delivery and the third should see the Post Operative ward” (MS10) 
Qualifications 
All staff recruited on contract to the CEONC programme have SBA training and two nurses 
have OT training.   
Human resource management arrangements  
Contracting doctors annually through the CEONC fund resulted in a lack of service continuity. 
Two years ago, financial support was obtained from the HDC and this has enabled two doctors 
to be employed continuously with regular service provision increasingly possible with the 
opportunity to support more complicated cases. This has encouraged increasing service 
uptake by the community. Stable staffing also enables staff to obtain clinical practice outside 
the hospital, which supports motivation. 
Availability and quality of equipment and supplies 
Quality of CEONC equipment and supplies 
Good availability of drugs and equipment existed. The OT was clean and well maintained.  
However, equipment is becoming dated with upgrades and additions being desirable to meet 
high demand and the consequences of the rainy season (as there is no drying equipment 
available). Cooperation within the hospital has avoided problems so far.   
Infrastructure  
The physical infrastructure of the facility is satisfactory although the hospital management 
identified a need for a separate building for delivery services. Plans to repair earthquake 
damage to the OT exist as well as other infrastructure developments.  
“the earthquake brought some problems. The upper floor where there was OT service, has been 
damaged. This has created difficulty. The master plan is ready and as it incorporates the 
programme of building the new infrastructure, probably it will start within a year” (HM5).  
Procurement 
There is a clear procurement process within the hospital with the store taking a proactive lead 
to ensure supplies are available and there is no shortage of drugs.  
In service training, supervision and teamwork 
Induction of new staff 
New staff are inducted into the obstetric team. Initially new staff are given guidance and 
performance is monitored. Subject to satisfactory performance they are then allowed to work 
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independently. New staff are paired with experienced staff for up to 3 months to ensure they 
gain appropriate exposure and training. 
 
In-service training of medical staff 
Locally organised in-service training exists including on nutrition, tuberculosis, HIV, Leprosy 
and SBA training. Training is first given to sanctioned staff and then to temporary staff. On-
site infection prevention training was available for all clinical staff in 2015.    
“Matron does [allocation of training] for the general nursing staffs and sometimes Medical 
Superintendent does it for the doctors. In the government trainings, government staff are given 
more priority than the private staff. Sometimes, the name of the staff to receive the training is 
indicated directly from the higher level. It is done on rotation basis. Public will be benefited if all 
the staffs become skilful.” (MS13) 
Supervision  
The MeSu regularly visited the wards to address problems and there was no evidence of a 
blame culture if problems did arise. There also appeared to be good delegation of authority 
to department heads. The MeSu and heads of departments lead by example (e.g. arrive 
before formal office hours). The matron appeared to lead her team effectively, oversaw 
management and also helped in OT and to conduct normal deliveries.   
Hetauda hospital had a formal performance management process, both for non-performing 
and high performing staff. For non-performing staff this consisted of a first verbal warning, 
followed by a written warning. For high performing staff there was public recognition in staff 
meetings.  
“We usually take 2 consecutive actions. At first, we give verbal warning. Next time, we give it in 
written. Till now, it has not been necessary to go beyond this. They get aware after this. For the 
high performing staff, we gather them every 6 months and provide appreciative remarks in the 
mass and thus motivate them” (HM5) 
Teamwork and staff attitudes 
Teamwork was strong. There was mutual respect between the MeSu and the staff who each 
noted the support of the other. Division of work was fair and teamwork was good between 
contracted and sanctioned staff. Good coordination across teams (i.e. among administration, 
accountants, MeSu, sisters and doctors) was noted as key to ensuring positive teamwork for 
CEONC service delivery.  
“Sometimes, there can be problems. But it is all about coordination. When there is high load, it is 
difficult due to the inadequate staff. However, all are cooperative……..we have good 
coordination and things are well managed in the 24-hour service.” (MS13) 
Management developed staff motivation through financial incentives, exposure visits, public 





Managerial style, monitoring and leadership 
Interaction and communication 
Interaction and communications between staff and between staff and senior management 
were good. Individual staff were able to talk with the MeSu directly, both through ad hoc 
meetings and regular monthly staff meetings. Since the hospital had become a 50-bed facility, 
relationships with the DPHO had become less formal and frequent. Whilst the DPHO was 
supportive, in practice, because they no longer had responsibility for managing HR their 
engagement was seen to be less important by the hospital. No adverse consequences had 
appeared and more autonomy had improved services as the hospital was able to add more 
general and specialist staff.  
Target setting and monitoring of performance 
Implicit targets of an annual increment in services were set by the hospital management, 
although there was a concern that caesarean should not increase unnecessarily and should 
be in line with clinical indicators.  Service data records were kept by the record section of the 
hospital and there was clarity on the numbers of services provided by several senior members 
of the team. The process for monitoring performance was shared between the MeSu, the 
HDC and the DoHS. The MeSu focussed on the clinical aspects of performance, the HDC on 
client satisfaction and the DoHS on overall quality of care and service provision. 
Awareness of progress 
Staff were aware of progress in annual increases in patients and in service quality 
improvements. Common figures were cited from both hospital management and medical 
staff which would indicate that data is widely disseminated. The perception is that patients 
who would have previously sought treatment in other districts are now seeking care at 
Hetauda.  
“Since the service delivery is good, even the patients who would have otherwise gone to the 
Bharatpur hospital, come here for delivery.  Both the caesarean and normal delivery cases have 
increased”. (MS13)  
Perception of their role 
Roles and responsibilities amongst the leadership team are clear and this applies to 
responsibilities for CEONC services. The matrons and senior doctors consider themselves to 
have a responsibility for the CEONC team and their patients. 
Leadership,  
Leadership is strong. The HDC and MeSu place priority on CEONC services and ensure that 
problems are appropriately managed, even if that means visiting the FHD to petition for 
assistance. The MeSu regularly visits the CEONC ward and undertakes operations if required. 
The team felt highly supported by the leadership.   
“He [the MeSu] gives [the CEONC programme] high priority. For example there was some 
financial problem in this programme. He himself visited the DoHS and settled it down. It is 




Managerial support and teambuilding 
There is clear managerial support and teambuilding across functions. The managers set the 
tone for the working environment and aim to develop a positive culture through the practice 
of “good counselling” (i.e. that staff should be respectful to each other). In addition, the 
expectation is set by the management that no team will work independently and mutual will 
be provided as required. 
“We should observe other departments also. I should not stay here saying I belong to CEONC. 
While in need, I should assist in surgery and emergency.” MS12 
Relationship with the FHD 
The hospital benefits from regular visits from the FHD which occur several times per year.  
These visits cover quality of care, monitoring of services, training in infection prevention and 
general support to CEONC services. They enable identification of issues, whether that is 
availability of equipment and supplies or training needs of staff. They are appreciated by the 
hospital.  
“We have good support from the FHD. They make visits 2 to 3 times a year. Dr_______[CEONC 
mentor] monitors CEONC.” (PHO4)  
Relationship with local community 
There is a strong relationship with the local community who have trust in the hospital, 
particularly in light of 24 hour services. The hospital has links with civil society and undertakes 
a process of public audit to ensure the transparency of their service delivery.  This trust and 
local accountability is important in driving delivery services and has changed over time in line 
with a more client focussed service.  
“In the past, they did not trust us and rather trusted on the service of the clinics. But now, they 
come here. The service is targeted towards the public. Now public trust has increased. There is 
more than 350 delivery every month. People from other districts like Rautahat and Sarlahi also 
come here.” (HM5)  
Oversight by HDC 
Hetauda hospital benefits from having a strong, engaged and financially independent HDC 
which is prepared to cover salaries and continue staff contracts in the absence of actual funds 
being received from the centre. The HDC have generated their own income stream through 
provision of laboratory and x-ray services, and by removing private providers from the 
hospital premises so that income can come directly to the hospital.    
“There should not be gap in the budget release. The Hospital Development Committee bridges 
the gap.  In the previous years, it was difficult for the committee to provide the salary. It 
[funding] has increased due to lab and x-ray service………In addition, another important thing is 
that private x-ray clinics cannot run their clinics in the government shutters [facilities]. We had to 
struggle a lot to remove them and our income increased.” (MS11)  
Overall, the HDC was helpful and active. The chair of the HDC visits the hospital daily and 






The CEONC budget received from the FHD is seen to be sufficient to meet hospital needs. The 
budget is allocated by the MoHP. No decisions are taken locally about its composition. The 
grant follows the CEONC fund guidelines, and expenditure only occurs within the specified 
budget headings.  
“That [allocation of expenditure] is indicated in the guideline. The salary for the staff like 
anaesthesia assistant, doctors and nurses are pre-determined…………..The expenditure can be  
done only as per the expenditure headings provided in the guideline.” (MS13) 
The hospital wanted more consultation about the CEONC grant, particularly given the 
fluctuation in the grant allocated to the district between financial years. This fluctuation 
causes confusion at district level and inhibits planning. Greater flexibility in how the grant can 
be used was also desired.  
 “The doctors should also be involved in this [Financial decisions]. This is a 9-month project. 
Therefore, the new team next year may not like the suggestions of the current CEONC team. 
However, suggestions should be taken from the team.” (MS10) 
Financial management during year 
Whilst there was generally good understanding of the CEONC fund, there was some confusion 
amongst hospital management between this fund and the Aama fund12. Whilst guidelines are 
provided for CEONC fund utilisation, awareness of these guidelines is mixed and conflated 
with the Aama guidelines.   
“There is no separate CEONC fund. The fund of Aama Surakchhya Program is collected at hospital 
development committee's fund.” (HM6).  
Problems due to delays in budget release from the centre were noted by several interviewees. 
The perception was that because this is an emergency programme, it should not be bound by 
the same rules as other budgets and release of funds should occur at the beginning of the 
fiscal year.    
Hetauda hospital employs different strategies for managing the gap in CEONC funding. For 
example, it delays paying staff until the funding is released and then back pays staff. 
“The budget is sent all at once. This time, it was not sent. Then, the salary was not given. The 
staff get the salary as a whole for those months. It came in Kartik13. They will be paid now from 
Shrawan14 to Kartik.” (MS13) 
Whilst a 1-2 month delay is manageable for staff who are financially stable, this causes 
problems for lower paid members of staff who find it difficult to manage if salaries are 
 
12 Aama is a related maternal health programme that focuses on increasing the proportion of deliveries 
that occur in health institutions and thereby reducing related morbidities and mortality.   Through this 
programme the hospitals receive payment per service provided.  Those funds go into the hospital budget 
and can be used for providing financial incentives to health providers and purchasing equipment and 
supplies. 
13 Nepali month running roughly 18th October- 16th November 
14 Nepali month running roughly 16th July – 15th August 
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delayed. As another strategy, the MeSu directly lobbied the DoHS to send a letter committing 
to covering the funding and requesting continuation of services whilst awaiting budget 
release. This letter from the DoHS is seen as a sufficient level of surety to reduce the risk of 
the hospital using other budget lines such as the Aama programme to temporarily fund staff.    
 
Financial reporting 
Consistent reporting occurred through both TABUCS and direct to the FHD through their 
CEONC fund financial monitoring system (see table below). However, regular underspending 
occurs against the budget (with 43% of the grant spent in 2013/14 and 76% in 2014/15).  This 
underspend is attributed to delayed release of the budget, and therefore insufficient time to expend 
the resources.  
Makwanpur financial reporting 2013 - 2015 
Financial 
Year 
CEONC Grant  NPR 
(000) 
Amount spent (000s) 
Reported to FHD Reported in TABUCS 
2013/14 1,200 517 517 
2014/15 1,700 1,285 1,285 
 
Auditing 
Internal and external audits take place.  The main concern of audit appears to be over 
ensuring that procedural rules are properly followed, e.g. over compliance with staff 
recruitment rules and compliance with the budget. Apart from taking audit comments into 
account, audit has little impact on financial management practice. 
Summary  
The figure below summarises the key systemic and local barriers and enablers to the delivery 
of health services in Makwanpur identified through the study. This demonstrates the complex 
interplay of local and system factors and the imbalance between barriers and enablers, with 












Enablers and practical barriers to service delivery in Makwanpur 
 
 
Critical local enablers for the performance of Hetauda hospital are the strong leadership from 
the HDC and MeSu resulting in a well-managed facility. There are robust and clear 
management practices in place, which facilitate strong teamwork and clarity on roles and 
responsibilities in delivering services. The hospital also benefits from systemic enablers and 
has strong relations with the FHD and is regularly visited by the CEONC mentor who is active 
in his support and guidance. Despite regular engagement from the CEONC mentor, some 
systemic barriers exist as the allocation of CEONC grants for staffing remains inappropriate 
for the local needs and increased engagement from the local team would ensure that there 
is more effective use of the funds. Whilst the team face challenges of insufficient staff 
numbers and delays in the release of the CEONC grant from the centre, the financial strength, 
leadership and teamwork in the hospital and the support of the HDC is sufficient to ensure 
that a continuous service can be delivered. The proximity to Kathmandu is a significant 
advantage to this hospital. Its convenience makes it attractive as a place to work and the 
regular interaction with the central departments creates an understanding of its problems 
which could well influence (maybe very informally) central departmental policy, 
demonstrating a non-linear engagement in policy formulation between the district and 
central levels.  
Ilam    
Ilam District Hospital was categorised as having a high percentage of caesarean (20.05% of 
deliveries within the facility) and in receipt of a high CEONC grant (2,900,000NPR) for the year 






Ilam is in the Eastern Region. Geographically it is in the Hill zone and borders India. Ilam is a 
relatively prosperous district benefiting from fertile lands which have supported transition 
from traditional cereal production towards modern agricultural business (Subba, 2015). Many 
different ethnic groups are living in the district including Brahmin, Limbu, Chhetri, Newar and 
marginalized groups such as Lepcha, Sherpa and Sunuwar (Subba, 2015). The HPI for Ilam is 
26.96 (UNDP, 2014) better than the national average. However, there are a high percentage 
of children under 5 who are malnourished (46.1%) and almost a quarter of the population do 
not have access to safe drinking water (UNDP, 2014). The district headquarters and location 
of the hospital is in Ilam. The district was not affected by the two earthquakes.  
Ilam hospital was a 25 bed facility and was upgraded to 50 beds in October 2015. Ilam is a 
major hub for transportation and communication and is therefore a strategic location for the 
hospital enabling access not only to people from Ilam but also surrounding districts 
(Taplejung, Panchather, Tehrthum and Jhapa) (DPHO Ilam, 2013). Officially the hospital has 
recently separated from the DPHO, but only one month before data collection and in practice 
the DPHO still exercises significant engagement and oversight as if it was a DHO e.g. the 
2014/2015 budget was sent to the DPHO. A new hospital building was built and brought into 
operation in 2013. The facility provides outpatient services; emergency services; in patient 
services; surgical services; laboratory services; X-ray services; dental services; ambulance 
services; community drug programme; safe abortion services; and free health services 
(including maternal health).  
Results against the theoretical framework. 
Staffing and Qualifications 
Staffing  
The hospital has sufficient staff to provide a 24/7 service with 3 doctors (2 general doctors 
and 1 gynaecologist). Staff are employed through a mix of contracts and sanctioned posts and 
they draw on staff from other departments, in particular the OT, to support CEONC services. 
Ilam is also a training centre so the hospital can draw on students, as necessary, to ensure 
sufficient coverage. The main staffing challenge is the availability of an anaesthetist. Only one 
AA is in post and when absent the OT is closed with patients being referred to other facilities. 
“There should be at least two AAs so that CEONC services don’t get interrupted when one AA is 
not around. It is also easier to manage complications if there are two AAs.” (MS15) 
Training 
Highly qualified staff are seen to be the critical factor in ensuring the trust of the community 
in the facility’s services. Ilam currently has a qualified and reputable gynaecologist and 
general doctors who can cover for each other. Nurses are trained in SBA and OT management 
and the majority of the nurses have received SBA training. This allows the hospital to handle 
complicated deliveries.   
“Most of us nurses are SBAs. So, we can handle even complicated delivery cases. We don’t carry 
out caesarean, that is something we leave for the doctors. We perform neonatal resuscitation 
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and vacuum delivery in complicated cases without supervision by a doctor. We all are confident. 
Only two of the nurses haven’t taken SBA training; all others have.” (MS17) 
Human resource management 
Human resource management is hampered by the transfer of staff by the MoHP without 
consultation with the facility. Both a doctor and an AA have been transferred to other 
districts which has adversely affected service delivery. The hospital had to petition the 
director general (DG) of the DoHS to have staff returned. Contracts for temporary staff 
employed through the CEONC grant have to be renewed every year, with staff taking 
written and verbal exams.  
“Only one AA is available at current. The one which has sanction post of AA in this hospital is now 
working in Taplejung hospital. I am trying to return back in this hospital and I have already sent 
letter to the DG.” (PHO6) 
“The HDC doesn’t know anything about the transfer of employees. We come to know about it 
only after the transfers are made. We have major problems when the doctors are transferred. 
For example, Dr _________ was working here but suddenly he was deputed to Dhankuta. Then 
came Dr __________. He too got transferred. It’s our request that don’t transfer the doctors who 
carry out the operation. Patients from Panchthar and Taplejung come to this hospital by paying 
up to Rs 40 thousand to ambulances. It is sad to refer them to other hospitals because of the lack 
of doctors.” (HM7) 
Availability and quality of equipment and supplies 
Quality of CEONC equipment and supplies 
The OT in Ilam is well equipped and has the drugs and instruments needed for CEONC service 
delivery. The HDC readily provides funds to purchase equipment if required and it has 
supported provision of equipment from NGOs. The main equipment deficiency is for neonatal 
care although some interviewees felt that whilst equipment was available it was not 
necessarily in the optimal condition and would benefit from updating. In addition, there isn’t 
a NICU available which means that neonatal cases have to be referred to other facilities.  
“our labour bed is not in a good condition. I have been demanding a new labour bed for the past 
many years. But they don’t provide” (MS17) 
Infrastructure  
The hospital building where the OT is located is new and comfortable. Ideally a waiting room 
for maternity patients should be built, but this is not currently restricting services.  
Procurement 
Procurement is adversely affected because of a lack of technical knowledge by staff involved 
of medical equipment and supplies.  This results in delays in acquisition. 
In-service training, supervision and teamwork 
Induction of new staff 
No formal induction process exists for new staff. However, new staff are: 
• introduced to the team during a staff meeting;  
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• Informed about the OT rules and regulations including use of different equipment; 
• Teamed with more senior staff member for two or three deliveries.   
 
In-service training  
In-service training is available to staff although it is ad-hoc and refresher courses are required, 
for example, on infection prevention. Staff have received training on neonatal resuscitation 
and on “one golden minute”15. NGOs have provided some training.  
CEONC service delivery has benefited from targeted in service training to key staff members. 
An example was provided of an inexperienced doctor who did not have the confidence to 
perform caesarean on her own. She was helped to attend another hospital to build her 
experience enabling her subsequently to provide caesarean.  
“Then Dr._________ was transferred to Sindhuli. Dr________ didn’t have full confident for 
caesarean, she could not do alone caesarean. Then I sent her in AMDA hospital for practice for 
5/6 days where she did Caesarean cases. Coming back to Ilam hospital, she started to do 
caesarean.” (PHO6).   
Supervision 
The MeSu supervises the services and is supported by department chiefs. However, 
supervision does not appear to be systematic.  
Teamwork and staff attitudes 
Currently teamwork amongst those providing CEONC services was perceived to be generally 
good amongst the nursing staff. However, some tension amongst the doctors was reported 
which was attributed to the competition for receipt of financial incentives for the delivery of 
certain procedures, in particular caesarean. The DPHO sought to manage this by the 
introduction of an ultrasound service for provision of which doctors also receive an additional 
financial incentive.   
“Conflicts are raised because all doctors wanted to do caesarean…….The major conflict is due to 
incentives/money. Now they are working turn by turn. Ultrasound service is available. They get 
extra money from ultrasound. Ultra sound charge is 550 rupees per case and 50% of it goes to 
doctor who do ultra sound. So, all are willing to do ultrasound.” (PHO6) 
 
Managerial style, monitoring and leadership 
Interaction and communication 
Regular monthly minuted staff meetings were held where issues could be raised and 
discussed as well as ad hoc meetings based on need. There are trimesterly Reproductive 
 
15 Within one minute of birth, a baby should be breathing well or should be ventilated with a bag and 
mask. The Golden Minute identifies the steps that a birth attendant must take immediately after birth to 




Health Care Committee and Maternal and Perinatal Death Review (MPDR)16 meetings which 
provide a forum for the doctors to discuss their resource needs as well as analyse clinical 
incidents with the DPHO. There are also clear duty handover processes where current 
experiences are shared.  
Target setting and monitoring of performance 
No clear targets were set for service outputs and there was no external monitoring of 
performance by the DPHO. Within the hospital, however they have a system of MPDR which 
provides a basis for monitoring and reviewing service delivery and ensuring that lessons are 
learned from maternal, neonatal deaths and “near-misses” to identify the facility gaps and 
challenges including underlying causes. This supports improvement of quality care at the 
facility level. 
Awareness of progress 
Staff were aware of a general improvement in the number and quality of services provided, 
but felt that improvements could still be made. However, without clear targets set by the 
management actual progress could not be quantified. 
Perception of their role 
Staff had a clear perception of their roles and responsibilities. Now the hospital has separated 
from the DPHO, the DPHO role has changed from one of leadership to advisory.    
Leadership 
With the increase to 50 beds, management of the hospital has recently changed from being 
under the control of the DPHO to management by the MeSu and the HDC with oversight from 
the DPHO. Monitoring of CEONC services is mostly performed by the MeSu. There have been 
challenges in leadership in the past, which led to the hospital gaining a poor reputation, 
conflict between doctors and poor levels of staffing. The perception was that this was partly 
due to the leadership of the previous MeSu and that significant inputs were required by the 
DPHO to manage the situation.  
At the beginning, the situation of Ilam hospital was not good. Gradually, I had organized meeting, 
took leadership. I had managed with media people as well for CEONC service, I had meeting with 
civil society, District Development Committee (DDC) and political groups for CEONC service. Then 
after, political persons are supporting us.  (PHO6).  
However, the current MeSu is seen as a positive contributor to the overall reputation and 
operating of the hospital.   
After joining by Dr_________[current MeSu], the environment of the hospital changed and was 
good. There has been good reputation of the hospital. (PHO6) 
 
 
16 Maternal and Perinatal Death Review (MPDR) is an evidence based approach that cross examines both 
health system and social factors through a systematic process. The MPDR in covers maternal and 
neonatal deaths including stillbirths in both the community and at facility level, maintaining anonymity as 
well as a no-blame and non-punitive environment with participation at all levels. 
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Managerial support and teambuilding  
There is mutual cooperation between the ward staff and OT teams which creates a supportive 
working environment. The leadership encourage teams to cooperate and through the MPDR 
there is a process of a ‘no-blame’ review of challenges. One emerging problem though is that 
financial incentives are available to those doctors who perform complex procedures. From a 
positive perspective, these incentives have not unnecessarily increased the provision of 
caesarean, but it has created discord in the team as all doctors compete to be able to perform 
the procedure in order to obtain the financial reward.  
Relationship with the FHD 
Monitoring of the CEONC programme from the central level is perceived to be weak. At best 
only annual visits have occurred.  
“Who comes from central, nobody… Dr. _______[CEONC mentor] visited 2 years back. Dr. 
______and Dr______[FHD staff] visited once in last year. Then nobody came from Kathmandu” 
(PHO6) 
Additional monitoring would be appreciated and interviewees also felt it would boost staff 
morale.   
Relationship with local community 
The community is perceived to be supportive of the services as its reputation improves. 
Oversight by HDC  
The HDC in Ilam do not have a formalised meeting schedule, meeting on an ‘as needed’ basis 
which can in some circumstances be quite frequent. However, the perception is that the HDC 
is engaged and functional. The HDC do not play a direct role in managing CEONC services, 
seeing their role being to ensure hospital services more broadly are running effectively.   
“Our role is to make the hospital’s services more effective. We watch the service delivery by the 
hospital and play a constructive role in making it more effective.” (HM7) 
However, the HDC have hired two staff on contract to the CEONC programme (as well as many 
others across the hospital) and are perceived as being helpful in the running of CEONC 
services. 
“It [the HDC] has been helpful. They have helped us in managing manpower and equipment. 
They work at the policy level.” (MS15) 
Financial oversight 
Budgeting  
The budget for the CEONC fund is developed centrally and neither the DPHO, nor the hospital 
staff, contribute to its preparation. There is significant fluctuation in the grant allocated to 
the district between financial years (the grant dropped by two-thirds between the FY 2013/14 
and 2014/15). This causes confusion at district level, inhibits planning and consequently is 
seen as inappropriately allocated and inadequate for the needs of the hospital.  
We do not have direct role and contribution in budget preparation. Budget is not like “demand 
based or request based”. FHD puts budget i.e. not proper as per our need. (PHO6) 
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Financial management during year  
No expenditure was reported against the fund in either TABUCS or direct to the FHD through 
their financial monitoring system. It is unclear if this is because no funds were spent against 
the fund or financial reporting is inadequate. However, the interview data indicates a high 
level of confusion between the CEONC fund and the Aama programme with both public health 
staff (nominally in charge of the CEONC budget) and senior clinical staff conflating the two 
funding streams. This may be the cause of the lack of financial reporting against the CEONC 
budget line. 
Ilam hospital has been affected by the delays in payment of CEONC funds. In 2014/15 this was 
almost 5 months of the year. The hospital employs different strategies for managing the 
funding gap. In FY 2014/15 the HDC in Ilam covered the costs of contract staff for 5 months. 
At the point at which the research was taking place (i.e. in the FY 2015/16) some staff had not 
been paid for four months. They were working essentially voluntarily, but on the promise of 
receiving back pay and a lump sum of four month’s salary.  
“It’s been four months since we haven’t got our salary. But we hope to get it over the next few 
days.” (MS17) 
The hospital had received a letter from the FHD asking them to cover salaries and CEONC 
costs in the interim before the budget was released. However, the perception was that 
because this letter did not come from the DG of the DoHS it had no legal standing and would 
not be accepted as evidence for continued expenditure by the Budget and Account Control 
Office.  
Financial reporting 
Financial data is not available from TABUCS or the FHD on expenditure against the fund. This 
may be due to confusion with the Aama fund.  
Ilam Financial reports to TABUCS and FHD 
Financial 
Year 
CEONC Grant  NPR 
(000) 
Amount spent (000s) 
Reported to FHD Reported in TABUCS 
2013/14 2,900 0 0 
2014/15 1,000 0 0 
 
Auditing 
The office of the auditor general undertakes an audit. The auditors seem unfamiliar with the 
guidelines for the various programmes. The audit process is therefore not particularly helpful 
in improving financial management.   
Summary  
The figure below summarises the key systemic and local barriers and enablers to the delivery 
of health services in Ilam identified through the case study. This demonstrates the complex 
interplay of local and systemic factors and the imbalance between barriers and enablers. 
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Whilst the balance between barriers and enablers is more equal than Makwanpur, on the 
whole the number of both systemic and local enablers outweigh the barriers.  
 
Enablers and barriers to service delivery in Ilam. 
 
The key systemic enabling factor affecting the level of caesarean in Ilam is the availability of 
an almost full complement of skilled staff. Services can be provided 24/7 as duty schedules 
can be efficiently managed. As a local enabler, Ilam also benefits from a financially 
independent and interested HDC that is a local adaptive agent that has reacted to the 
systemic weaknesses, prioritises CEONC services which is willing to provide financial support 
as necessary. The quality of management practices in Ilam is mixed. Supervisory 
arrangements are unclear and there is a reliance on informal processes to induct staff.  
Conversely, there are regular staff meetings and the process of MPDR allows for open and 
frank discussions on how to improve the quality of services. As a systemic barrier, Ilam does 
not receive good or frequent support from the FHD. The CEONC fund allocation process does 
not reflect the needs or circumstances of the hospital including referrals from surrounding 
districts.  
 
Additional Themes Identified 
Several additional themes were identified through the data analysis of the case studies that 
broadly lay outside the theoretical framework developed from the literature. A selection of 
these additional themes are detailed below (these are.  
Referral 
Referral of cases both into and out of the district was a critical factor identified by 
interviewees from all case study hospitals as a key factor driving the numbers of caesareans. 
In the poorer performing districts, Nawalparasi and Rukum, their inability to provide services 
24/7 and the lack of appropriate facilities (for example an adequate blood supply or NICU) 
meant that cases need to be referred on to other facilities.  
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When complicated cases come from the community, we have to refer them to well equipped 
health facilities. Reasons behind the referral of cases is due to inadequate staff and the lack of 
NICU. (MS3) 
Conversely, in Makwanpur and Ilam there were high levels of referrals and self-referrals from 
patients outside of the district as well as a reduction in referrals onwards from the hospitals 
as a result of increased capability of the staff to cope with complex cases. For example, during 
the fuel crisis in 2015 there was a higher caseload as Hetauda was more accessible for patients 
from surrounding districts than their own district hospitals. In Ilam several of the surrounding 
districts lack doctors, so Ilam has to cover patients from several localities.   
There was no doctor in Panchther, so cases are coming from there also. If doctor not available 
for Caesarean in Taplejung, then they also come here. But, cases from Fikal go down the hill. 
(PHO5) 
In Hetauda, however, this increased caseload put extra pressure on an already overloaded 
team.  
As there is blockade in the Terai districts like Sarlahi, Siraha and Birgunj, the patients from those 
districts also come here. Therefore, our workload has increased and it is difficult to manage. 
(MS10) 
Quality of care 
A reputation for good quality of care and positive attitudes of health workers contributed to 
whether a client would choose to go to a facility or not. This was an inhibiting factor in 
Nawalparasi, where one interviewee cited poor behaviour towards clients as a barrier to 
access. 
 We can demand for health workers. Whether the hospital (Prithvi Chandra) is providing quality 
services or not is linked with various such factors as people's attitude and behaviour. There is a 
difference between speaking a couple of nice words and speaking in a condescending manner 
with the people seeking services. Those who get overlooked while trying to receive health 
services will not come back. For this, it is essential for health workers to change their attitude 
and behaviour. I think if we change our behaviour and attitude towards our clients or 
beneficiaries, they will be satisfied with our services.  (PHO2) 
Providing quality services though was inhibited in Rukum by staff transfers as qualified staff 
were transferred away from the district.  
One sister trained for scrubbing, got promoted and transferred. Last time operation was done 
without trained staff for scrubbing. Trained human resource are lacking here. (MS6) 
Conversely in Makwanpur there was a systematic mechanism to measure and ensure quality 
of care through a quality scorecard. Similarly, in Ilam they were running a maternal and 
perinatal death review programme which enabled systematic investigation of adverse events 
and a review of whether quality services were provided. This has built the trust of the 
community.  
Multiple overlapping programmes  
At the district level, there is some confusion between The Aama Surakshya programme 
(Aama) and the CEONC fund. Aama is a related programme that focuses on increasing the 
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proportion of deliveries that occur in health institutions and thereby reducing related 
morbidities and mortality. Through this programme the hospitals receive payment per service 
provided. Those funds go into the hospital budget and can be used for providing financial 
incentives to health providers and purchasing equipment and supplies. Whilst guidelines are 
provided for CEONC fund, awareness of these guidelines is mixed and conflated with the 
Aama guidelines. This can create confusion at the district hospital level about how and when 
the CEONC funds can be spent and whether they include incentives for individuals. There was 
a lack of clarity on the different funding mechanisms amongst staff in public health, 
administrative and service provision functions. Whilst it might not be expected that medical 
personnel would have much knowledge of the different financing mechanisms even hospital 
management and public health officers who should be overseeing the financial management 
of the separate programmes were also unsure of between the CEONC fund and Aama. This 
confusion was present in all districts, regardless of whether they received high or low levels 
of funding, or whether they provided high or low levels of caesarean section.   
“Interviewer: Do you know how CEONC budget is managed? 
Interviewee: I know about it. There are incentives for doctors, can be used for repair 
maintenance if required. I think incentives can be given to nursing staff and AA, but I don’t think 
so they get it. 
Interviewer: Don’t nursing staff get incentive? 
Interviewee: That’s what I am telling. They received incentives out from 7000 per case C/S, but I 
guess they have not received incentive from CEONC budget.” (PHO5) 
 “There is no separate CEONC fund. The fund of Aama Surakchhya Program is collected at 
hospital development committee's fund.” (HM6) 
Separating the two funding streams from a financial reporting perspective, was further 
complicated at the central level as, until recently, all financial data from district hospitals was 
reported in aggregate to the MoHP.   
Managing public sector spending pressures 
Shortage of funds for public services and an inability to plan over the longer term affected 
all hospitals. Whilst multi-year budgeting is nominally a feature of central government 
budgeting, funding decisions are actually made annually. There is no practical focus on 
improving efficiency and effectiveness in public expenditure. A lack of financial resilience 
also means that unforeseen events, such as the 2015 earthquakes, overtakes any financial 
planning decisions.  
“Interviewer: what is the priority of government centrally for providing CEONC services and 
funding? 
Interviewee: We put money, we allocate budget. This is not only my decision. This is a long 
process. From us it goes to DG and to ministry and then to planning commission to finance 
ministry and in finance ministry we have to defend , this time also we put 90 million and 
increased number of districts also but from finance ministry it was cut down to only 56 million. 
It’s very difficult, we now have to adjust that money. 
Interviewer: Did they give reason for why they cut the budget? 
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Interviewee: Because of this earthquake, all money went to the response. We are supposed to 
expand 5 districts and we sent money for equipment in 5 districts, but it was a lot less money 
that came from the finance ministry so we will now expand in two districts only.” (CI16) 
 
Staff motivation 
Two key areas of staff motivation were highlighted by the interviewees that affected staff 
recruitment and retention. Firstly, career progression. In Ilam, the staff felt that they had 
opportunities to build their skills which improved their career prospects overall.  
“The working environment is good here. We get to see interesting cases here. So, if you work 
here for some time, it’s easier to work at other places.” (MS16) 
In Nawalparasi, however, the HDC found it difficult to recruit contract staff because career 
prospects weren’t as good as those in government sanctioned positions.  
The government staffs get promoted and transferred, which increases their career prospect but 
the staff members hired by the Board don't have transfer opportunities and they have limited 
scope for promotion. (HM2) 
The other motivation was that incentives are provided under the Aama programme but not 
under the CEONC fund. The salaries of government doctors are low and they rely on incentives 
to boost their income. Without this there is a need to seek salary supplements through 
working in the private sector.  
“The other motivation is the incentive they get. Nobody wants to work if there is no incentive 
(laughs). The salary provided by the hospital is not that much. If you compare the salary of a 
peon and that of a doctor, there is a difference of only Rs 10,000. Our salary is that low. We 
make some extra income from CEONC. The incentive we get for providing CEONC service is the 
biggest motivation.” (MS16) 
“The responsibility [for caesareans] should be given to the CEONC doctor. The incentive should 
be solely provided to the doctor. If the incentive is given to doctor then he/she would not go for 
private practice. Therefore, there will be no problem in the CEONC.” (MS12) 
However, as noted above, these incentives can also lead to disharmony in the team as certain 
doctors seek to perform all the caesareans in order to monopolise the financial rewards.  
Trust between districts and the MoHP and FHD 
With the exception of Makwanpur where regular visits from the CEONC mentor occurred, 
there was a lack of trust between the districts and the central level. This manifested itself in 
different ways.  In Ilam the hospital management was unwilling to accept a letter from the 
FHD to encourage them to continue to provide services during the period where there was 
budget delay.   
“Who comes from central, nobody… Dr. Prajapati visited 2 years back. Dr. Kiran and Dr. Shilu 
visited once in last year. Then nobody came from Kathmandu. 
IV:Did you receive the letter sent by FHD to continue staff in the next fiscal year? 




This same letter was received by Makwanpur, but due to their positive relationship with the 
FHD they accepted the risk based on the direction in the letter that they would receive 
reimbursement. 
 
“Dr. _________(CEONC Mentor) visits every 4 months. He conducts the meeting and discusses 
about the lacking issues. He suggests that the patients should not suffer and should not buy 
medicines from outside. He provides knowledge on CEONC. He sees the OT and assesses what is 
lacking. NHSSP had sent us a letter to continue the program. Before that, the authority had made 
an investigation on why the program was not given continuity.” (MS10) Makwanpur 
Nawalparasi and Rukum also lack trust in the centre to adequately support them.  The 
perception was that the budget is released late from the central level, but they are the ones 
having to explain to auditors why funds have not been spent as expected.  They also do not 
believe the Ministry will support them, even if they have had personal assurances.  
Budget is not released in time. If it is released at all, it is released at the eleventh hour. And, 
when the accounts get audited, auditors catch hold of us why the money is not spent as 
expected and if it is spent, why the money is spent. (PHO2) 
I don't think the Ministry has done anything to run CEONC services. When we go to the Ministry 
and enquire about the continuation of the support, they take it lightly and say that it will be 
extended. I went to the Department of Health Services for continuation of the programme, the 
DG told me to prepare a proposal stating what is required from the Department and which 
equipment or materials are required. He told me that the Department could support from 
regular resources. We have not sent the list (proposal) yet but I am not sure if he will send the 
items if it is long. (PHO2) 
 
Central Level Interviews 
In addition to the case studies at district level, nine semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken with key personnel at the central level. The purpose of these interviews was to 
triangulate the data from the districts and provide an understanding of the functioning of the 
CEONC fund and the delivery of CEONC services from the perspective of those working with 
an overview of the whole system.   
Overall the perception of the CEONC fund and the CEONC programme at the central level is 
that if the fund is properly utilised it has increased services as well as reducing maternal 
mortality, child mortality and neonatal mortality. However, the interviews also reveal concern 
about aspects of the present CEONC fund arrangements and that the delivery of CEONC 
services indicates a complex system, but those concerns do not extend to indicate a central 
ministry aiming to achieve reform to the system.  
Staffing and qualifications 
Staffing 
The central level interviewees recognised that sufficient and skilled HR are critical to the 
delivery of CEONC services but that clinical staff can be difficult to recruit and hard to retain, 
particularly in remote districts. In some districts the enabling environment for doctors is poor, 
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with no quarters provided and poor salaries, particularly on the part of doctors employed by 
the government (as opposed to on contracts). This leads to attrition of staff from the public 
to the private sector.   
The CEONC fund is meant to supplement the hospital budget and enable the hospital to build 
one obstetric care team. The central level interviewees accepted that because the staff 
recruited through the CEONC fund are contracted and not in government sanctioned posts, 
they are often paid substantially more and that this can cause conflict which has led to some 
government staff refusing to work. 
“somewhere doctor is there, all team is there but they are not working, mostly government 
doctor even they can, they are not doing because they say "I am getting low salary than CEONC 
doctor" “ (CI1) 
Qualifications 
Overall, the central level interviewees accepted that it can be challenging, particularly in 
remote districts, to bring together a comprehensive and qualified team. In some districts, they 
have advertised 2 or 3 times for CEONC staff, but there have been no applicants, despite 
higher salaries offered. In some areas, the numbers of qualified and trained people are limited 
and competition for them can be severe.   
Human resources management 
The central level interviewees accepted that staff postings for sanctioned posts are managed 
at the central level, but currently there is a lack of HR planning by the MoHP. No priority is 
given to districts which are currently providing CEONC services thus allowing them to continue 
to do so. There is also an ad hoc approach to staff transfers, with no consideration towards 
keeping a team stable, ensuring that a full team is in place to deliver services or indeed that 
staff with specialist skills are posted at the right level in the health system.  
“The MoH also need to change the HR transfer [arrangements], they have to think they shouldn’t 
change the team you know. So there are many districts that due to disruption of the team, the 
service has stopped” (CI3) 
They pointed out that whilst districts can recruit staff on contract given the time it takes to 
recruit staff and the annual delays to the budget release can mean that contracts only run for 
a few months. There was an acceptance that an ability to enter into multi-year contracts 
would be an advantage. Multiyear contracts would also enable hospitals to retain well 
performing staff, rather than annually embarking on a lengthy recruitment process.  Pressure 
within the FHD does exist to facilitate multi-year contracts, but procedural difficulties and 
administrative unwillingness prevent progress.  
 
“Lots of advocacy was done to do the multiyear contracting and people realize its need also but 
there are other administrative issues. There are some clauses that if they work more than this 
many years they have to be made permanent, so financial department [MoF] is not ready to 
make multiyear contract.” (CI3) 
Quality and availability of equipment and supplies 
Quality of CEONC equipment and supplies 
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The central level interviewees made the point that grants of 1,000,000 NPR (~£6,600) are 
allocated to districts accessing the CEONC fund for the first time to purchase CEONC 
equipment, such as OT tables, lamps and delivery beds. A further budget of 300,000NPR 
(~£1,950) to maintain the equipment is also made. However, in 2015 the MoF cut the 
equipment budget by 300,000NPR.  
“Now we don't have this 3 lakh17 extra fund for CEONC because fund is very low, so, only CEONC 
new site will be given 10 lakh, this year no extra money, suppose if a OT bulb is fused the CEONC 
will stop because OT bulb is very costly.” (CI1) 
Procurement 
The point was made that initially the procurement budget was held by the FHD but inefficient 
procedures caused it to be delegated in part to districts for the purchase of such items as OT 
tables and lamps.  This delegated authority has not been accompanied by any training in 
procurement and as a result sometimes inappropriate equipment has been bought.  
“in Jumla they got solar lights and they bought few things but they didn't know that small battery 
was needed and once the battery ran out there was no provision for that kind of battery to be 
available in the market” (CI3) 
In-service training, supervision and teamwork 
In-service training of staff 
The intention of the CEONC fund was just to hire already trained staff. A separate training 
budget exists. Interviewees recognised that not all doctors are skilled and confident. The 
solution adopted was to rely on the CEONC mentor to provide training and support to doctors 
to give them confidence to provide caesareans. But this too, they observed, is an inadequate 
solution because of the added burden it imposes on a single person.  
Supervision 
There was a recognition that there is little investment in management training or leadership 
development. As a result, there is neither the individual nor collective understanding of the 
role of the manager, nor a sufficiently robust management and accountability system to hold 
people to account for the delivery of services. 
“It’s more a system question, does the person have the reasonable system to work in, does he or 
she have a supervisor, who knows who cares, who gives feedback , you know for us one of the 
thing is…Is there a definition of what you are supposed to do so, this thing of what we called the 
minimum service standard which we think at very least provides a report card that says this is 
what you should do” CI5.  
Teamwork and staff attitudes 
For the system to function effectively the central interviewees recognised that teamwork and 
positive staff attitudes should exist in hospitals. Where there is a progressive MeSu and/or 
HDC acting as a local adaptive agent this will occur but this approach is not universal. 
 
17 lakh is a unit in the Nepali numbering system equal to one hundred thousand 
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Interviewees recognised that where there is a strong leader and a committed team, this 
makes a substantial difference to the performance of the facility.  
“It makes lots of difference on the managers role and definitely, the team if the team is 
committed, and if they can, if they have the attitude of saying ok, I need to do it I have to do it 
and it’s my responsibility and accountability towards what they are doing, I think that would 
definitely make a lot of differences.”(CI4) 
Managerial style, monitoring and leadership 
Interaction and communication 
There is a complex relationship at district level between the DHO/DPHO and the MeSu which 
depends on the size of the hospital and the relative seniority of the DHO/DPHO and the 
experience and ability of the MeSu. This complex relationship stems from an administrative 
arrangement for overall funding for hospitals established by the DoHS. Some hospitals are 
under the MeSu (if it is above 50 beds) and some are under the DHO. If the hospital is under 
the MeSu, in these cases there is a DPHO separate from the hospital. In these circumstances, 
whilst the grant from the FHD nominally goes to the DPHO, they do not have any influence 
on how or whether the grant is spent. Conversely if the hospital is under 50 beds and comes 
under the jurisdiction of the DHO, there is greater oversight of the funding, but this does not 
necessarily lead to improved service numbers. There are several examples of conflict between 
the DHO/DPHO and the district hospitals where improved clarity of roles and responsibilities 
would be beneficial.  
“In Sagarmatha there is a very good DPHO, but he says I cannot do anything it’s not in my hand. 
He has given up.”(CI4) 
Setting of targets and monitoring of performance 
The overall targets for the health system are set through the NHSS. However, individual 
targets for district hospitals based on local circumstances are not available. Monitoring of 
hospital performance is seen as a crucial task of both the FHD and the DHO/DPHOs. The 
central interviewee perception is that the DHO/DPHOs should be responsible for monitoring 
the CEONC fund and services, although this runs contrary to the perceptions of the 
DHO/DPHOs in the case study districts. DHO/DPHOs should monitor performance against 
objectives and patient numbers. The FHD should also assess if activities are carried out on 
time. The FHD also has a responsibility to monitor patient satisfaction and whether the service 
is meeting patient needs. In practice, neither of these DHO/DPHO or the FHD are adequately 
performing these functions. There is little or no linkage between the service monitoring and 
the monitoring of the finances and little follow up to establish if grants are awarded what 
services result (and it can happen that grants can be made for several years but with no 
service resulting). 
“In Tanahun and Syangja since 3-4 years we always put money but they didn’t start services.” CI6 
Leadership, managerial support and teambuilding  
Leadership at the district level and the strength of both the DHO/DPHO and the MeSu are 
recognised as important factors in the delivery of CEONC services. The manager’s skill, 
attitude and leadership are important and can influence the ability of the team to deliver. No 
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matter how good the team is, if the manager is poor, services will be negatively impacted as 
so much comes under the control of the manager. Leadership is perceived to be the key thing 
in the Nepali context which really makes a difference in utilisation of services.  
“It worked very well in Gulmi for example where the doctor was dynamic, the local Medical 
superintendent was co-operative and the population was generally progressive. They went from 
0 to 80 C-section within a few years with doctor getting there. They tripled the number of 
patients from 15 thousands to 45 thousands.” CI5 
A feature of leadership is a recognition of the dynamics of the team and its composition. In 
some circumstances having multiple doctors on a CEONC team can cause friction and this 
needs to be managed.   
 
Relationship with the FHD 
Leadership for the programme at the central level is with the FHD. However, they oversee 89 
different programmes, of which CEONC is just one. The FHD themselves have capacity issues 
which mean that certain crucial roles are either not undertaken, not undertaken by people 
with the relevant skill set or are undertaken by externally funded consultants, such as the 
CEONC mentor and therefore potentially transient depending on the will of external donors 
to continue funding.  
The CEONC mentor provides the main monitoring role of the programme on behalf of the 
FHD. However, despite travelling almost every week, he alone is unable to cover all the 
districts, especially with the planned expansion to all 75 districts. The CEONC mentor will 
monitor the whole hospital, including the operating theatre, the labour room, the ward, the 
availability of equipment and supplies, the use of appropriate clinical tools. The mentor will 
also meet with staff and identify issues with delivery of the programme including whether the 
team is capable of utilising the grant money. If required, he will also provide training and 
advice. However, the FHD recognise that now there are so many districts receiving the grant 
just one mentor may no longer be feasible.  
“The CEONC mentor is very necessary but currently only one person. Now there are 65 districts it 
is very difficult to manage all those places. There needs to be two more mentors I think dividing 
all the districts between them and having responsibility for monitoring, skills building, and 
generally supporting the districts.  There needs to be central level supervision.” CI3 
Relationship with the community 
The central interviewees acknowledged that the relationship with the community can have 
an impact on the delivery of CEONC services. In some districts, they accepted that clinical staff 
feel insecure in delivering services as the community can be aggressive and even violent, 
particularly if there has been a death as a result of a complicated delivery. The doctors may 
refuse to undertake any caesareans for fear of repercussions from the community. 
“In the Arghakhanchi community is violent so they are afraid there after death of PPH [post-
partum haemorrhage] case, they were not doing caesarean till 8 month though doctors were 
available.” CI1 
The CEONC mentor, as part of his role, has tried to mediate in areas where there are poor 
relationships with the community. He has supported meetings between the hospital 
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manager, the chief district officer and the military and provided information to key 
stakeholders and the media as an advocate for CEONC services.   
Oversight by HDC 
The hospital development committee is perceived to have a pivotal role in the continuity of 
services at district level but how they exercise that role is mixed. Where the HDC is active and 
engaged and there is good leadership they actively seek alternative sources of funding to 
continue financing services whilst awaiting budget release. Whilst some hospitals have strong 
committees, often they are weak, and can in some circumstances have a detrimental effect 
on service provision.  
A key challenge is that many of the HDCs, whilst empowered to manage hospitals are not 
populated by people who have the appropriate skills and expertise. There is no common 
definition or tools that set the standard for how the facility should be managed. A view was 
expressed by a central interviewee that because their role is so crucial in creating the enabling 
environment for service providers the capacity of the HDCs should be developed. 
Financial oversight 
Budgeting and the CEONC fund 
The central interviewees explained that the majority of the CEONC fund is provided by the 
government (although the budget in some years has been topped up by bilateral agencies 
such as the Department for International Development). Overall, the pot of available funding 
is determined by the number of districts in receipt of the fund which has increased year on 
year since its inception in 2008. The budget is developed by the FHD and then this is submitted 
to the MoHP who in turn submit it to the MoF and the NPC. Each year the total envelope for 
the CEONC fund has been increased as the number of service sites has expanded, although 
the total budgets for individual districts may have actually decreased. The exception was 2015 
when the budget was cut to divert money to the earthquake relief.  
There are several key challenges experienced by the FHD with this approach that indicate the 
complexity of the system. Firstly, the MoF can limit the budget that gets allocated for the 
CEONC budget, and they do this based on expenditure in past years. However, as the financial 
reports from the districts show, expenditure reporting can be unreliable. Further, this 
approach does not take into account that delayed budget release may have been the reason 
for spending shortfalls. 
“They say that when 2 years back we had Rs.27 thousands budget allocated then Ministry of 
Health was only able to utilize 23 thousands. So, next time when we asked for 35 thousand and 
the MoF said when we gave you 27 you only utilise 23 then why shall I give you 35, I will not give 
you.” CI1 
“Some problems are there because finance allocate budget from July, but we are getting budget 
funds only after 6 months, so for 6 months our programme collapses. The MoF take back the 
money and say you are not utilising. I told them send the money in proper time then it will be 




Secondly, departments of the MoHP have to write and provide documentation on how much 
fund is needed to the MoF via the MoHP. The MoF and MoHP will then call the director and 
programme manager to discuss the budget and funding requirements. If the director cannot 
adequately argue the financing case, the budget can be cut. This can be difficult in an 
environment of frequent HR changes at senior levels in the DoHS and MoHP when 
inexperienced staff are expected to argue the case. 
“All departments write and send documentation on how much budget is needed to the MOF 
through the MoHP. The MoF call the director and programme manager and discuss the need for 
this fund. If you can’t advocate and your explanation isn’t good they can cut the budget. For 
example, this year the budget was 9 crore but after 15 days they cut the budget because the 
director changed and the new director could not adequately advocate to the planning person.” 
CI1  
Thirdly, the budget may be allocated to more districts than is necessary or inappropriate sums 
may be allocated. This is because districts are not consulted and allocations are subject to 
political decision.  
Fourthly, in practice as the evidence from the case studies shows the financial data available 
to the FHD is unreliable, but none of the central interviewees mentioned this. 
The grant allocations to districts are calculated by the FHD after receiving a total budget 
allocation for the year. Distribution is based on the personal knowledge of the needs of the 
district by the CEONC mentor and the buoyancy of the local HR market. 
The central interviewee said that districts may contact those developing the budget in the 
FHD to say that they have specific requirements, but this is ad hoc and there is no formal 
process in place to take into account their requests. Currently, the processes for developing 
the grant allocations are purely input based with no linkage to activity or service provision. 
There is no standardised allocation formula which takes into account, for example, the size of 
the local population or the distance between the birthing centres or health posts and the 
referral facilities. No account is taken of alternative sources of finance such as the hospital 
budget or local HDC funds. 
“we calculate here and on the basis of whether a doctor is available or not similarly anaesthesia 
assistant, OT nurse, peon, lab assistant are there or not on that basis we put money.” (CI6) 
“After getting bulk amount i.e. 9 crore like that then I email the people [in the FHD] who are 
heavily involved for the division of this budget……….they will sit together and display the districts. 
Suppose it is hard to find doctor in Dolpa so put more budget, easy to find doctors in Bhaktapur 
put less budget, equipment and these things they will sit and make the planning.” (CI8)   
Financial management during the year 
Financial management of the fund from the FHD is limited and there is no in-depth monitoring 
of the outputs or outcomes of the programme against financial inputs. Financial monitoring 
is largely done by the State auditor or by Ministry of Finance internal auditors, not by the FHD. 
The MoHP focuses on whether funds have been spent in line with the budget and there is no 
link with the programme aims or objectives.   In practice the CEONC fund is only represented 
by a single line item in the budget and therefore there is no detailed on how the CEONC fund 
is actually being spent (see below section on financial reporting). 
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Originally the concept of the fund was to provide a flexible pot of money that the districts 
could spend in line with their needs. The grant would enable the districts to supplement their 
recurrent budgets through contracting staff without placing an additional financial liability on 
the government’s finances as a result of financing permanent staff. However, due to a 
nervousness about how the funding would be utilised and potentially misused if the districts 
were autonomous increasingly strict implementation guidelines have been developed that 
restrict the districts to purely filling gaps on a pre-determined list of requirements.  
“if you put a kind of flexible fund that’s very good I mean then you would be able to mobilize for 
different things but sometimes it might be misused and now the implementation guideline is also 
quite strict ……. I think the concept was to give that pool of flexible fund so that they can spend 
as they need but I think as I said if a leader is not qualified to be a leader then it makes a lot of 
difference.” (CI4) 
A key challenge to the delivery of the CEONC programme is the delayed release of funds from 
the central level. Several interviewees argued that the solution to limiting the impact of the 
delays in budget release lay not at the central level, but in the districts. Where leadership at 
the district level was strong, the interviewees felt this was a key factor in whether the districts 
would commit their own money to continuing services whilst awaiting the arrival of the funds.  
“if there is very strong people, output oriented people, in the district, they will find ways to 
continue their doctors, nurses and others…..If chief of the hospital is lazy, and budget is not 
coming and thinks why should I take risks.” (CI8) 
The FHD has tried to motivate the districts to spend their own finances to bridge the gap in 
funds distribution, by sending a letter signed by the Director of the FHD to confirm that they 
will be reimbursed for any expenditure they make that would be covered by the grant 
allocation. This has had varied success with some districts accepting the legal basis for the 
letter and others, who are more risk averse, still awaiting the actual transfer of money. This 
delay in release of funds, however, is not restricted to the CEONC programme and the FHD, 
and other programmes and divisions have had more success in encouraging districts to bridge 
the funding gaps. However, not all FHDs have funds available but this appeared not to be 
recognised. 
Financial reporting  
Financial reporting had, prior to the introduction of TABUCS been very unclear. The District 
would send financial reports that aggregated all expenditure within the health sector at 
district level. The programmatic breakdown of expenditure wasn’t visible to the FHD, despite 
them financing various activities. However, the FHD has made little attempt to understand 
expenditure against the fund. No separate reporting mechanism was implemented when the 
fund was established in 2008 that could track expenditure. A financial reporting mechanism 
was only initiated in July 2014 and at the point of data collection, not all districts were 
reporting their expenditure and no one in the FHD had been allocated responsibility for this 
process.  TABUCS is a new financial accounting system being introduced across the health 
sector. This system will at least detail expenditure against the CEONC fund as an individual 
line item (although it is not possible to break this down further to identify what funds have 
been spent on HR, infrastructure, equipment and supplies etc.). However, the system is new 
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and not everyone understands it and can confuse spending on CEONC activity with spending 
from other funds.  
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Appendix 7: Overview of structure of the health system in 
Nepal (pre-federalism) 
This appendix gives a brief overview of the structure of the health system in Nepal to aid the 
reader to understand the context in which CEONC services are delivered.  Nepal has recently 
undergone a move towards a federalised system of government.  As the research was 
undertaken pre-federalisation, this appendix describes the health and administrative system 
at the time of the research i.e. pre-federalism. It is not intended as a complete and thorough 
analysis of the Nepal health system.    
Development Context of Nepal 
Nepal is an economically poor country.  On the Human Development Index (HDI) (a metric 
developed by the UN to assess the social and economic development levels of countries) 
Nepal has a score of 0.548 (in contrast, Norway at the top of the index has a score of 0.944).  
This means it ranks 145 among 188 countries for HDI, the same level as Kenya and slightly 
above Pakistan, Myanmar and Angola (UNDP, 2015).  Nepal has a population of nearly 28.17 
million, nearly 83% of whom live in rural areas and over 25% of the population live below the 
poverty line (World Bank, 2015; Bhattarai et al, 2008).  
Administrative organisation of Nepal and its healthcare context 
Administratively, Nepal is divided into 75 districts. The districts are regrouped into 14 
administrative Zones and the Zones are further regrouped into 5 Developmental Regions; 
Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western and Far-western (See below map) (Rai et al, 2001).   
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Health policy environment in Nepal 
The current health policy environment in Nepal is framed by its commitments to delivering 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the MDGs and looking forward to the SDGs.  Guided by 
both the National Health Policy of 1991 and the Second Long Term Health Plan 1997-2017, 
the government put in place the first Nepal Health Sector Programme (NHSP-I) as its 
implementation plan for the period 2005 - 2010. The second sector programme for the period 
2010-2015 (NHSP-II) was largely seen as an extension of the previous one, however, with 
greater emphasis on partnerships, local governance, decentralized service delivery and 
equitable access to essential health care services including maternal health services.  A new 
strategy, the Nepal Health Sector Strategy (2015-2020) (NHSS) has recently been completed 
after an extensive series of consultations with a wide variety of stakeholders at all levels of 
the health system.   
 
MNH remains a prominent part of NHSS with two of the eleven key targets measuring the 
maternal mortality ratio and the neonatal mortality rate (MoHP, 2015a).  NHSS also 
establishes the aim for all 75 districts to have at least one CEONC site by 2018 (ibid). However, 
continuing challenges are recognised in the NHSS that need to be addressed and that have a 
direct impact on the ability of women to access CEONC services. There are wide variations in 
health service availability, utilisation and health status across different socio-economic and 
geographical population groups, indicating the challenge of access and equity (ibid). This 
stems from a variety of reasons, but prominently the persistently inequitable distribution of 
the health workforce with about half concentrated in the central region, dropping to just 7% 
in the far-western region (ibid).  
 
There is also a critical need for improvements in the financing of health facilities including to 
grant distribution mechanisms, the timely disbursement of grants, improvements in financial 
management systems at all levels (including the training of all officials contributing to the 
information contained in the financial management system), and in the strengthening of 
procurement systems at central and district levels (Tiwari et al, 2011). The MoHP’s ability to 
address financial management concerns is hampered by the existence of different financing 
arrangements for different aspects of health expenditure, by late settlement of budgetary 
allocations, lack of coherent information about actual spending by hospitals, by the existence 
of off-budget and off programme funding (i.e. funds that are not reported or run through the 
official government budget management system such as those that are funded directly by 
donor agencies), and weak forecasting of external assistance by development partners (ibid). 
The implementation of reforms to improve financial arrangements have become bound up 
with political discussions about the introduction of a federal structure for the state. NHSS is 
designed to accommodate this. Restructuring covers decentralisation and strengthening local 
health governance, and defines the health sector roles of central, regional (or provincial) and 
local tiers of the government. The aim is to secure marked improvements in the health and 




Structure, financing and human resource management 
Structure 
The government health service operates at national, regional, zonal, district levels and below 
(e.g. primary healthcare centres, health posts, sub health posts), as well as at community level 
(NHSSP, 2012). The health system is highly centralized with major policy decisions regarding 
planning and financing taken at central level (Dhakal et al, 2009). The MoHP has ultimate 
responsibility for the oversight, governance and policy environment under which the health 
system operates (MoHP, 2014). The Department of Health Services (DoHS) is a department 
of the MoHP and is responsible for delivering preventive and curative health services 
throughout Nepal and the promotion of health services. Within the DoHS, the Family Health 
Division (FHD) has responsibility for overseeing the provision of maternal and newborn care 
services (DoHS, 2014).  At the district level, depending on the size of the district hospital, 
responsibility for all health activities including the organization and management of district 
hospitals, PHCCs, HPs and SHPs lies with either the District Health Offices (DHO) (if the 
hospital is a 15 or 25 bed facility) or the District Public Health Offices (DPHO) (if the hospital 
is a 50-bed facility). The DHO/DPHO has responsibility for administration of the budget and 
human resources, planning, monitoring and evaluation of district health service activities and 
supervision of health facilities activities and the activities of the peripheral health staff.   There 
are 55 DHOs (often physically located at the hospital) and 20 DPHOs (often situated separately 
from the hospital) (DoHS, 2014).  The DPHO has less direct management responsibility for the 
hospital. The below table shows the number of public hospitals, PHCCs, HPs and SHPs 
providing health services.  
 
Type, Function and Number of Public Health Facilities 
Type of facility Function 2014 
Central, Regional and sub-regional 
level hospitals  
Provide tertiary care services. These hospitals 
provide a wide range of curative services 
through a variety of health-workers, 
physicians and specialists in particular. These 
are located in cities and the majority of them 
are in Kathmandu. There are specialty 
hospitals for heart disease, mental illness, 
maternity hospital, tropical and infectious 
disease, and children’s diseases. 
13 
Zonal and District hospitals These hospitals are located in cities and 
provide in-patient and laboratory services for 
secondary care. The district and zonal 
hospitals have at least 25 beds and are staffed 
with “upper-level” health workers i.e. one 
specialist and three medical officers along 
with staff nurses and paramedics. They 
should provide CEONC services 24/7 
10 Zonal 
65 District 
Primary Health Care Centres PHCCs offer primary care services including 
BEONC and are staffed by “upper level 




and “mid-level” health workers i.e. Health 
Assistant, Auxiliary Nurse Midwife and 
Auxiliary Health Worker. 
Health Posts and Sub-Health Posts  SHPs serve as referral centres for community 
based services. SHPs and HPs have birthing 
centres; HPs monitor the activities of the 
SHPs in their geographic area in addition to 
offering services available in the SHPs. The 
HPs are staffed by “mid-level” health workers 
Health Assistants, Auxilliary Nurse 
Midwives/Mother and Child Health Worker 
and Auxillary Health Workiers. 
3805 
Source: DoHS, Annual Report, 2014/15  
 
The SHP and HP are the first contact points for basic health service, as well as the point for 
community-based activities, such as outreach clinics and immunisation programmes. 
Referrals are made to each level above the SHP and HP, to PHCC, and to district, zonal and 
regional hospitals, and to specialty tertiary care centres in Kathmandu. Logistical, financial, 
supervisory, and technical support is provided from the centre to the periphery (NHSSP, 
2012).   
 
PHCCs, HPs and SHPs provide preventive and basic primary care at the village level (Bhusal et 
al, 2013). Hospitals provide secondary and tertiary care services with inpatient services in 
addition to primary care (Bhusal et al 2013). For the majority of districts, the district hospital 
is the focal delivery point for CEONC services, although CEONC service may also be delivered 
through zonal and regional hospitals, which have a greater allocation of budget and human 
resources. District hospitals are mostly 25-bed facilities, however recently several district 
hospitals have been upgraded to 50 bed hospitals. 25 bed hospitals fall under the 
management of the district health office and 50 bed hospitals are more autonomous.   
 
Financing 
Facilities are financed by a variety of mechanisms. These are principally by government; 
private (i.e. households and individuals) through out-of-pocket expenditure in the form of 
user fees or payment for non-government subsidised drugs at hospital run pharmacies; and 
financial support from foreign sources (to both the public and private sector) through foreign 
aid budgets (Uprety et al, 2016). Out-of-pocket expenditure is the largest source of funding 
in Nepal, followed by government expenditure (ibid). The figure below shows the variety of 




Financing mechanisms for government health facilities in Nepal 
 




Fee for services: healthworkers and 
hospitals are paid for each service. 
Cash transfers to patients: retrospective 
payments made to users to  compensate them for 
transportation costs incurred when seeking care; 
(b) subsidise a specific objective, such as 
nutritional support for tuberculosis patients; or (c) 
simply incentivise the use of health services. This 
method does not constitute a provider payment 
mechanism, as it is paid to users not health service 
providers. 
Population-specfic case payment: retrospective 
extra budget allocation linked to services provided 
to specific pre-determined groups within the 
population. It can be used to pay for the treatment 
of certain conditions, e.g. in citizens above 75 
years of age. Expected reimbursements per case 
are not known in advance by health facilities, as 
the discount applied to patients may vary from 
case to caseTop up grants: prospective input-based 
specific grants .  Often focussed on high 
priority programmes such as safe 
motherhood.  Not linked to performance. 
The CEONC fund is such a grant.  
Line Item Budgeting: Prospective input-based 
resource allocation. health facilities receive 
resources to fund their inputs, including 
operational costs in advance. Not linked to 
performance.  mainly based on last years 
budget adjusted by a percentage
Disease specific case payment: budget 
allocations for specific diseases can be made in 
addition to the budget provided under line items. 
expected reimbursements per case are known in 
advance by the health facility. the Safe 
Motherhood Programme  is one such scheme.  
the annual budget is allocated based on 
forecasted outputs and then the services are 
provided. At the end of the  fiscal year, 
adjustments are made depending on whether the 
allocated resources fall short or exceed the total 
output delivered by the provider. 
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There are no charges for BEONC or CEONC services: all such services are provided free at point 
of use. In terms of planning and budgeting, the government of Nepal works on an annual 
budgeting process.  Under this system, public sector budgets are prepared annually, cover 
one year, are approved by the Parliament every year, and are executed over a one year 
period.  Within the health sector, the MoHP’s Policy, Planning and International Cooperation 
Division (PPICD) is responsible for the entire planning process. Many actors are engaged in 
the budget development and sign off process and it takes a period of at least seven months 
from initiation to completion (MoHP and NHSSP, 2015). The typical process and timeline is 































Budget Development and Authorisation to spend process and timeline
 
MoHP should then provide the authorisation to its dpeartments within 15 days and departments should do the same 
to their cost centres within another 15 days after receigin authorisation to spend from MoHP (July / August)
Within a week of the budget speech the MoF should provide the expenditure authorisation to the MoHP (July)
Parliament endorses the budget of the coming fiscal year  (June/July)
The MoF announces the AWPB publicly through the budget speech and submits the final version to Parliament for 
endorsement (June)
The MoF compiles the sectoral budget and prepares the national budget with policy and programmes - this is called 
the annual workplan and budget (AWPB) or "the red book" (May)
MoF calls PPICD chief and concerned officials to discuss item-wise justifications on their planned budgeted 
amounts/budget lines . Selective cuts and adjustments may be made to the budget by the MoF. This may result in 
the deletion of important activities  if it is done by MoF alone without consulting concerned MoHP officials. (May)
NPC submits the agreed formats to MoF (April)
The NPC  discusses with MoHP officials e.g. director general and departmental, divisional and centre directors, along 
with the and the planning and finance unit as when required. The NPC seeks justifications for selected items and may 
suggest adjustments if it is not satisfied with the justifications. (March)
PPICD's Planning Unit reviews them, consults concerned authorities, corrects and inconsistencies and 
inappropriateness of the contents and compiles them together to send to the National Planning Commission (NPC) 
(March)
PPICD collects completed planning and budgeting formats prepared by all departments, divisions, centres and 
central hospitals  (March)
All MoHP’s divisions/centres and other entities prepare their annual workplan and budget (AWPBs) based on their 
priorities in the previous year’s budget. (March)
The Policy, Planning and International Cooperation Division (PPICD) of MoHP then allocates a budget ceiling to all its 
divisions and centres based on priority programmes, the previous year’s budget, programme performance and actual 
expenditure.  (January/February)







Source: MoHP AND NHSSP, 2015 
 
For the district hospitals, their routine budgets are compiled and submitted through the 
District Development Committees (DDCs).  The DDCs are responsible for the development of 
budgets across all sectors, not just health (Sigdel, 2014).  In theory, the health office in a 
district should make its plan according to the directives issued by the MoHP and forward it to 
the DDC and the concerned division or department of the ministry (ibid).  The table below 
shows the intended schedule of the district level planning and budget preparation process 
(this is rarely adhered to).  
 
Schedule of district level plan and budget preparation 
Date  Activities  Responsible authority  
First week of November  Budget formulation guidelines 
and limitations sent to DDCs. 
Budget preparation started 
based on last year budget and 
need.  
NPC/Ministry of Federal Affairs 
and Local Development 
(MoFALD)  
First week of December  Ministry-wise guidelines sent to 
DDCs  
NPC/MoFALD/MoHP  
Second week of February  District-based budgets and 
programmes of line ministries 
prepared and submitted by 
district councils  
DDC  
First week of March  District programmes and 
budgets are sent in stipulated 
format to the NPC/MoFALD  
DDC  
Source: NHSSP and MoHP (2015) 
 
However, in practice, there are several challenges to the budget preparation and 
implementation process in general. Firstly, annual plans and budgets that are developed by 
the DDCs are submitted directly to the NPC and hardly ever reach the MoHP (NHSSP and 
MoHP, 2015). This can result in less funding for the health sector due to the limited technical 
knowledge of the health sector within the DDCs and more pressure for other projects such as 
infrastructure (ibid). Indeed, discrepancies between the local-level budgetary demands and 
the allocation of the approved budget shows that central level institutions significantly govern 
the budget making process (Sigdel, 2014). Secondly, the entire budget cycle consists of budget 
formulation, budget approval, budget implementation and budget evaluation. As all of the 
processes are linked any delay in one phase affects the other.  Further, in Nepal, the various 
process overlap.   
 
Action of the MoHP
Action of the Departments and Divisions of the MoHP
Action of the National Planning Commission




This means that by the start of the fiscal year (mid-July) it is unlikely that Parliament has 
approved the budget; therefore the budget cannot begin to be implemented until at least 
September each year, if not later (ibid).  The below table shows the date the budgets were 
submitted for approval to Parliament and the date they were approved from 2006 to 2013.  
This demonstrates part one of the “bottlenecks” experienced by the facilities in receiving 
funds as the CEONC fund is only released after the budget has been approved by Parliament.   
 
Difference between date of budget submitted and approved in the Parliament 
Fiscal year  Date budget submitted to 
Parliament  
Date budget approved by 
Parliament  
2006/07  July 12, 2006  August 23, 2006  
2007/08  July12, 2007  August 8, 2007  
2008/09  July 14, 2008  November 1, 2008  
2009/10  July 13, 2009  November 10, 2009  
2010/11  July 12, 2010  February 8, 2011  
2011/12  July 15, 2011  September 20, 2011  
2012/13  July 15, 2012  April 9, 2013  
Source: Sigdel, 2014 
 
Human Resources 
Whilst there is an increasing number of medical staff being trained, shortages of generalists 
and specialist physicians and nurses persist in the public sector, district hospitals and PHCCs 
in particular. Only about 9% of the doctors (generalists and specialists) are located in district 
hospitals while the majority are located in central hospitals (NHSSP, 2013).  
  
In its workforce planning the MoHP allocates a certain number of permanent positions 
(sanctioned posts) across each cadre of medical staff to each type of facility.  However, the 
numbers of sanctioned posts per facility are still based on the 1991 Health Policy, despite the 
fact that the population has increased by 45% since 1991 (Shrestha et al, 2012).   
  
The Civil Service Act 1993 and the Nepal Health Service Act 1997 specify the rules and 
regulations for permanent and temporary contracts in the health sector. The Public Service 
Commission (PSC) is responsible for the permanent recruitment while the MoHP and its 
departments have the authority for appointing contract staffs. The majority of the public 
health workforce positions are “sanctioned” posts (over 80%) while the rest of the public 
health workforce is hired on contract (NHSSP, 2013).  
  
The recruitment process in the public sector is long and complicated, requiring multiple levels 
of authorisation. As a result only about 50% of sanctioned posts for doctors and nurses were 
filled in district hospitals in 2012 (ibid).   To compensate, health workers can be hired locally 
on temporary, contract or daily wage appointments.  The ability of district hospitals to appoint 
temporary staff is affected by the budgetary allocations to hospitals and for CEONC services 
the specific CEONC fund allocations to hospitals (as well of course of the quality of the local 
contract market).  
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The Health Service Act specifies regulations for the transfer management system of the health 
workforce, according to which employees can be transferred after they have worked in a 
remote area for two years or in the most remote area for a year. Transfers are made by the 
MoHP and in making those transfers consultation does not always occur with the district 
hospital affected.  As a result, staff vacancies emerge which then can be difficult for the local 
hospital to fill, especially if there is only a limited local market in health professionals.  In 
actual practice some staff transfers are based on political influence (ibid).  
 
Additionally, local management does not have the authority to recruit or dismiss permanent 
staff which is the prerogative of the MoHP at the central or regional level (ibid). This makes 
the development of a local HR policy difficult to achieve.  
  
The National Health Training Center (NHTC) is responsible for developing and providing in-
service training. However, management of the training and selection of the most appropriate 
personnel for training has been a challenge. Whilst the government is committed to providing 
in-service training to staff and has allocated financial and human resources for the purpose, 
most of the training is supply driven as opposed to by organizational or individual needs. 
Additionally, there is no training program on management, human resources, data 




Appendix 8: Summary of Selected International Hospital 
Financing Mechanisms 
 
This appendix gives a brief summary of a selection of hospital financing mechanisms to aid 
the reader to understand the nature of the CEONC fund as a financing mechanism. It is not 
intended as a complete and thorough analysis of all financing mechanisms.    
 
Setting the healthcare budget 
Globally, various mechanisms are employed to finance health care facilities. According to 
Mossialos et al. (2002) there are basically five forms of health financing available to any 
country. These are taxation; social health insurance; voluntary and private insurance; out-of-
pocket or cash-and-carry; and donations. Which is the predominant source of funding 
depends upon the circumstances prevailing in different countries. However, in many 
countries the principle source of funding is tax based national government budgetary funds 
or funds generated from specific health taxes (Hepworth, 1984; Bennet et al, 2001; Mossialos 
et al, 2002). These are then allocated to the providers of medical services in a variety of ways 
depending upon the circumstances and traditions prevailing in a particular country, including 
who is responsible for actual medical service provision.   
 
Where health care facilities are treated as part of the national budget (as in Nepal, although 
there are some private hospitals) those responsible for preparing the budgets (which would 
be a ministry and not the actual health facilities themselves) will be expected to conform to 
the budget rules and timetable and be subject to the overall budgetary constraints including 
the political priorities of the government. This may mean that restrictions could be imposed 
on how budgetary allocations are spent, e.g. funds included in the health care facilities budget 
for staffing may not be allocated for other purposes. Other restrictions may also apply, 
particularly over procurement. This means that on the allocation of budget funds to health 
care facilities the discretion of the management of those facilities is limited.   
 
Exactly how the national healthcare budget is prepared will depend upon local arrangements. 
These arrangements may be ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom up’. If the former the appropriate ministry 
will determine the share of available funds that is to the allocated to the different types of 
health facility within an overall total or ceiling that may be set by the government for all 
healthcare activity with that ceiling depending upon the government’s political priorities. If 
the latter, then the likelihood is that individual health facilities will be asked to prepare draft 
budgets for submission to the central ministry who will amalgamate them and either accept 
them or modify them as part of its budget preparation for negotiation with the ministry of 
finance (Boadway et al, 2007). Either way a key factor in determining the totality of the 
healthcare budget will be the previous year’s spending plus an allowance for inflation.  
However, that budget should also take into account demographic changes, changes in 
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government priorities and any other factors that are likely to influence the overall total (e.g. 
the consequences of meeting the millennium development goals). 
 
The outcome of the negotiations with the ministry of finance will then determine what actual 
funding will be available to individual health facilities and may also determine any restrictions 
about how such funds may be used. 
 
Once a national health budget has been determined a process will need to be established to 
allocate this budget over the different health facilities. This will be via some form of grant 
mechanism (specific or general grants). Some grant arrangements limit the flexibility of the 
recipient in how they use the funds (e.g. for investment purposes only) or they may leave all 
decisions about the utilisation of funds entirely to the recipient of those funds (Ensor et al, 
2009; Sutherland, 2011; Witter, 2012; Mathauera et al 2013; Palmer et al, 2013; Financial and 
Fiscal Division, 2014). Some funding may also be ‘ring-fenced’ so that it can only be used for 
specific purposes, such as for the development of obstetric care. 
 
Where health care facilities are funded direct from budgetary funds, whatever the 
distribution mechanism, these central funds can be, and often are, inadequate to meet the 
totality of health care needs and they are often supplemented in a variety of ways such as 
from user fees, fees for drugs, attendance fees and so on. In addition, hospitals may also be 
supported from local or regional government resources such as local taxes, and foreign aid 
support (Witter, 2012).  
 
Grant mechanisms distributing budget funds to other public institutions 
Different types of grant mechanism can be employed to allocate funds to individual health 
facilities or any other type of public organisation. For health facilities, only in some special 
circumstances would a central ministry seek to control directly how a facility actually 
managed its budgets.   
 
Grant mechanisms have the advantage that they involve less central government involvement 
in the management process, even though the grant arrangements may impose limitations in 
how grant aid may be spent. There are two broad types of grant aid, general and specific 
grants.   
 
A general grant is usually made available to a local or regional government or hospital or other 
type of public organisation to assist with the finance of its overall operations. Such a grant is 
not tied to any specific activity but can be used for any operational public purpose of the 
supported organisation (CIPFA, 2014).  
 
General grants often contain two elements.  One element may be used to equalise financial 
resources of public organisations and a second element may be used to provide financial 
support to meet their overall outgoings. The equalisation element usually is applied where 
public organisations have a significant proportion of ‘own resources’. Both elements leave an 
247 
 
organisation to decide how to allocate funds, subject to any additional conditions which may 
be attached to the grant aid. This form of grant can have managerial and political advantages 
to the recipient public organisation but has the problem of how to devise the allocation 
formula, which in turn has managerial and political consequences for the central government. 
(With all grant arrangements there is the possibility of political involvement in the distribution 
process with the aim of favouring particular groups and only a strong civil society and 
parliamentary process can diminish the impact of this (Hepworth, 1984; Mossialos et al, 2002; 
Mathauer et al, 2013). General grant distribution formulae often use regression analysis to 
determine the distribution arrangements and in determining that formula governments often 
seek to agree the arrangements with representatives of the recipient organisations. However, 
sometimes general grants, along with specific grants are distributed as a percentage of 
approved expenditure. This then requires the government to become much more involved in 
operational managerial decisions. General grant funds may be used for supporting the 
financing of current and investment costs.  
 
The term “specific grants” describes government grants, including supplementary and special 
grants, to local or regional governments, hospitals or other organisations. Such grants are 
usually made by the relevant  ministry depending upon the purpose of the grant (Hepworth, 
1984; Mossialos et al, 2002). Specific grants can only be used for a particular purpose specified 
in the grant arrangement. They cannot be used in aid of expenditure generally (unlike a 
general grant). They can be either percentage grants or unit grants, i.e. represent a specified 
percentage of expenditure (in which event they are often accompanied by other operational 
conditions). If a unit grant they usually represent a sum payable to support a particular unit 
of activity (such as per patient or per patient of a particular type) and the cost of the unit will 
be centrally determined. Specific grants give much less managerial freedom than general 
grants. A variation in the arrangements for the distribution of specific grants is that they can 
be distributed following some form of ‘bidding’ process, whereby public organisations make 
bids to central government which then allocates funds on the basis of the ‘quality’ of those 
bids. 
 
Specific grants may be towards funding current expenditures, or specific items of 
expenditure, or for funding investment expenditure.  (Hepworth, 1984; CIPFA, 2014) With all 
specific grants, no matter how constructed, the recipient organisation is usually expected to 
account for how it has used the funds and an external auditor is asked to verify these 
accounts.  With general grants the recipients are also usually expected to adhere to high 
standards of accountability (Boadway et al, 2007).  
 
The factors in the formulae for distributing any kind of grant can include general factors like 
population or numbers of children and old people, or sparsity or density or they can include 
factors which are specific to a particular service, such as diagnosis related groups (used in 




All of the arrangements for distributing grants have both advantages and disadvantages 
(O’Reilly, et al 2012; Mathauer et al, 2013). For example, specific grants allocated as a 
percentage of expenditure tend to encourage expenditure by the recipient at the expense of 
the central government thus causing the central government over time to start to impose 
restrictions on its usage. Unit grants depend upon the development of an appropriate costing 
arrangement and at best unit based grants can only be distributed on the basis of average 
unit costs (unless there is some particular reason not to do so) and wherever averages are 
used there will be those that gain and those that lose (Mossialos et al, 2002; Mathauer et al, 
2013).  A formula based grant depends upon the accuracy of the statistics which underpin the 
formula and the relationship between the formula and incidence of expenditure. Where the 
allocation is based upon ‘bids’, the ‘fairness’ of the distribution depends upon the total sum 
available and the ability of organisations to compile an effective bid (Hepworth, 1984; 
Mossialos et al, 2002; Mathauer et al, 2013).     
 
However, apart from these different types of grant ad hoc arrangements may be made which 
fit into none of these categories and grant allocations can be made on a purely subjective 
basis.  This ad hoc approach generates its own difficulties and not the least of these tends to 
be instability from one year to the next in the volume of funds available to a particular 
beneficiary.  
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Appendix 9: Table of Included Literature 
Quality assessment tool: 
Mixed methods studies:  Tool: MMAT - Scores were awarded Low, Medium and High.  Low indicates passed screening but responses were no or can’t tell to the 
mixed methods category and the criteria for both the qualitative and quantitative components; Medium indicates responses were yes to the mixed methods 
category and to some of either the qualitative and quantitative components, with the remaining as no or can’t tell; High indicates responses were yes to the mixed 
methods category and to the majority of the criteria for both the qualitative and quantitative components 
Qualitative studies: Tool: CASP qualitative – Scores were awarded Low, Medium and High. Low indicates answered no or can’t tell to 8 or more CASP questions; 
Medium indicates answered no or can’t tell to 4-7 questions; High indicates answered Yes to almost all the questions.  
Quantitative studies: Tool: MMAT, quantitative components – Scores were awarded Low, Medium and High. Low indicates passed screening but responses were 
no or can’t tell to the quantitative component questions; Medium indicates answers were no or can’t tell to 3/5 questions; High indicates answered Yes to almost 
all the questions.  
 
Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 









styles in two 
Ghanaian 





ethnographic study  
High  Power is core to determining the style of leadership that managers 
can exercise in public health care institutions 
 
National and health policies should aim at giving hospital 
managers more power and autonomy in making decisions on 
critical resources including the right workforce mix, infrastructure 
development, drugs, medical supplies and equipment 
 
Adequate resources and financial support should be provided to 
boost managers’ capacity to meet workers and hospitals’ needs. 
 
Leadership styles impact staff motivation which in turn impacts 
quality of care and a hospital’s reputation.  
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 




Macq, J; Buve, 























case study, Mixed 
methods 
High routine monitoring of the interface by managers of general health 
services and of programmes will provide avenues for optimizing 
the interaction between programmes and general health services 
by proactively searching and seizing all opportunities 
 
Well-managed DHs perform better in terms of tuberculosis control 
compared with those that are not well managed. Hospitals that 
function well with regard to their three dimensions (spatial, 
managerial, and technical) also have better tuberculosis control 
outputs. 
 


























observations and a 
review of 
High poor staff attitudes led to low quality of care and services, which 
was not accepted by the community. People stayed away and the 
subsequent weak revenue generation tied the hands of the 
management team. Inadequate maintenance further strained the 
already poor infrastructure. This all resulted in an organisational 
culture of fatalism, 
 
HiCom management can contribute to better performance. The 
hospital management team at Ho incorporated a balanced 
administrative and commitment- eliciting HR strategy within an 
overall change strategy. By triggering mechanisms of staff 
 251 
Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 
routine health 
information. 
participation, empowerment and reciprocity, it instigated a U-turn 




Luke M. Funk, 
Dante M. 
Conley,  William 










Africa: A Pilot 





High the hospital with the highest management scores—the mission 
hospital—had the highest surgical volumes per operating room, 
the highest relative number of employees, surgeons, and surgical 
nurses, and no waiting list for essential surgery 

















Medium • Individual interests and capacities of local authorities and 
hospital management are critical in achieving autonomy 
• Even with autonomisation, effective HRM is limited.  
• Autonomisation doesn’t automatically lead to improved 
quality of care and any moves towards this need to ensure 
appropriate statistical measurement and governance to 
prevent abuse of the system.  


























sample of 248 public 
health centres and 
dispensaries in 24 
districts in 2010. 
Data collection 
included surveys 
with in-charges (n = 
248), HFMC 
members 
(n = 464) and facility 
users (n = 698), and 
High Need to ensure that HFMC activities are transparent and members 
are accountable for how they use the money entrusted to them 
include training on financial management and targeted supportive 
supervision. 
 
It is also important for there to be accountability with members of 
the wider community aware of available funds, activities of the 
committee, and how they can air their views and contribute to 
better health services in their communities. 
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 
record reviews. 





















why do some 
hospitals 
achieve better 












High Clear differences in institutional culture emerged between 
hospitals with low case-fatality rates and those with higher rates. 
The differences that affected quality of care were 
primarily in-service training, induction of new staff, attentiveness 
and assiduousness in the performance of tasks, supervision, 
teamwork, and audit and feedback systems, and, in 
these, ward sisters played a key role. Underlying factors were 
differences in leadership and management including teambuilding, 





& Judith Healy 
 
2000 
The role of the 





data from a major 
study undertaken 
by the 
High hospitals are complex human service organizations, and not just 
assemblies of industrial units to be reconfigured at will 
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 


























High Key aspects of leadership style are use of data to improve service 
delivery, supportive leadership, teamwork  
 
strong emphasis on supportive supervision, nurturing relationships 
and in-service training in the successful hospital. 
 
Appropriate use of data helps the better performing facilities to 
understand and monitor programme performance.  This facilitates 
accountability and better use of resources.  
 
hospital performance is often largely attributed to resource 
availability and hardware issues, such as finance, human 
resources, equipment, drugs and supplies; and excludes the 
software aspects (values, trust, power, interrelationships and 
others) 
 
Relationship with central government was not supportive.  
 























Medium a leadership that facilitates openness, risk taking and reflection 
necessary for learning and communicates a compelling vision for 
the organisation creates the environment for establishing strong 
teams and greater accountability to the community 
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 





E., Mbachu, C., 
(...), Molyneux, 








option: The case 
of the basic 
health care 
provision fund 
(BHCPF) in Nigeria   
 
Qualitative: 
National, state and 
LGA level 
respondents were 
interviewed using a 
semi structured tool 
High system-wide approach to strengthening accountability - working 
across all tiers of the health system, engaging multiple actors and 
involving multiple mechanisms.  
 
Strengthening accountability demands action across the system as 
a whole, working with financing, performance and political 
accountability and combining external and internal mechanisms. 
 
It is important to monitor the usage of the Fund at the federal, 
state, and local levels which should be conducted regularly  
Kenya Waweru E, 
Goodman C, 
Kedenge S, Tsofa 


























national, district and 
facility levels, facility 
record reviews, a 
structured exit 
survey and a 
document review 
High finance mechanisms can have a strong and broad positive impact 
on peripheral facilities 
 
facility funds can be overseen and used in a way that strengthens 
transparency and community involvement. 
 
need for clarity in the roles and responsibilities of key actors 
 
There are limits in achievements of one financing intervention in 
the context of wider 
challenges, including an unreliable drug supply, poor access to 
emergency transportation and shortages of qualified staff. 
 
There may be unintended consequences of financing mechanisms 
that need to be explored 






funding as a 




data collection at 30 
public health 
high improved health worker motivation, utilization and quality of care, 
improved utilisation and management of drugs and anecdotally a 
positive impact on funds utilisation. 
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 










with the in-charge, 
record reviews and 
exit interviews. In 
addition, in-depth 
interviews were 
conducted with the 
in-charge 
and HFC members 
at 12 facilities, and 
with district staff 
and other 
stakeholders. 
cases of corruption and misuse of funds were identified at a 
limited number of facilities. Training was reportedly inadequate, 
and no DFF guidelines were available at facility level, leading to 
confusion. 











Eyalc & Bruce 
Hayesa 
 







medium • Bundles of interventions that support doctors in remote 
postings but also focus on performance facilitate retention. 
• Personal attributes of doctors are important. 
 256 
Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 
2016 
 
Nepal R Dhakal,1 S 
Ratanawijitrasi










n in Nepal: an 












observation of six 
health facilities and 




data for this study. 
medium • Overcoming challenges posed by political, legal, financial, 
institutional, administrative and human resource are critical 
for implementation of policy on decentralization in Nepal 

















baseline data and 
interviews.  
medium • need to consider community engagement in health facility 
management 
• Mobilization of local resources by HFOMCs 
• Increased responsiveness and accountability towards the 
community 

















Quantitative: Survey medium • availability of staff, training, competence and confidence in 
performing various services, availability of supplies and 
equipment — can then be tackled by management and 
policies that support service provision 
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 
in-depth look 




















Synthesis.   
Qualitative: case 
studies in the four 
countries, using 




medium Since implementing transformation programs requires changing 
the culture of the system,  
 
the implementation of decentralized programs such as the DSS 
requires disaggregated data in order to ensure an accurate 
monitoring of the progress. 
 
limited participation of communities in implementation of the 
mechanism, weak monitoring activities by the MOE, lack of 
disaggregated education performance indicators for rural and 
urban areas, seemed to undermine the transparency and 



















Mixed: A structured 






and key informant 
interviews  
 
high What are providers perceptions of the fund in relation to quality of 
care, working environment etc.  
What is the awareness of the community of the CEONC Fund and 
transparency of its management 
Is financial information relating to the fund displayed or reported 
anywhere? 
Who are the various actors engaged in managing the fund? 
What is the pattern of expenditure of the fund? 
What is the absorptive capacity of the facilities? 
What is the degree of autonomy that facilities have over the 
budget – is this the right amount? 
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 















data analysis, KAP 




one other state that 
has good flexi-fund 
utilisation 
medium lack of proper training and orientation has aggravated 
underutilization of funds because these funds are considered by 
the new fund managers as ‘government’s money’ and key 
functionaries, especially at the block as well as HSC and VHSC level 
have developed a fear of spending these funds. 
There is no mention of mechanisms for ensuring internal 
accountability for the use of flexifunds from national to sub‐district 
level.  
 
Responsibility has been assigned for each step of the fund flow, 
but there is no mention of how to ensure that people responsible 
are adequately trained and enabled to fulfil their responsibility. 
Nepal Devkota, M., G. 
Shakya, N. 
Pratap K.C., M. 
Dariang, M. T. 
Upadhyay, S. 
Karn, L. Hulton, 

















and OT registers on 
service delivery 
statistics 
medium Unclear lines of responsibility for facility leadership; lack of 
knowledge on funding mechanisms; CEONC readiness impacted by 
intermittent funding flows, understand what makes one facility 
function and another not.  
Kenya Waweru, E, 
Goodman C, 
Kedenge S, 
Tsofa B, and 
















and research studies 
related to HSSF; and 
interviews with key 
stakeholders 
low To run the fund there needs to be a focus on financial 
management and consideration of financial reporting.  
 
How will the CEONC fund be aligned to the devolution process? 
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Country  Author & Year Title Research Method MMAT / 
CASP 
Assessment 
Reflections - these are edited text taken from the papers. 
 





























and focus group 
discussions 
high There were significant improvements in maternal care between 
1998 and 2008 but these needed to be scaled up and sustained 
 
Training needs to be available to ensure that staff skills are 
sufficient and practised.  
 
Ad hoc staff transfers are an endemic problem.  
 
Good and understood referral pathways are critical to ensuring 
women get appropriate care.  
 
 
